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           ABSTRACT 




December 16, 2014 
 
 
This dissertation is a critical intervention into the question of student agency. An 
interdisciplinary project that draws upon philosophy and linguistics, it reviews four major 
tendencies that have animated composition pedagogy over the last several decades—
process theory, social-constructivism, procedural rhetoric, and trans-lingual pedagogies—
and identifies some of the key tensions that both motivate and problematize these 
approaches. First, it examines the debate between Peter Elbow and David Bartholomae, 
and the interplay between teachers’ authority and student agency. Second, it explores the 
imbrications between representation and materiality in social constructivism. Third, it 
uses Alain Badiou’s Being and Event to analyze the tensions between (nominally) 
formulaic composition strategies and the elusiveness of kairos. Fourth, it investigates 
non-standard English dialects, Suresh Canagarajah’s concept of “code meshing,” and the 
competing conceptualizations of language as a static system, and as a dynamic, emergent 
process of sedimentation. Rather than attempting to resolve these tensions, my 
dissertation dramatizes them, painting a fuller, clearer picture of the contradictions that 
every classroom inhabits. In doing so, I do not privilege any single approach over the 
others. Instead, I call for a particular pedagogical disposition that can productively inform 
all of them: a resistance to closure, an openness to critical puzzlement, a negative 
capability that invites the rupture of rigid structures and schemas. With regard to 
composition studies more broadly, my dissertation dissects the key terms and 
	  iv	  	  
assumptions of the debates surrounding these pedagogical tendencies, forwarding a more 
nuanced theoretical platform on which they can transpire. Ultimately, my dissertation 
aims to inform pedagogical practice and curriculum development more generally, and 
lead to an enriched understanding of how student agency can vitalize the classroom. 
	  v	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INTRODUCTION 
Many, if not most, of the key terms that circulate through a given academic field’s 
scholarly conversation are ephemeral, emerging and fading in accordance with the 
fashions and trends du jour. Yet, each discipline also has key terms that remain 
cornerstones over long periods of time. Within rhetoric and composition studies, there is 
one term that, along with the field’s two titular terms, has proven to be truly foundational: 
pedagogy. It is heard around the coffee-bearing folding tables in the hallways of the 
major conferences, spoken in nearly every graduate seminar, printed on every other page 
of our major journals. Indeed, the term is almost as fundamental to our professional 
discourse as grammatical conjunctions and definite articles. With its combination of real-
world applicability and referential flexibility, it is impossible to conceive of 
contemporary rhetoric and composition existing without it. 
Yet, perhaps just as age-old proverbs and cliched commonplaces become so 
universalized within our daily informal discourse that we no longer bother to interrogate 
their origins and meanings—does anyone really know what it means to “make no bones 
about” something?—the tensions inherent in competing deployments of the concept of 
pedagogy, as elemental as they are for our field, are often represented in fuzzy ways. 
Indeed, as with so many things in life, its greatest advantage is also its biggest 
downfall—the flexibility that renders it so useful in so many different contexts also 
threatens to render it near-useless. It can mean virtually whatever one wants it to mean. 
The only referential constant is that there is always a teacher and student involved. Given 
the inevitable chasm between the meaning we intend when we speak the word and our 
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co-interlocutor’s interpretation of it, how can we possibly be using it with maximum 
productivity? 
In this project, I plan to delineate the tensions, contradictions, and overlaps 
between competing concepts of pedagogy within, and/or in reference to, four dominant 
pedagogical tendencies (or approaches) that have animated composition scholarship over 
the last several decades: the process approach, the social-constructivist approach, the 
procedural rhetorical approach, and the translingual approach. The goal is not to forward 
a stable, concise definition of each tendency—a task that is as impossible as it is 
undesirable, given the myriad contexts in which it is used and the inevitability of (and 
practical need for) its definitional shifts across time and context. Rather, I will attempt to 
provide a clearer and fuller illustration of these competing approaches throughout the 
history of the discipline, in all their kinetic complexity. I will also examine the 
philosophical, epistemological, and ontological assumptions that underlie these 
approaches. Ultimately, this project will aim to map the fraught and generative theoretical 
domains within which the term is used—and, furthermore, to limn the limitations and 
uses of competing definitions of the term in order to provide a richer description of the 
theoretical landscape in which we currently find ourselves, in all its problems and 
possibilities. 
Methodologically, this project will parallel books such Byron Hawk’s Counter-
History of Composition, which deconstructs the traditional view of rhetorical invention as 
a simple, dialectical interaction between a writer and a context, and supplants it with a 
complexity theory-informed representation of rhetors as situated within complex 
“affective ecologies” (224); and John Muckelbauer’s The Future of Invention, which 
	  	  	   3	  
relies on post-structuralist theory to demonstrate the difficulty of overcoming the 
Hegelian dialectic via writing. What these works, as well as my own project, have in 
common is that they are far more diagnostic than prescriptive, more of an unveiling of the 
mechanisms and tensions inherent in composition processes and pedagogy than an 
instruction manual on how to operate or obviate them. Furthermore, the tensions between 
the pedagogical approaches I examine and the theoretical and philosophical lenses 
through which I examine them mirrors the discordances intrinsic to the approaches; in 
other words, this project performatively portrays the same kinds of tensions that it intends 
to reveal. Ultimately, by applying theoretical frameworks exterior to mainstream 
composition studies to several dominant pedagogical approaches, I aim to reveal the 
dissonances and tensions immanent to those approaches, so as to reveal and trace the 
troubled contours of the ground on which the field now stands, and must proceed upon. 
Of course, each approach is highly variegated internally. For this reason, it is 
important to emphasize that I cannot, and do not intend to, embark on a project akin to 
that of Jorge Luis Borges’ cartographers, who draw a map so detailed and expansive that 
it blankets the entire earth. This project, then, will be necessarily reductive. The goal is to 
provide a richer account of the competing pedagogical perspectives, not a comprehensive 
one. A common thread links these perspectives: the representation of the classroom as a 
space where teachers and students engage in a dynamic relationship, in a transactional 
balance of powers and ideologies mediated through language. However, each approach 
posits dissimilar, if often overlapping, accounts as to what actually happens, and/or 
should happen, within these relationships. This project aims not only to theoretically 
describe each approach’s account, but to destabilize these assumptions that underlie these 
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approaches, and to demonstrate the ways in which the perspectives are subtly intertwined. 
Ultimately, through this de- or reconstructive move, I aim to paint a more elaborate and 
labyrinthine picture of the fissions, interactions, and contestations between and within the 
approaches, to cast a new light on the uncharted regions of the wilderness through which 
we must navigate. 
Because these pedagogical tendencies are byzantine in their intricacy and nuance, 
this project will deploy the concept of student agency as a connective thread that weaves 
the chapters together. The question of the extent to which students can become 
“rhetorical agents” is a cardinal concern for every classroom. Virtually every pedagogical 
outcome hinges on this question, be it the ability for students to be effective academic 
writers in other college courses, their capacity to communicate effectively in their late 
capitalist careers, or their maturation into active participants in democratic civil 
discourse. In dissecting the core theoretical assumptions within these dominant 
pedagogical approaches, this project aims to rethink and inform pedagogical practice, and 
lead to an enriched understanding of the possibilities and limitations of how student 
agency can vitalize the classroom. 
Cultural Studies (or Social Constructivist) Approach 
James Berlin, one of several scholars that spearheaded the cultural studies 
approach to pedagogy in the 1980s, impugned the process approach on the grounds that it 
failed to recognize the asymmetrical power structures that condition social relations in the 
classroom. Placing the “question of ideology at the center of the teaching of writing” 
(“Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class” 735), Berlin developed a theory of 
pedagogy, rooted in a Marxist epistemological model, that aimed to empower 
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marginalized students via the critique of the false consciousness wrought by the late 
capitalist mode of production, via “dialectical interaction engaging the material, the 
social, and the individual writer, with language as the agency of mediation” (730). 
The development of this approach coincided with a broader discursive turn within 
the humanities and social sciences—a turn that some contemporary theorists are 
beginning to challenge. In A New Philosophy of Society, Manuel Delanda draws on Gilles 
Deleuzes’ assemblage theory in order to theorize a realist theory of social ontology that 
cuts across the chasm between concrete materialism and social constructivism. Delanda 
and Berlin share similarly Marxist assumptions about the mutually constitutive nature of 
language and materialism—but only to a point. Delanda is more skeptical regarding the 
extent to which discourse can reshape the concrete universe, arguing that the sort of 
social constructivism with which Berlin is (partially) aligned lapses into dubiously tidy 
and totalizing essentialism. For Delanda, the assemblages of the social and material world 
(including classrooms) are shaped largely by non-linguistic forces—agents, that is, who 
are not manipulable via discourse.  
In terms of composition pedagogy, the tension between social constructivism and 
Delanda’s critique highlights an inevitable obstacle in the classroom: gauging the extent 
to which marginalized students can actually be “liberated” via critical discourse. Whether 
or not one is aligned with the specifics of Berlin’s Marxist method, few teachers would 
argue that teachers should not help students resist, through writing, the political forces 
that may oppress them. But the post-linguistic turn poses a troubling question: What 
forces are working to resist this form of resistance? Are these forces more obdurate than 
some scholars may assume? In this chapter, I plan to read Berlin’s arguments in light of 
	  	  	   6	  
Delanda’s, and to locate the limits of Berlin’s version of social constructivist resistance. 
The field of composition has long assumed, to varying extents, language’s ability to mold 
reality in marginalized students’ favor. This is forgivable to some degree; after all, words 
are the tools with which we work, and language does, in fact, play a role in political 
resistance, as the cultural and political influence of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s speeches 
attests. This chapter, however, will complicate this assumption, and offer a revised 
depiction of the politically charged milieu that our classrooms inhabit—one in which 
non-discursive forces restrict language’s power to resist and empower. 
Contemporary Classical and Procedural Rhetoric 
This chapter will examine the rhetorical, epistemological, and ontological  
implications of contemporary renderings of classical rhetoric, particularly through the 
lens of invention methods. A recently-revived cornerstone of rhetorical theory is the 
concept of kairos, which Kinneavy provisionally defines as “the right or opportune time 
to do something, or right measure in doing something” (Kinneavy, 58). Scholars such as 
Fahnestock and Secor apply this concept to composition pedagogy, arguing that a 
writer’s apprehension of kairos is paramount to persuasive efficacy. However, they also 
acknowledge the elusiveness of kairotic capture: “Because each rhetorical situation is 
unique, each occurs in a time and place that can’t be wholly anticipated or replicated;” a 
rhetor, then, must perpetually grope in the dark, for an approach that may be effective in 
one rhetorical context may not be generalizable to others (Crowley and Hawhee, 44). I 
plan to further explicate and problematize this dilemma by reading it in light of Alain 
Badiou’s Being and Event. For Badiou, an “event” is an abrupt intervention of “being,” 
which is exterior to language, into the established, ontologically-constructable order of 
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reality. In other words, the social order is ruptured by an “indiscernible” incident (e.g., as 
when the French Monarchy was riven by the French Revolution). According to Badiou, a 
subject can pledge “fidelity” to an event and integrate it into a reconfigured order of 
reality, but being itself remains eternally inarticulable: the subject can never gain direct 
access to being.  
When read as an attempt to assimilate an event into the current order, then, the 
uses and limitations of kairos can be be more fully accounted for theoretically: a 
successful apprehension of kairos may be not be capable of transmitting representations 
of a reality exterior to language, but it can productively refigure the constructable 
universe of language—and do so in light of forces exterior to linguistic representation. 
 Pedagogically speaking, this draws attention to a dimension of composition that remains 
under-acknowledged by procedural rhetoric proponents: the non-discursive forces that 
shape writing process.  Contemporary scholars outside the discipline—e.g., philosophers 
like Badiou, as well as psychologists—have questioned the extent to which mental acts, 
and by extension writing processes, are actually grounded in the discursive procedures 
that scholars such as Fulkerson have assumed, and have suggested that cognition is at the 
mercy of forces that it cannot control or even comprehend. This chapter will examine 
these forces, and in so doing, will illustrate the rift between rational writing processes and 
the inarticulable dynamics of the “being” that conditions them. 
Process Approach 
In his 1995 conversation with David Bartholomae, Peter Elbow argues that the 
roles of “writer” and “academic” conflict. In contrast to Bartholomae, who maintains that 
teachers need to emphasize students’ writing within conventional academic contexts in 
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order to gain literacy and empowerment with/against this dominant discourse, Elbow 
asserts that, while students’ appropriation of the role of academic is critically important, 
the role of the writer should nonetheless be privileged. For him, this means the classroom 
should be a space in which students come to “experience themselves as writers” (78) via 
free inquiry through writing. Inevitably, such inquiry can result in naive self-absorption, 
but as Elbow notes, such pride (and even arrogance), along with a counterbalancing dose 
of caution, is a quality possessed by anyone—including academics—who is confident 
enough to construct identities as “writers worth listening to.” Ultimately, in such a 
classroom, it is the students who take ownership of their writing, not the teacher to which 
they must write “up.” 
Jacques Rancière’s The Ignorant Schoolmaster, published in 1987 and translated 
to English in 1992, offers an analysis that both enriches and complicates this debate. 
 Rancière relates the story of Jacob Jacotot, an early 19th-century teacher who, after 
instructing a class of students who spoke a foreign language, found that they were able to 
comprehend and analyze difficult texts without any help from him. He later replicated 
this experiment, with similarly successful results, in courses on piano and painting (he 
was proficient in neither). The upshot of this, for Rancière, is that all intelligences should 
be presumed equal, and that academic achievement is rooted in students’ will rather than 
a master explicator’s expertise. This stands in sharp contrast to pedagogies informed by 
Bourdieu’s theories, who, even as they espouse “liberatory” pedagogical practices, 
nonetheless construct students as somehow inferior, unable to apprehend the teacher’s 
lofty and liberal social theories without their aid (for Rancière, this withholding of 
knowledge merely perpetuates the classroom’s asymmetrical power relations). 
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Rancière casts the Bartholomae-Elbow debate in a new light, elucidating a tension 
that exists in every composition course: the balance of power between teachers and 
students. While Elbow’s bottom-up, student-driven classroom parallels Jacotot’s in some 
senses, most of Elbow’s scholarship recognizes the practical reality of teacherly 
authority, albeit a reduced authority aimed at empowering students. Bartholomae’s 
insistence on the primacy of the teacher-academic echoes Bourdieu’s sociological 
theories, which Rancière criticizes, but as even Elbow acknowledges, the academy’s 
institutional demands require a certain level of teacherly dominance in the classroom—
and perhaps, given the brevity of a semester, even a certain amount of masterly 
explication for the sake of pedagogical expediency. By reading the problem of teacher vs. 
student authority in light of Rancière, I plan to problematize the political tensions that 
every classroom inhabits—not to provide easy answers to the conflict, but to dramatize 
the difficulty, if not impossibility, of circumventing it. 
Translingual Approach 
For the last several decades, the general trend in the composition classroom has 
been one of increased student diversity. Since the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement and 
financial aid for the poor (e.g., Pell Grants) have enabled more minority and working 
class students to enroll in college. Globalization has also ushered in a transformation of 
student demographics in classrooms across the United States, with the proportion of 
international students increasing each year. While this diversity is healthy for the 
academy’s intellectual ecology, it also presents challenges to the composition classroom. 
In response, a wealth of recent scholarship has grappled with the question of how we 
should attend to the increase of non-“standard” English dialects in the classroom. 
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This chapter focuses on one of the more dominant pedagogical models of today: 
code meshing. Code meshing involves the blending of multiple dialects within the same 
text; this practice aims to assert the validity of marginalized dialects and to reconstruct 
academic discourse as more inclusive and diverse, thereby investing disenfranchised 
students with a degree of rhetorical agency that they may not otherwise possess. 
Continuing this project’s effort to illustrate the tensions within dominant pedagogical 
approaches, this chapter complicates the concept of code meshing, demonstrating, for 
instance, that the validity of code-meshed texts is contingent, in part, on non-linguistic 
factors, e.g., the perceived social and/or economic status of the authors that produce 
them. This chapter also argues that nominally unified codes (e.g., “African-American 
English Vernacular” (AAVE) and “Standard English Vernacular” (SEV) are already 
internally heterogeneous, and that the very notion of code meshing is, at its core, 
reductive. This is not to say, however, that reductiveness is necessarily undesirable.  
Indeed, as this chapter argues, there is no way to not to speak of language(s) in reductive 
terms; this tension stems from the inherent complexity of languages, i.e., their status as 
dynamic, fluctuating, emergent, and interactive processes of sedimentation. Furthermore, 
reductive conceptions of language can have much practical use, given the need for 
solidarity in many forms of politically resistance (e.g., the Civil Rights Movement 
represented African-Americans as a nominally unified front, even though there is much 
internal diversity within the African-American community). Ultimately, this chapter aims 
to illuminate the tensions between what languages are; the terms we use to demarcate 
their porous, fluxing borders; and the cultural, economic, and political forces that shape 
the production and reception of academic discourse. 
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As anyone who has ever taught knows, translating pedagogical theory into 
practice is an exacting task. But as this project hopes to demonstrate, the practical 
dimensions of “pedagogy”—what actually happens within its transactions, and what 
possibilities these transactions offer—is equally as difficult to define. As scholarship 
from outside the discipline, as well as some under-acknowledged tendencies at work 
within the field, suggests, some of the core assumptions that ground our research and 
praxis—e.g., the extent to which language has the power to shape material reality; the 
tensions and plays of power between teachers and students; and the capacity of writing to 
enact political resistance—are, while not baseless, harbor complicating and limiting 
tensions. This is not to say that these goals are unachievable, or should not be pursued.  
They should be. But before we attempt to pursue them, it is imperative that we temper 
our enthusiasm with a dose of apprehension. Therefore, after justifying its method of 
mashing and interanimating dissonant texts and assumptions as a way to unveil the 
tensions that both problematize and enrich the critical conversation, this project will 
conclude by reflecting generally on the obstacles that confront and confound us, by 
stepping back and taking stock of the troubled territory we inhabit and are charged with 
pushing forth across. Again, I do not claim to provide easy prescriptions to these 
problems. Rather, like an explorer who loses his bearings and retraces his steps to an 
earlier location so as to reconsider his trajectory, I hope to reorient our pedagogical 
approach(es), rendering our conversations about them in sharper relief, and therefore 
helping them move forward more productively.  
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CHAPTER 1: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH 
The New Brutalist architecture of the University of Louisville’s (UofL) Bingham 
Humanities Building is at once marvelous, forbidding, intriguing, and disorienting: 
Overhanging slabs of raw concrete loom and jut in puzzling, kinetic angles; crisscrossing 
hallways meet, part, and terminate in dead ends. Bingham is the home of several 
academic departments: English, Philosophy, and the Foreign Languages. On the third 
floor lie the administrative and faculty offices; the lower two floors are primarily 
classrooms, which often host first-year composition courses. In several spots in the third 
floor hallway, concrete parapets open into wide, square shafts that descend to the lower 
floors. The building is situated centrally on the main campus. During the school year, on 
weekday mornings and afternoons, it teems with students and staff. In the evenings, the 
sidewalks are more quiet, walked by non-traditional students, as well as traditional 
students who work the notorious third shift at UPS. 
While UofL has developed into a Research 1 university replete with dormitories, 
its roots are as a commuter campus. This contradiction between its present and its past 
educational roles has rendered the school a site of intersection, harboring a panoply of 
students of different races, classes, and ethnicities—a panoply that mirrors the 
demographics of the city itself. Louisville has been called both the “Gateway to the 
South” and the “Gateway to the North,” and as such, the community—and the student 
body—represents a diverse, and sometimes frictional, patchwork of identities: 
cosmopolitan and rural; wealthy and working class; progressive and conservative; white, 
black, and a host of other hues. The UofL also draws students from all over the world, 
whose cultures mingle and elbow with and against those of the natives.  
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It is in this building that I often teach first-year composition. The unique qualities 
of Louisville, the city and campus, generate both richness and tension: The metro council 
is well-represented by African-Americans, but Louisville also erupted in race riots in 
1968, following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., the resonances of which still 
ring today in the much-neglected West End of the city. As a teacher, my mission is to 
both capitalize on the advantages of and resist the disadvantages of this diversity and 
tension, to help disenfranchised students negotiate the formidable power structures that 
often serve to further marginalize them, and the manifold insights of decades of 
composition scholarship are crucial intellectual tools for doing this. Within composition 
studies scholarship, a particularly dominant approach for accomplishing this has, for the 
last 20 years or so, been social-constructivist pedagogy, which draws on post-structuralist 
and post-modern theories in order to nurture pedagogical contexts in which students 
acquire agency, resisting and reshaping their own subjectivities within/against broader 
structures of power and ideology. 
In this chapter, I will examine some of the social-constructivist approaches that 
have prevailed over the last two decades. I aim to highlight both the uses and limitations 
of these approaches, and to paint a clearer picture of the possibilities for student 
empowerment they offer, as well as the practical obstacles they continue to face. More 
specifically, I will consider social-constructivist approaches in light of recent theories, 
such as Manuel De Landa’s, that signal what could be called a “post-linguistic turn” in 
contemporary philosophy—that is, “post” the linguistically-grounded post-modern and 
post-structuralist theories that gave birth to social-constructivist pedagogy. My reading of 
this post-modernism is that it, explicitly and implicitly, overstates the extent to which a 
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composition student might acquire “rhetorical agency” in a social-constructivist-oriented 
classroom. Furthermore, I will interrogate the teacher-student power relations implied in 
some versions of social-constructivist pedagogy, suggesting that these relations entail a 
rather dubious notion of student agency, and that this dubiousness stems, in part, from 
privileging a discourse-based model of critical resistance over the diversity of students’ 
local, embodied experiences. Language, rhetoric, and signifying practices in general 
certainly play significant roles in organizing the material and social dimensions of reality 
and society. They also play a role in our students’ acquisition of rhetorical agency. My 
goal is not to reject social constructivism; it has had, and continues to have, deep and 
important implications for pedagogical practice. The question I plan to address is: Have 
we placed so much emphasis on rhetorical representation that we have understated the 
material facts of existence that lay beneath it? Is social-constructivist pedagogy an 
opportunity for students’ rhetorical agency, or just another dreamful representation, 
unmoored from concrete reality? Or, put metaphorically: Is our project akin to throwing 
student essays at the Binghman Building’s confounding, fortress-like walls, and hoping 
that this siege will cause them to tumble or shift? 
For the sake of clarity and brevity, I will often conflate post-modern and post-
structuralist theories into a single term, “post-modern theory” or “post-modernism,” 
intended to denote the general effects of these traditions on composition studies. This 
simplification aside, however, these theories are hardly monolithic, having been 
articulated and rearticulated in manifold, and sometimes contradictory, ways over the last 
several decades. But several themes of particular interest to composition studies can be 
abstracted from this heterogeneity. Broadly speaking, post-modernist theory presents a 
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challenge to many of the most elemental assumptions underlying the Western intellectual 
tradition: the connections between words and things, the notion of the autonomous 
identity, and the viability of objective reason, just to name a prominent few. 
Objectivity—in the sciences, in philosophy, in criticism, in politics—had long been 
apotheosized, appropriately to an extent, as a sort of pure light that scorches away 
obfuscation and ignorance, a demystifying lens through which any perceptible 
phenomenon or concept can be understood. At risk of being reductive, post-modernism 
essentially—or anti-essentially, one could say—asked a question so basic, it might be 
judged as jejune if its impact on the intellectual foundations of the humanities had not 
been so calamitous and pullulating: What happens if we turn objective reason on itself—
or, as Jacques Derrida puts it, foreground the “impossibility of a principle of grounding to 
ground itself” (9)? How can we objectively assert that objectivity is, indeed, objective? 
How can we ascertain the validity of the scientific method by using scientific method? 
The repercussions of this simple query were the opposite of simple. Like the act of facing 
two mirrors squarely to each other, post-modern language theory opened up a bottomless 
space where representations collapse infinitely into themselves, a space that the 
humanities and social sciences are still scrambling to claw their way out of, or around, or 
through—or at the very least, to learn to reside comfortably within. 
That linguistic analyses spearheaded significant elements of the post-modern 
movement accounts for much of that movement’s interest to composition scholars. 
Jacques Derrida, drawing on the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, coined 
the neologism differánce, which describes how meanings are produced through 
differential relationships between words. In keeping with Derrida’s destabilization of 
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signification, differánce is a polyvalent word, irreducible to a single definition; it 
simultaneously means “to defer,” “to differ,” and “to disperse.” But put roughly, 
Derrida’s thesis is that a perpetual and uncontrollable “slippage” disrupts the connections 
between words and referents, and that meanings are thus generated through binary 
oppositions between words in a larger system of signification. There is no referential 
“presence” inherent in words, and we can only attempt to define words with other words, 
which themselves float upon a void, an absence. Meaning is thus perpetually deferred, 
scattered across differential networks of signifiers. From this local deconstruction of 
signification, Derrida deduces that the entire Western intellectual tradition relies on the 
dubious notion of “logocentrism,” a “metaphysics of presence” that assumes a referential 
stability that simply does not exist. In “The Principle of Reason: The University in the 
Eyes of Its Pupils,” Derrida explains this with the metaphor of the Cornell University 
campus, which is perched above a system of rivers, with bridges spanning the yawning 
voids beneath; in 1977, the university erected barriers to discourage students’ suicidal 
leaps off the bridges. For Derrida, the Enlightenment’s lofty rationalism is founded upon 
a similar “abyss,” but the language-bridges we build across it, as well as the barriers we 
erect to prevent us from peering over the edge, prevents us from recognizing the void 
upon which our discourse is precariously built. This is not to say that all communication 
is impossible; after all, Derrida gets his point across. But the abyss of uncertainty lurks 
beneath all of it, and we need to confront this, as well as our own confrontation of it. As 
he puts it: 
The time for reflection is also the chance for turning back on the very conditions 
of reflection, in all the senses of that word, as if with the help of a new optical 
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device one could finally see sight, could not only view the natural landscape, the 
city, the bridge and the abyss, but could view viewing. (p. 19) 
A key consequence of this irruption between words and reality is that knowledge, 
and our perception of reality, are not retrieved from some stable and objectively-
accessible exterior, but are constructed. Michel Foucault, another eminent Continental 
philosopher, examines this constructedness in terms of the power hierarchies that 
condition the formation and maintenance of social institutions throughout history. In 
books such as Discipline and Punish and Madness and Civilization, Foucault counters the 
portrayal of history as a logical, coherent improvement of the human condition, arguing 
instead that the social formations of the Age of Reason are more aptly characterized as 
ideologically-driven regimes of social control. In other words, rationality is used not 
simply as a means to arrive at cogent understandings of material and social reality and 
thereby improve them, but as a method to normalize dominant worldviews and 
marginalize alternative worldviews. Like Derrida, Foucault repudiates traditional 
representations of the Enlightenment, characterizing discourse, as expressed through 
social institutions, as arbitrary and fabricated—and going even farther in his efforts to 
expose the deeper implications of this constructedness. 
Also aligned with the post-modern disposition is Jean-Francois Lyotard, who 
critiques the cultural influence of totalizing “metanarratives”—of history, of capitalism, 
of socialism, of science, and of knowledge domains in general. For Lyotard, totalizing 
truth claims obscure and silence counter-narratives, and therefore offer an incomplete—
though dangerously satisfying—account of reality. For Lyotard, a central metanarrative 
of Western civilization involves the supposed triumph of reason over myth: scientific 
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objectivity peels away the mythical (e.g., religious) shrouds over reality and accesses 
indisputable truths. To return to the simple question discussed earlier, Lyotard asks how 
science, with its inherent inability to objectively examine its own method, can possibly 
know with certainty that this narrative is correct (and even if it could do this, this 
examination would have to be examined in the same way, and so on, ad infinitum). This 
metanarrative is therefore suspect for Lyotard. For him, objective data derived from 
rational inquiry are, in effect, representational. Like Derrida and Foucault, then, Lyotard 
suggests that reality cannot be separated from and analyzed in isolation to discursive 
constructions. 
Importantly, post-modern theory developed at, and out of, a time when the global 
political climate had veered sharply to the right. In the United States, the 1960s counter-
cultural left was deflated by a seemingly unending war in Vietnam, as well as the election 
of Richard Nixon in 1970. France, home to many of the post-modern theorists 
themselves, witnessed the quashing of the 1968 May Revolution by forces loyal to 
Charles De Gaulle. Even more significantly, the oil crises and economic “stagflation” that 
gripped the U.S. in the 1970s caused much anxiety within the middle class, who were not 
only concerned about the perpetuation of their white-collar status, but with the literacy 
education that they perceived as being a key facilitator of that status. And when 
recessions strike, and the middle class worries about education, it’s a pretty safe bet that 
they will soon fantasize about more traditional teaching practices that they associate with 
a better, bygone past (that Newsweek published “Why Johnny Can’t Write”—a 
denunciation of writing education’s perceived abandonment of the grammatical 
“basics”—during the economic stagflation of 1975 is probably not coincidental). With 
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regard to the field of composition studies—which was increasingly influenced by the 
innovative pedagogical practices of the likes of Peter Elbow and Donald Murray—this 
traditionalist tsunami was pedagogically troubling. With a widening rift between the 
affluent and working classes—a cause of deep worry for composition teachers in an era 
of open admissions—also came a call, enabled by the right’s persuading of the general 
public that a literacy crisis was afoot in American education, for a “back-to-basics” 
approach to teaching. As Lester Faigley puts it, the  
middle class believed that American education had veered off course and that a 
‘golden age’ of education had existed in the not-too-distant past. The list of 
villains proposed as causes for the literacy crisis…[included] too little grammar, 
too little homework, too much freedom, too little discipline, [and] too many 
electives. (62)  
In this view, the pedagogical prescription included, for instance, an emphasis on grammar 
correction. 
Progressive scholars such as Donald Murray and Peter Elbow bucked this 
rightward trend with the development of process pedagogy, which shifted emphasis from 
finished products—and the error-correcting red ink that was slathered upon them—to the 
recursive process of writing. But also around this time, the radical politics of Continental 
philosophy were crossing the Atlantic, and had begun to animate both the literary-critical 
and composition wings of English departments. In light of this, the process approach was 
viewed as an inadequate response for some of the more politically committed 
composition scholars. Superficially at least, early versions of process theory are 
comparatively reticent when it comes to questions of race, class, gender and ethnicity; the 
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strategies of brainstorming, drafting, and revising are commonly portrayed as more or 
less universal, color blind to the unique struggles of disenfranchised social groups. As 
Faigley puts it, this ostensible oversight led some critics to “accuse process advocates as 
accomplices in closing the doors of colleges to African-American, Hispanic, and other 
underrepresented minority groups” (68). This may be an unfair characterization for a 
couple of reasons. For one, Faigley adds that it “grossly overstates the power of writing 
teachers.” Second, a close reading of Elbow and other process theorists reveals a 
heightened awareness of social inequities. But in light of the political pressures of the 
Reagan era, some scholars, including Berlin, viewed it as a rather tepid retort to the rise 
of the politician- and media-endorsed pedagogical conservatism that ruled the headlines 
at the time. 
Berlin’s scholarly project blended pedagogical pragmatism with an unabashedly 
leftist agenda, an agenda that grew increasingly fervent as his career advanced. One of his 
early major articles, “Contemporary Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories,” is 
concerned primarily with the assumed interactions between discourse and truth within the 
dominant pedagogical paradigms of the time. With regard to process theory, Berlin holds 
that its “truth is conceived as the result of a private vision that must be constantly 
consulted in writing,” which for him is problematic in that it assumes (or, more 
accurately, he assumes that it assumes), that a stable core of foundational truth, an 
isolated fountain spewing Romantic genius, resides “within” all writers, and writing, and 
the truth it expresses, is a result of accessing this wellspring. But Berlin also lays the 
groundwork for a more politicized approach with what he calls “New Rhetoric,” which 
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holds that textual meanings arise “out of the interaction of the writer, language, reality, 
and the audience. Truths are operative only within a given universe of discourse” (266). 
Postmodern theory—with its insistence that meanings are not exterior to 
language, but contingent on and emergent from discursive context—heavily inflect 
Berlin’s argument for New Rhetoric. And as Berlin’s project progressed, he took a rather 
heterodox approach to Marx-influenced criticism, drawing on post-modern theory (e.g., 
in Rhetoric, Poetics, and Cultures) in an effort to develop what was, for him, a more truly 
liberatory and student-empowering pedagogy. For scholars like Berlin, a pedagogical 
approach that assumes the relative fixity of identity (rather pejoratively dubbed 
“Expressivism”), the tidiness of correspondence between word and thing (“Current-
Traditionalism”), and/or the rigidity of racial, gender, class, and ethnic categories would 
seem incapable of challenging the cultural and linguistic structures that disempower and 
marginalize students. Post-modern theory, on the other hand, opens up sites of potential 
contestation, sites of great interest and promise to scholars such as Berlin, who see in 
them an opportunity to reconstruct asymmetrical socio-political relations through 
rhetoric. Postmodern theory decenters identity—we are not autonomous, unified subjects, 
but are instead positioned contingently within a patchwork of ideologies and institutions, 
all of which are reinforced by shared symbolic practices and potentially ruptured by 
counter-practices. Because identities, cultures, and ideologies are unstable, they are also 
malleable. And since they are constructed with language, language can be used to 
compose subject positions that are politically engaged, empowered, and ultimately 
liberated. For Berlin, the possibility for rhetorical agency—and by extension social, 
political, and economic agency—lies in part in an awareness of this malleability. 
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While, as Berlin notes, some post-modernists see liberation in anti-
foundationalism as such—as a sort of playful free-for-all—social-constructivism is not, 
for him, a mere ludic game, a leisurely diversion for the educated bourgeoisie. Within 
this play of symbols, power expresses itself in Foucauldian social formations, arranging 
material reality in particular ways, some of which marginalize some students. So however 
much these signifying practices are based in representation, their effects are concrete, 
real. Oppressive ideologies, shaped by discourse, squelch students’ social power and limit 
their agency; for Berlin, this is a crucial oversight of the process approach, which he saw 
as placing so much emphasis on the agency of  “individual student writer and her pen” 
that it neglected the broader, more nefarious ideological structures that surreptitiously 
squelch her agency. For social constructivists, then, concrete reality can be grappled with 
via rhetoric—and, more specifically, via a writing classroom guided by a presumably 
false consciousness-free instructor who can help students learn to challenge the 
ideologies that impede them.  
Before proceeding, however, it is important to acknowledge that Berlin’s 
theoretical and pedagogical scope stretches beyond postmodern theories of language. 
Again, under Berlin’s version of social-constructivist pedagogy, writing is not done for 
its own sake as a playful toying with a linguistic bricolage. Rather, writing is viewed in 
terms of its interaction with reality: students wield resistant rhetoric as a means to contest 
and reconstitute the material conditions of their existence. For Berlin, this method of this 
contestation lies squarely within a Marxian epistemological model: Through resistant 
writing, students unveil the “false consciousness… and the absence of democratic 
practices in all aspects of experience” wrought by late capitalism (733). And with this 
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critical agency comes student “empowerment” or “liberation,” Berlin’s definition of 
which is perhaps most clearly articulated in “Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing 
Class:” 
Self-autonomy and self-fulfillment are thus possible… through resisting those 
social influences that alienate and disempower, doing so, moreover, in and 
through social activity… The liberatory classroom begins this resistance process 
with a dialogue that inspires [a democratic social order in the classroom]… 
Teacher and student work together to shape the content of the liberatory 
classroom. (734) 
Echoes of Paulo Freire, the influential synthesizer of Marxian and pedagogical theory, are 
evident here, as Berlin acknowledges. Later in this essay, then, I will also examine 
Berlin’s postmodernist and (Freirean) Marxian tendencies in tandem, and attempt to 
identify some of the strengths and limitations of Berlin’s use of postmodern language 
theory as a means for students’ liberation/agency in contexts of materiality. I will also 
analyze the overlaps and schisms with and between Berlin’s and Freire’s models of 
politicized pedagogy. It is also important to note that the Continental philosophers 
discussed above also tend to be invested in questions of Marxian materialism. But as I 
will demonstrate later, Foucault’s conception of the interaction between language and 
reality is quite different from Berlin’s—and even, as I hope to show, lies in tension with 
Berlin’s conception of it. 
Berlin translates the implications of post-modern theory into a utopian vision of a 
democratic classroom, one that operates on dialectical examinations of difference. In a 
nod toward individual student agency that seems somewhat at odds with his critique of 
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process pedagogy, Berlin, in his Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures, states that in first-year 
composition courses, he  
explain[s] at the outset that the class will participate in disagreement and conflict 
in open, free, and democracy, [and] student are asked to draw up a set of rules to 
govern members in their relations to each other... [and compose] a statement of 
rights to protect minority positions. (104)   
In other words, a liberatory classroom is achieved by having students, led by a 
ideologically self-conscious teacher, study how language mediates ideology, and then 
identify and critique the gaps, overlaps, fissures, and frictions that simmer within the 
classroom. For Berlin, if we can identify the rhetorical practices that shape our 
ideologies, our ideologies’ imbrications and dissonances with/against other ideologies, 
and locate the political forces that that flex and fluctuate across these boundaries (as 
Foucault notes, balances of power are differentially mediated, emerging through shifting, 
local relations), we can help marginalized students empower themselves, help them 
create identities as citizen-rhetors, and help them become critically empowered agents. 
While Berlin is an exceptionally prominent exemplar of this approach, numerous 
social-constructivists of the 1980s and 90s advocated similar critical pedagogies, such as 
Patricia Bizzell, who wants students to “know more of their own and others’ cultural 
histories in order to be effective participants in a multicultural democracy” (“The 
Prospect of Rhetorical Agency,” 41); Lester Faigley, who sees in Lyotard’s concept of 
the differend a “an argument for locating ethics within a postmodern pedagogy” (236); 
and John Trimbur, whose notion of democratic consensus-building (or at least the 
striving for it) in the classroom “offers students utopian aspirations to transform the 
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conversation by freeing it from the prevailing constraints on its participants, the 
manipulations, deceptions, and plays of power” (476). And while composition studies has 
been anything but static since the advent of the social-constructivism, the approach 
continues to inflect the scholarly conversation, coloring, shaping, and underpinning an 
array of liberatory, cultural-critical pedagogies. One notable example of this tendency is 
the embrace of service learning as a transformative practice, as well as the idea of “code-
meshing,” a well-grounded and propitious strategy for helping ESL students acquire 
English, but one which, as I will show later, has nonetheless infused some scholarship 
with faulty liberatory social-constructivist assumptions. 
The threads that interweave these practices lead to a definition of pedagogy that, 
above all, hinges on the primacy of language, on the assumption that rhetorical agents can 
use words to shape the world. Post-modern theory stands as a corrective to an earlier, less 
liberating era, when students were boxed into inflexible identities, teachers dispensed 
knowledge unilaterally like ATM machines, and society’s distributions of power were as 
intransigent as steel beams supporting a corporate skyscraper. Once composition, as 
Berlin puts it, “placed the question of ideology at the center of the teaching of writing” 
(“Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class” 735), the signifying practices that, in their 
broadest scope, catapulted white males through four-year colleges and consigned 
African-American women to housing projects by the railroad tracks could, at last, be 
interrogated, challenged, contested, and altered. Students can therefore reconstitute 
and/or empower their own subjectivities, as well as the linguistically-comprised 
institutions they must negotiate and find success within.  
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Upward socio-economic mobility catalyzed by writing education may be one 
desired consequence of social-constructivist empowerment, but it is not merely about 
financial gains. “Liberation” can also be interpreted, for instance, as a validation of one’s 
cultural or ethnic heritage, which is seen as positive in and of itself. To paraphrase Berlin, 
this empowerment emerges from a self-critical, dialectical interaction between the rhetor, 
the discourse community, and material conditions of existence. However, this 
empowerment will not always be achieved universally and without difficulty.  Like a 
Platonic ideal, the notion of critical empowerment functions more like an asymptotic 
limit than a palpable destination, an impetus for an activism that, if not validated by its 
(in)ability to reach the promised land, is distinguished by its forward progress, or at least 
a striving for progress, however incremental. And undoubtedly, it can work: If nothing 
else, many students of marginal subject positions have landed tenure-track jobs by 
capitalizing on post-modern theory, and many more have surely found sorely-needed 
validations of their own ethnic histories. So there are some compelling reasons why the 
echoes of the linguistic turn are still, and should be, continuing down an indefinitely long 
and winding road. 
Yet, when I swing open the ponderous metal doors of the Bingham Humanities 
Building and walk through its vexing hallways to teach first-year composition, I wonder 
about the limits of language as a sculptor of material existence. The African-American 
achievement gap, for instance, persists at colleges and universities across the nation 
(Spenner, et al.).  First-generation college students, in my classroom and others, often 
struggle with the conventions of the academy, as well as with the tensions and frictions 
between academic discourse and the discourses of their home communities. It would be 
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glaringly unfair to blame these inequalities on first-year composition teachers. But given 
that post-modern, social-constructivist theories have long permeated, if not dominated, 
departments of humanities and social sciences, the question can be fairly asked: What are 
the limitations of the social-constructivist pedagogical approach, and what out of what 
tensions do these limitations develop? As suggested above, there are undoubtedly many 
individual cases of students who have been empowered, in some sense or another, by the 
illuminations of Judith Butler and Julia Kristeva. But given the fact that College 
Republican organizations (and the white, wealthy, male status quo they tend to defend) 
seem to be as thriving today as they have in the pre-post-modern past, one may be 
forgiven for suspecting that many minds are not being changed by these pedagogies. 
Furthermore, if a teacher asks her class what their goals in college are, chances are, “to 
get a high-paying job” will be mentioned, to put it lightly, more than a few times. And 
even if an occasional student states that his goal is to, say, further legitimize his ethnic 
background within mainstream public or academic discourse, it is not at all clear that this 
localized liberation would not have occurred even if his English class were informed by 
Cleanth Brooks’ literary theories. After all, Frederick Douglass empowered his subject 
position long before a coterie of French philosophers started debating the nature of 
postmodern subjectivity. 
Just a few minutes south of UofL, just off an exit ramp on Interstate 65, the 
conveyor belts at the sprawling UPS WorldPort hum 24-7. The United Parcel Service 
pays its employees’ college tuition, which is tremendously helpful for working class 
students, but the common mandate that they must work the third shift draws attention to 
the struggles they face compared to a wealthy student whose trust fund pays for his 
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schooling. About an hour east of campus lies the city of Frankfort, the state capital, which 
features a largely white male population of perennial slashers of post-secondary 
education funding; UofL has had its state funding cut 11 times in the last 11 years.  And 
in the mid-2000s, for the first time since UofL joined the state college system in 1970, 
student tuition bore a larger brunt of the school’s budget than did state funding. Five 
hundred miles or so northeast of Frankfort lies our nation’s capital, Washington, D.C., 
where a Republican-dominated House of Representatives now aggressively opposes any 
motions to increase federal education funding, or to provide assistance to near-bankrupt 
states that, due in part to their near-bankruptcy, perennially slash post-secondary 
education funding. These budget decisions take place in the rarefied marble hallways of 
state buildings. And like this dissertation, and like my students’ essays, these budget 
decisions are constructed with language: textuality as means toward political agency. But 
the words that comprise the text of the U.S. national budget represent an exertion of 
power far more colossal than anything my words will likely ever know; and the material 
and social formations that separate my words’ power potential from that of a Senators’ 
are, in many ways, just as adamant as the raw concrete of the Bingham Building; perhaps 
a state legislator or university president could heave those slabs, but not me, nor my 
students. 
The question, then, is this: In the wake of the linguistic turn within the 
humanities, and the degree of primacy to which it accords language, what are the tensions 
that we continue to inhabit, particularly within the context of the composition classroom? 
Composition teachers naturally place much emphasis on the potential for language to 
empower. After all, words are the tools of our work. They represent, mediate, and 
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embody what we do; our experiences as scholars and teachers are steeped in linguistic 
representation. But it is instructive to reconsider this world of language, which we both 
inscribe and inhabit, in light of confounding forces of material existence. Social-
constructivist theory is a very effective tool for literary scholars that need only critique 
literary representations, but when it comes to the challenge of improving real-word 
students’ lives, what additional obstacles must it contend with? Social constructions are, 
at best, only half the battle; words and reality overlap, but to state the obvious, I can’t 
change the channel by talking to the TV, or repair my softball teammates’ battered limbs 
with an argument for the social-constructedness of hamstring injuries. Not of language 
itself, perhaps, but of its place within the larger ensemble of bodies, universities, 
classrooms, cities, states, nations, and all the wood, concrete, oil, grass, pigment, carbon, 
insects, etc. that interact—sometimes obediently, sometimes stubbornly—with those 
representations. I do not claim to know where the limits of language lie. It is nearly 
impossible to say, if only because we can only use that very (limited) language to say it. 
But it’s important that we acknowledge the existence of that limit on a routine basis.  
This metaphor relies on a reductive binary; as I have tried to emphasize, there are 
probably cases in which social-constructivist pedagogies yield measurably positive 
results in individual situations. The question is one of balances, of proportions, of spectral 
gradations between the purely material and purely symbolic. And I wish to suggest that 
our assumptions are skewed unrealistically towards the symbolic. To use yet another 
metaphor: The power of positive thinking (in words) has been shown to improve cancer 
prognoses. But there is a limit to its powers. No amount of signifying practices will 
stymie the malignant growth of stage-four pancreatic cancer. Similarly, a working class 
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African-American woman may improve her financial prospects by attending college and 
compellingly meshing her “home” vernacular with academic discourse. But the material 
conditions that confront her are formidable; this is perhaps why, as Lisa Delpit recounts, 
a teacher of a group of African-American veterans who encouraged the veterans to find 
their “own, unique voice” was met with intense opposition from the students, who 
demanded that they be “taught grammar, punctuation, and ‘Standard English’” (161). 
They didn’t want to resist the bogeyman of progressive pedagogical politics; they wanted 
to emulate him. I have never met these men, but I would not be shocked if some of them 
have spent their lives using their “own, special vernacular voice,” only to be met with the 
disparagement or disdain of the ruling classes, which is precisely why they enrolled in the 
course in the first place. Someone, or something, out there suggested to them that 
“dialectal diversity” is not always viewed as a valuable, agency-investing asset in 
American society. They don’t need a college professor to tell them that they don’t 
fluently speak the language of the dominant socio-economic elite; they’ve been 
struggling with and lamenting this fact for years. 
In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault’s analysis of state-
mandated discipline, enforced through imprisonment in a panopticons, indirectly 
illustrates student rhetors’ productive limitations. The codification of behavior in prisons, 
such as strictly regimented exercise routines (again, presumably inscribed in paper or, in 
contemporary times, electronic documents), make “possible the meticulous control of the 
operations of the body, which assure[s] the constant subjection of its forces and impos[es] 
on them a relation of docility-utility” (Discipline and Punish, 137). This is not to say that 
prisoners in the Panopticon were entirely powerless; because the central watchman could 
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observe the entire prison clandestinely, “there were bars, no more chains, no more heavy 
locks” (202). And indeed, along with the subjection of the body, soul, and subject itself 
comes resistance and the exertion of power; as in the case of military regimentation, 
“discipline increases the skills of each individual, coordinates these skills, accelerates 
movements,” (202). However, this power can only be exercised in certain, circumscribed 
ways. A prisoner is not free to simply walk out of the Panopticon. One must be careful 
not to overstate the similarities between a Panopticon inmate and a disenfranchised 
minority student, but the plight of the typical American ghetto—a lack of social mobility, 
a dearth of material and economic resources, police harassment that routinely and 
disproportionately targets African-Americans and Hispanics—stands as an analogue of 
the Panopticon’s walls. A marginalized student can resist them with an essay in a critical 
pedagogy course, but the walls will keep pushing back.  
Foucault was also skeptical of Marxian resistance in general. For him, the events 
in Paris in 1968 called into question “the equation Marxism = the revolutionary process, 
an equation that constituted a kind of dogma” (qtd in Young, 12).  His leeriness lies in 
what he sees as Marxism’s totalizing portrayal of history as a simple, base vs. 
superstructure binary. As Michael Poster points out in “Foucault, the Present, and 
History,” Marx tends to universalize working class suffering and separate labor from 
other, “superstructural… domains of practice,” which has the effect of “totalizing the 
historical field [and introducing] a form of domination at the level of theory [that] works 
against the very interests of the emancipation it claims to promote” (112). I will not delve 
here into Berlin’s pedagogy’s relationship with Foucault’s depiction of the pitfalls of 
Marxian resistance in late-1960s France. But Foucault’s discontent—that Marxian 
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discourse is often too totalizing, blunt and insensitive to the more complex problematics 
of social and material reality—is, also, echoed by a key trend in contemporary 
Continental philosophy, the same intellectual tradition that sparked the linguistic turn in 
composition studies.  
Representatives of this trend challenge the view that language use can be 
privileged over the concrete facts of existence (in the case of Marxism, this could be 
considered the reductiveness of Marxian theory/discourse in the face of reality). One 
scholar who is aligned with this perspective is Manuel DeLanda, whose A New 
Philosophy of Society seeks to develop a theory of interanimating material and social 
structures, or “assemblages,” that contrast with essentializing, “Hegelian totalities” (5). 
 For DeLanda, a shortcoming of some versions of “social realism—of which, as I will 
show shortly, social-constructivism is an example—is “an ontological commitment to the 
existence of essences” that “form a seamless whole” (5). 
That social-constructivist pedagogies could be characterized as “essentializing 
totalities” may seem to be a dubious, if not outright fallacious, claim. After all, one of the 
most noteworthy features of post-structuralism is its relentless railing against 
essentializing totalities. And I want to emphasize that my appropriation of DeLanda’s 
philosophy here is qualified and non-categorical. I aim to read his theories in light of 
some of the practical difficulties that composition studies currently inhabits, and to wring 
practical insights from the dissonances between each framework: to mash DeLanda’s 
texts against Berlin’s in an effort to illustrate the tensions at work in the classroom. 
DeLanda critiques strains of social science that reject realism (16). Some social 
scientists, he contends, dismiss the notion that social entities “have an enduring and 
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mind-independent identity,” which, for them, would lead logically to the conclusion that 
social entities have stable essences. Strict social-constructivist perspectives can be read as 
aligned with this position, in that as they reject the idea that material existence is 
isolatable from subjectivity: because concrete reality is inevitably filtered, distorted, and 
colored by the perceptual lenses through which it is observed, realist ontology naively 
ignores the ideological determinants of all social analyses. This blind spot is a cause of 
great concern for social-constructivism, since it threatens to legitimize “realist” 
representations of existence that are, in actuality, ideologically (and arbitrarily) biased. A 
scientific analogue of this line of thought can be found in biologist Richard Lewontin’s 
and paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould’s repudiations of biological determinism. Gould, 
for instance, refuted 19th century craniometric (skull-measuring) analyses of racial 
intelligence, which supposedly proved that the African-American race’s “inferior” 
intelligence could be attributed to its comparatively pint-sized cranial capacities, which 
were described as hereditary. In The Mismeasure of Man, Gould’s scrutiny of these 
studies, however, found that racial prejudice played a much greater role in producing the 
results than did objective—that is, realist—scientific work.1 
In this view, then, any analysis of material existence must be qualified by the 
recognition that our perceptions of reality are skewed by our own ideologically and 
socially constructed predispositions. Neither an essentialist notion of material existence, 
nor general taxonomic categories that are detached from this existence (and which are 
therefore essentializing), are sufficient in social analysis. This realization, of course, is 
one of the (anti)foundational axioms of post-modern and post-structuralist theories, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Oddly enough, just a couple days after writing this, I read in the NY Times that Gould’s analysis 
is also guilty of confirmation bias, and perhaps even more so than the racist analysis.  So I guess Gould 
proved his point even more than he meant to.	  
	  	  	   34	  
Berlin emphasizes the point consistently.  But as DeLanda points out, such an attempt to 
escape ontological essentialism can lead to a different incarnation of the same nemesis: 
“social essentialism.” Social essentialism occurs when anti-realist epistemologies reify 
the theoretical structures that they rely on to organize reality. With regard to social-
constructivist approaches to composition, such structures are linguistic: If we assume, as 
some interpreters of Derrida and others might, that language does not provide transparent 
access to, or representation of, material existence, then we are “essentially” mired in a 
shifting, free-playing web of signifiers. And if this is the case, then we have just 
hypostasized language into a sort of essentialist representation. As DeLanda puts it: 
 [General] categories do not refer to anything in the real world and to believe that 
they do (i.e., to reify them) leads directly to essentialism.  Social constructivism is 
supposed to be an antidote to this, in the sense that by showing that general 
categories are mere stereotypes it blocks the move towards their reification.  But 
by coupling the idea that perception is intrinsically linguistic with the ontological 
assumption that only the contents of experience really exist, this position leads 
directly to a form of social essentialism. (44) 
So for DeLanda, the idea that reality can be described in terms of competing ideological 
biases is just as reductive as the notion that it can be described objectively, or purely 
abstractly. DeLanda’s corrective to this is an elaboration on Deleuze’s “assemblage 
theory,” which contrasts with essentialist social ontologies insofar as it aims to avoid 
imposing reified, top-down symbolic schemas onto complex historical and material 
processes. Assemblages are comprised of historically-contingent ensembles of symbolic 
and organic (material) properties, which interact in different ways depending on the 
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historical processes that (re)configure them. Because these properties are emergent and 
can interact in manifold ways, the assemblages that arise from their interactions are 
unstable, and therefore non-essentialist. One way to describe the provisional systems that 
emerge from an assemblage’s interacting parts is consider how the same genetic protein 
that creates a hand in a human can also create a paw in a ocelot: the phenotype depends 
on networks of relationships, and not on the essential functions of parts that synthesize 
essential wholes. DeLanda’s reading of Deleuze thus aims to destabilize and de-totalize 
(in the Hegelian sense) social-constructivist ontology by embedding it within concrete, 
contingent organic processes. 
While DeLanda’s analysis is useful in describing the limitations of social-
constructivism, it only takes us so far. Berlin, again, is careful (to an extent) to avoid 
reducing social-constructivism to reified word games, dissociated from the organic 
processes that DeLanda emphasizes. For instance, in his Rhetoric, Poetics and Cultures, 
Berlin cites Cornel West’s rejection of a “postmodern epistemological skepticism 
sometimes found in Baudrillard, a proposal that argues for the complete abandonment of 
any concern for the non-discursive” (72). For West, African-Americans have a “strong 
sense” of the material facts of their blackness and socio-economic disenfranchisement—a 
rock-hard reality that “upper-middle class Americans” cannot know, and which their 
reduction of discourse to mere free-floating signifiers therefore fails to recognize. Berlin 
also, drawing on Freire, “acknowledges that the concrete material and social conditions 
of our experience shape and limit us” (98). In other words, he recognizes that the 
stubbornly materialist properties of race, class, gender, etc. are as real as the laptop 
keyboard I type this upon (a keyboard which many of the marginalized individuals of 
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which I am typing about cannot afford to buy). So Berlin, like DeLanda, sees that social-
constructivist critical discourse cannot be wholly severed from material existence. In 
these passages at least, Berlin actually lays an inchoate foundation for DeLanda’s 
critique. 
But just because Berlin does not fit neatly into DeLanda’s rather straw man-esque 
depiction of social-constructivism does not mean that DeLanda fails offer a useful 
critique here. While DeLanda’s arguments are, to some extent, based on rigid binaries 
between social-constructivism and assemblage theory, my project here is not to reproduce 
or reinforce those binaries. The operative concept here is that of a spectrum: While Berlin 
may not be the relentless essentializer described by DeLanda, DeLanda’s critique still 
holds to the extent that it describes tensions inherent in any critical pedagogy-oriented 
classroom.   
A recurring tendency in Berlin is that, whenever he acknowledges the limitations 
of a liberation-through-language approach to pedagogy, he often follows that 
acknowledgement with a “However,” with a “But still...”. For instance, immediately 
following Freire’s quoted skepticism, Berlin downplays that quote’s significance: 
“[Freire] sees in the mediating power of language, however, the possibility for the change 
and transformation of these [concrete material and social] conditions” (98). Discourse, 
Berlin contends, can be used as a means of control and domination, defining individuals 
as “helpless ciphers,” but it can also form “narratives that enable democratic participation 
in creating a more equitable distribution of the necessities, liberties, and pleasures of 
life”; on this last point, Berlin laments that critical pedagogy in the United States has 
“failed” with regard to this “moment of democratic politics” (98). 
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Political oppression and liberation, in other words, are enacted and reinforced by 
language, at least in part. The American Revolution was about more than musket balls; it 
was also about words, about a redefinition of a citizenry from “royal subjects” to 
“participants in a representative democracy.” The “however” that follows Berlin’s 
acknowledgement of the difficulties of political liberation can, however, be turned right 
back on itself: The American Revolution was about more than words; it was also very 
much about the Redcoats’ musket balls, about obstinate material forces and properties 
that resist our rhetorical intentions. Berlin couches his explanation for critical pedagogy’s 
“failure” in discourse-centric language—i.e., the privileging of a “white male subject” in 
“naïve and simplistic terms”—and undoubtedly, it would difficult to effect political 
change without effecting the right discursive change; integral to the feminist and Civil 
Rights movements was the rejection of labels like “weaker sex” and “the n-word.” But as 
DeLanda’s critique illustrates, and as Berlin recognizes elsewhere, discourse is only one 
element within a broader assemblage of forces with which we must contend. 
Furthermore, revolution does not necessarily lead to liberation. One of Freire’s 
pedagogy’s central points of emphasis is that, for any revolutionary pedagogy (and for 
Freire, all revolutions are inherently pedagogical), there must be a full awareness of—
and, presumably, a mechanism to deal with—the fact that, once “liberated,” the 
oppressed simply transform into the oppressors: 
Even revolution, which transforms a concrete situation of oppression by 
establishing the process of liberation, must confront this phenomenon. Many of 
the oppressed who directly or indirectly participate in revolution intend - 
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conditioned by the myths of the old order - to make it their private revolution. The 
shadow of their former oppressor is still cast over them. (46) 
One need not delve too deeply into the history books, or even read the news very 
religiously, to see the evidence of such inversions of power asymmetry. The political 
struggles of the Middle East for the last several decades instantiate this argument: 
relatively secular monarchies oppressing Islamic sects (pre-1979 Iran), who in turn stage 
a successful revolution and oppress the secular populations (Iran’s 1979 revolution), who 
in turn challenged the established theocratic order (the squelched, but still volatile, 
Iranian protests of 2010-11). The upshot to this is that “liberation” can lead to undesirable 
situations. One wonders how Berlin would respond if a minority-dominated classroom 
democratically agreed to silence any student who begged to differ with such a student-
driven classroom, or whether a social-constructivist teacher’s insistence on democratic 
dialogue doesn’t, in itself, represent yet another unilateral imposition of ideology upon a 
pluralistic group. It is worth adding, too, that the traces of Marxism—which, as 
mentioned earlier, Foucault reads as a kind of dogmatic blunt instrument—that tend to 
inflect social-constructivist theories add yet another layer of essentialism to the equation. 
Even if Marxism were the only non-oppressive political position, it’s nonetheless true 
that the teacher would be assimilating students into this prescribed perspective. To what 
extent could we truly call this an empowerment of students’ embodied responses and 
experiences? 
Berlin notes, repeatedly, that post-modernism can easily deteriorate into useless 
relativism. And if this deterioration occurs, then one would have no more ground to stand 
on when arguing for multiculturalism than one would have when advocated white 
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supremacy. Berlin’s idea, or ideal, of the classroom democratic dialogue—“dialogue” 
being a key concept for Freire as well—seems to be a response to this predicament. But 
this leads to the obvious question of how, exactly, democratic dialogue alone would sway 
student perspectives that run counter to ideals of postmodern, multiculturalist dialogue. 
Ultimately, this dilemma represents yet another limitation of social-constructivism’s 
essentialist, language = liberatation assumption: language alone does not determine, 
shape, or entrench any ideology. Language may contribute to an ideology’s 
reinforcement, but ideology is also beholden to many non-discursive factors, such as 
race, class and gender (the experience of being white/male/wealthy is fundamentally 
different than that of being black/female/poor, and ideology will be shaped accordingly). 
If dialogue alone were a sufficient liberal response to conservative culture, then one 
would think that the internet age, as polarizing as the blogosphere is, might have 
contributed to at least a modicum of mutual understanding. After all, a cyberspace 
voyager would seem to be much more likely to stumble upon and engage with an 
opposing viewpoint than is, say, a person who receives all of their news from a 
politically-slanted local newspaper. Yet as even a casual political observer knows, 
contemporary politics has not become any more civil in the internet age, or any more 
sympathetic to the Marxian tendencies that Berlin and others advocate. 
Democratic discourse, then, faces numerous obstacles in unveiling the false 
consciousness that Berlin sees as pervading the composition classroom, and the tension 
between these forces arises, in part, from social-constructivist frameworks’ tendencies 
toward linguistic essentialism. It is true, as noted earlier, that linguistic change is an 
integral component of social change, but it is only one component. Just as no amount of 
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well-composed first-year essays can move the concrete slabs in the Bingham Building, no 
amount of words, however well-directed the barrage, can alter the hard material facts of 
the classroom: the students and teachers themselves, their bodies and skin colors, the 
infinitely rich and complex diversity of their consciousnesses of their own personal 
experiences and histories. Words may change the way we talk about these facts—one of 
the seeds of revolution—but the facts will remain in tension with our words. In A 
Counter-History of Composition, Byron Hawk argues that an understanding of situated 
embodiment is essential to our understanding of the dynamic forces immanent to the 
classroom. As he states, “For [Berlin’s] pedagogy to work, rationality has to overcome 
the historical and cultural position of the students and their irrational desires.  But he does 
not take into account the fact that justice is also situational, and, yes, irrational” (80). For 
Hawk, local historical, experiential and biological-material factors, such as maleness 
(which is not only a discursive “subject position,” but an inescapable physiological and 
psychological fact), can disrupt Berlin’s pedagogy by rendering students resistant to 
teacher-led (or teacher-imposed) rational change. The stubborn facts of race, class, and 
gender across time and space are rooted in situated, material, bodily, and local contexts—
contexts that are complex and unpredictable, and stand as a natural resistance to the 
efficacy of rhetoric—especially in such a short span of time (a semester or two) and with 
such young students. As a result, as Hawk recognizes, “teachers cannot predict the 
outcomes of their pedagogy any more than historiographers can predict history” (80). 
Of course, Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures was first published in 1996, so it is 
unfair, to an extent, to lump all of the extensions, revisions, and permutations of social-
constructivist pedagogy under a single Berlinian umbrella. But only to an extent. For the 
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same essential(izing) tendencies that can be found in Berlin also permeate contemporary 
incarnations of liberatory pedagogies. At this time, among the more talked about 
liberation-through-language pedagogies is the concept of “code-meshing.” Developed by 
Suresh Canagarajah, code-meshing asks students who are not literate in the dominant 
conventions of English, especially academic English, to blend their “home” discourses 
with “standard” academic English in their writing.   
Two interrelated trends can be identified within code-meshing research. On the 
one hand, as Canagarajah argues in “Multilingual Strategies of Negotiating English,” a 
rigorous empirical analysis language second-language (or third-, or fourth-) acquisition, 
code-meshing provides a means to “explore how multilinguals’ modes of negotiating 
English in conversational encounters may [help] explain the strategies they adopt in 
writing” (17). By studying code-meshing practices that are already operant in student 
writing, as opposed to conjuring a code-meshing pedagogy out of thin theoretical air, 
Canagarajah systematizes many of the same strategies that ESL students deploy 
instinctively in literacy acquisition, and aims to cultivate these skills in students. 
Canagarajah hastens to add that code-meshing is in its theoretical infancy, and creates as 
many questions as it does answers. But he also demonstrates that the strategy is integral 
to ESL learning, so the translation of this innate tendency into a general pedagogical 
model stands as a promising method for helping students become literate in academic 
discourse—and, by extension, acquire rhetorical and social agency within that discourse.  
Code-meshing scholarship often hones its focus on notions of liberation along the 
lines of Berlin’s. In these cases, the goal is not merely to help students learn English, as 
they see depoliticized pedagogy as a fantasy, which it is to a great extent. So in addition, 
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they also seek to contest the structures of discourse and power that enforce the dominance 
of “standard” English. If students are encouraged to blend marginalized and dominant 
mainstream discourses, the argument goes, they then have an opportunity to refigure each 
discourse in terms of the other, thereby destabilizing the asymmetrical power balance 
between them, at once demystifying the tacit status of “Standard English” (a problematic 
term in and of itself, given the heterogeneity and mutability of any “single” language) as 
superior, and validating the alternative discourse by virtue of its presence in an academic 
text.  Canagarajah rushes up against this more radical perspective when he asserts that 
“autonomous literacy [must not remain] unchallenged” (45).  But a more obvious 
example of this argument can be found in Vershawn Young’s “Nah, We Straight,” which 
discusses the issues of code-meshing more politically-charged terms. Young views code-
meshing as a potential way to not only help students learn to write, but to combat racist 
monolingualism in society more broadly. 
The recognition of the practical uses of code-meshing in language acquisition is a 
welcome contribution to the conversation surrounding student agency and empowerment. 
Fluency in academic discourse is a gateway into virtually every field that requires 
English literacy—which is virtually every field, from academic disciplines to the private 
sector sciences to business administration and entrepreneurship. It is empowering on the 
most practical of levels, in that it acculturates students to the discursive conventions of 
high-status domains of study and work. In this sense, then, the work of Canagarajah and 
others is laudable and more than worthy of continued research. They are also, however, 
resisted by broader social, political, and racial forces. As I argue in “Code-Meshing 
Meshed Codes,” there is little reason to believe—and many reasons not to—that a student 
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who deploys code-meshing in any rhetorical context outside of the composition 
classroom will convince her audience that the presence of, say, Black English Vernacular 
or Tamil dialects in tandem with “standard” English legitimizes the marginal discourse as 
a novel and commendable stylistic model. Lisa Delpit, in her article “CCCC’s Role in the 
Struggle for Language Rights,” intersperses phrases like “[We] done come a long way, 
baby;” this is an effective rhetorical tactic for an established scholar like Delpit. If an 
African-American writing memos a telecommunications company used the same tactic, it 
probably wouldn’t be so glowingly received. Similarly, such phrases may please a first-
year composition instructor; in the composition classroom, language is free to resist 
discursive oppression in such subversive ways. But in many situations in the outside 
world, this form of resistance not only isn’t an effective way of resisting, it may even 
backfire and make one’s situation even more undesirable. 
This is not to say that code-meshing is completely powerless to contest and 
reconfigure dominant discursive conventions. Indeed, each act of meshing is a 
contestation and reconfiguration of discourse, albeit on a microscopic scale. But each 
meshing is embedded in a complex ensemble of forces and properties that surround any 
human interaction—be it linguistic, material, biological, political, or whatever—that 
places limits on its efficacy. While few, if any, classrooms are completely steeped in the 
social-constructivist linguistic essentialism described by DeLanda, these forces are 
always in tension with the classroom’s discourse. One need look no further than Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin for evidence that rhetoric plays a role in swaying public perception. But the 
text of Uncle Tom’s Cabin was nested within a broader assemblage that precipitated its 
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potency; that Harriet Beecher Stowe was white, affluent, and highly-educated, and not a 
slave, highlights these extra-textual forces. 
Code-meshing’s method of critically resisting dominant discourse conventions, 
then, might go over well in a composition classroom, particularly a classroom where the 
teacher is aligned with such models of critical resistance. But outside of this sheltered 
domain, it, as well as the student agency it aims to facilitate, runs headlong into a 
minefield of resistance. The widely held belief that a stable English “standard” exists may 
be patently absurd, or at least overstated. But it also is protected, often vehemently, by 
many people in positions of power. And these people’s worldviews are shaped by forces 
over which language has limited influence, material factors that may, to paraphrase 
Wittgenstein, be passed over in silence by language, but which are nonetheless present, 
concrete, adamantine.   
Some might argue that this analysis places undue weight on the material benefits 
of critically resistant language: the careers, the positions of power, the financial fortunes 
to be gained with the ability to write an effective memo to a major corporation’s 
departments of marketing and public relations. Money is not the only form of fortune: 
cultural identity is important, too. But this leads to yet another question: Even if a student 
feels edified and strengthened by the validation of their home discourse in a code-
meshing composition classroom, we must also inform them of the limits of code-
meshing’s range of efficacy. We could reemphasize the point that domains outside the 
academic humanities are often racist, or classist, or sexist, or have reductionist views of 
dialectal difference. We can tell the student that despite the bullheadedness of the 
powers-that-be, despite their bigoted denial of the inherent beauty of cultural diversity in 
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the service of a self-interested maintenance of an inequitable status quo, their cultural 
identity is real, wonderful, valuable, and worthy of applause. All of this may well be true, 
and there may well be some degree of perceived self-empowerment in the awareness of 
it. But the dismal prognosis of this recognition in so many contexts outside of the social-
constructivist composition classroom, its rather sketchy survival prospects in the red-in-
tooth-and-claw wilderness of the private sector (that teeth and claws are not made of 
words, but of carbon and calcium, is noteworthy here), draws attention to the limitations 
of liberatory social-constructivist approaches to writing pedgogy.   
Language reigns in the classroom. Language is a central to how we construct our 
self-awareness. In such domains, it is somewhat safer, and even desirable in some cases, 
to essentialize language to some extent, simply because language is such an essential 
constituent of that particular domain. But outside that domain, the playing field shifts, 
and the goalposts are moved, if not discarded altogether. This is not to say that these 
demonstrable capacities of language should be ignored, or go unharnessed. It is to say, 
however, that any discussion of these capacities must be tempered by a recognition of 
their boundaries.  
Any single explanatory paradigm is an inadequate descriptor of reality in its 
fullness. This is true on a micro-linguistic level: the word “tree,” while a useful signifier 
colloquially, cannot account for the vast diversity of real-world trees (spruce, maple, 
etc.), and thus obscures large swaths of reality’s intricacy. It is also true on a larger, more 
general level. The sort of classroom discourse encouraged by a liberatory, social-
constructivist pedagogy is challenged by this complicating reality. A particular teacher’s 
version of democratic dialogue, limited as it is by their own, inevitably narrow 
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ideological scope, cannot possibly taxonomize and respond to the manifold 
manifestations of students’ local experiences. This reveals another tension within social-
constructivist pedagogy: Because the classroom definitions of “empowering” or 
“liberatory” are inevitably shaped, in large part, by the instructor, frictions can emerge 
when students’ definitions of these concepts collide with the instructor’s, e.g., if a 
politically conservative student rejects the more progressive ideology implied in Berlin’s 
pedagogy. As Patricia Harkin points out in the latest edition of Rhetoric, Poetics, and 
Cultures, the analysis of race, class, and gender differences are not always successful 
when students are “products of a homogenous, rural, politically and religiously 
conservative culture;” it is hard for them to “see the racial and class based contradictions 
on which [Berlin’s] pedagogy was based” (205). In such cases, even if a teacher is correct 
to emphasize these contradictions—and I think she would be—there is nonetheless 
something of a contradiction between the teacher’s goal of “student empowerment” and 
the subtle (or not so subtle) desire to reshape a student’s conservative ideology into 
something more progressive. If students are to become effective democratic participants, 
some conservative students might be suspicious of the implication that this participation 
should take the form of progressivism.  
Neither Berlin nor any other social-constructivism-inclined scholars that I have 
encountered have asserted, explicitly anyway, that conservative viewpoints are not so 
much valid interventions into a classroom discussion as they are moral or intellectual 
shortcomings to be corrected. But given the goal of most social-constructivist 
pedagogy—a more tolerant, multicultural, minority-empowering classroom 
environment—the inevitable existence of such viewpoints (due, again, to the multifaceted 
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and obdurate nature of material and bodily existence) would seem to problematize the 
ideal of a “democratic classroom.” The classroom is never ideology free, and given the 
teacher’s position of power, it will never be an ideologically relativistic free-for-all. And 
the average composition teacher, shaped as she or he is by personal histories—not only 
discursive, as in the books their teachers assign them, but material, as in the (frequent) 
bourgeois upbringings that allow for tuition payments and comparatively large childhood 
libraries—is likely to fall within the academy’s liberal (at least compared to, say, rural 
Mississippi) orthodoxy, and read any student’s divergence from this orthodoxy as a 
divergence from some kind of indisputable truth. Hawk, reading Berlin, recognizes this 
assumption of liberalization-through-conversation as a “desire to interpellate students 
into his own ideology” (79). 
As the preceding parenthetical statement acknowledges, I, too, am largely in line 
with the 88% of English professors who describe themselves as “liberal” (Rothman, 
Lichter & Nevitte, 6). And I confess that my viscera contort unpleasantly whenever a 
student argues, say, that all government aid to the poor should be abolished and replaced 
by a privatized, church-run system of charitable giving. But I also realize that I am 
imprisoned within my own experiential history. If a student avers that unemployment 
insurance should be eradicated because it nurtures nothing other than learned dependency 
and indolence, I might be able to serve up a few empirical counter-statistics, e.g., that 
most recipients of said insurance express a desire for employment, and that it is perhaps 
the most effective form of economic stimulus in sluggish economic circumstances. I 
might also be able to tell a story or two about people I’ve known personally who 
benefited greatly from unemployment insurance, and then proceeded to land jobs. But 
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students in my classroom who are opposed to this view could also tell tales of people who 
manipulate the system (and they have told such tales), and they could also procure a few 
counter-statistics (they have done this, too). 
Even when the social-constructivist pedagogical perspective is taken as a given, 
the task of empowering students—whatever that may mean—is difficult and perplexing. 
One reason for this is that this perspective, as frequently represented, is far from a given. 
On the contrary, it appears to fall far short of as a description of what a truly liberatory 
classroom might look like, and what its outcomes might be. The intersections between 
writing, teaching, rhetorical agency, and material reality are intractably complex. 
Progressive politics dominates composition departments, and I am a passionate, if 
perpetually baffled and self-conscious, advocate of this perspective. But we must also be 
wary of over-imagining the classroom as a space where teacher/sages, who have 
published award-winning articles on Herbert Marcuse’s relevance to composition 
pedagogy, can lead a diverse class of students toward Truth and empowerment via a post-
structuralist analysis of how language, ideology, and politics interact and constitute each 
other. 
Furthermore, in practice, there are many avenues to rhetorical agency, and not all 
of them are progressive. Are William F. Buckley and the author of “Why Johnny Can’t 
Write” rhetorical agents? If not, why not? If they were in our classrooms, would we not 
be suppressing their self-empowerment by steering them toward an alternate (i.e., our) 
political orientation? Of course, everyone’s political consciousness develops from the 
reading and hearing of others’ ideas, so there is no such thing as an entirely “innate” 
ideology. But where do we draw the line between nurturing ideological diversity—a 
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cornerstone of a liberal education—to establishing an ideological dictatorship by fiat? It 
is always hard to say, which is why we should always be careful and self-critical. To be 
sure, Berlin recognized the need for this sort of self-reflection throughout his career, as 
well as the need for students to be “regarded as subjects of their own experience, not 
empty receptacles to be filled with teacher-originated knowledge”; that they “challenge 
accepted wisdom” (145) He also emphasizes that there will be a “diversity of discoveries 
and disagreement” as students learn to participate in the classroom’s micro-democratic 
society (145). Berlin’s writing, then, does not essentialize the classroom’s progressive 
discourse to absurd extremes. But with “diversity” comes difficulty, and the “accepted 
wisdom” being questioned may sometimes be the teacher’s. Berlin focuses on the 
possibilities of democratic classroom; it is also important to focus on the limitations. 
This series of interlocking puzzles is not an obstacle to be “solved,” because it is 
unsolvable. It is clear that writing, teaching, concrete reality, students, teachers, politics, 
economics, race, gender, and countless other forces are involved in constructing the 
classroom in which my students and I sit and/or stand. But the nature of these interactions 
is often far from evident. I stand in a classroom: there it is, right there, right here, I’m in 
the middle of it all: the desks, the chairs, the walls, the malfunctioning air conditioner, the 
students, their various hoodies and jeans and blouses and dresses, their stories, my story, 
our history, the cold and sprawling and befuddling architecture that envelops us, the gray-
matter machinery inside our skulls, processing it all. We can, and should, attempt to 
theorize this complexity, and glean as many insights as we can from that theorization. 
Words are an essential component of change and discovery, be the speaker an 
economically disenfranchised composition student who wants to be the first in his family 
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to graduate from college or a composition scholar trying to figure out how to best help 
him achieve this. But it is also important not to over-essentialize this essential component 
of change and draw excessively easy connections between the classroom we theorize and 
the classroom that actually exists—the raw, concrete classroom that is impossible to 
understand in its full richness and nuance. 
Not long ago, during a conference with a student after a day of class that involved 
a lot of discussion of the 2012 presidential campaign, the student noted that there “didn’t 
seem to be any conservatives in class that day.” Before I could even respond, she added, 
“Well, actually, I’m pretty sure that guy that sits near me is conservative; he probably just 
felt uncomfortable speaking up.” Whether or not the student was correct in her 
ideological assessment of her peer, there can be no doubt that this sort of thing happens in 
classrooms every day, in every university—and, as Harkin points out, in Berlin’s 
classrooms. What goes on in the minds of these students? Do they feel like they’re the 
“democratic agents” of our scholarly discourse, or do they feel marginalized, passed over 
in silence by the discourse of the class? The answers will vary, and they will be hard to 
know, but they are an inevitable classroom presence, standing in tension with the words 
that the instructor reads, speaks, and writes. 
When I finally walk up the steps of the Bingham Humanities Building to defend 
this dissertation, I will see many students, faculty, and staff. Their bodies will be 
inscribed with thousands of histories, and their minds will be animated by untold millions 
of reflections upon these histories. The totality of it will be beyond my comprehension. 
And when the sound waves of their voiced words collide with the walls of exposed 
concrete, they will fade away as echoes through the hallways’ mystifying angularity. 
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CHAPTER 2: PROCEDURAL APPROACH 
At its inception, modern composition studies defined itself in contrast to an 
image: Somewhere in a hazy, indefinite past, class is about to resume. The students 
quietly await the arrival of their teacher. Rows of desks are arranged in a neat, stark 
square. The students are nervous. A few days ago, they had turned in their theme essays 
on Sophocles’ Antigone—an exposition of that centuries-old play’s plot, setting, 
characters, style, and the author’s intended theme—and the teacher had made it jarringly 
clear that she was altogether disappointed with the student’s progress thus far that 
semester. Their knowledge of the rules of verb agreement had been woefully inadequate; 
their comma placement was farcical; their paragraphs’ topic sentences were flimsy, 
lacking lucidity. The themes are to be returned today, with corrections and set-in-stone 
grades, and the students know that if they don’t demonstrate significant improvement, the 
teacher will be none too pleased. One student anxiously jiggles his knee. Another stares 
grimly at the wall clock. A third tries to stifle a cough. 
The teacher strides in. Clearing her throat, she takes her seat at the heavy wooden 
desk at the helm of the classroom. She reaches into her leather satchel, pulls out a stack 
of papers, and slaps them on the desk with a splash. Her fingers drum rhythmically upon 
the desktop as her eyes scan the room, pausing briefly at times to direct a steely glare at 
certain students—most conspicuously at a boy named Thomas, at whom she aims a stern 
scowl for several tense seconds. 
With her thumb and index finger, the teacher grasps one corner of the paper atop 
the stack, lifts it, and dangles it in front of the class, as if holding the tail of a diseased rat 
that had just met its demise in a snap trap. The students lean forward anxiously. Even 
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from the back of the room, they can see the lines and loops of red ink scrawled upon the 
paper, the meaning of which as yet unknown. This, the teacher intones, is unacceptable. 
For homework this evening, you shall all reread chapter three of your grammar textbook, 
and diagram the sentences in your theme essays properly. You shall then rewrite your 
essays properly. This assignment will be due tomorrow—no exceptions, no excuses. We 
will also be diagramming sentences in class today. She rises from the chair, eyeing the 
students coldly as she does. She grabs a piece of chalk, turns to the chalkboard, and 
begins writing a sentence. Thomas, you shall diagram the first sentence. Now, step up to 
the chalkboard please. 
Such is the nightmarish image, reminiscent of Ralphie’s classroom in A Christmas 
Story, that has come to be called “Current-Traditional” pedagogy. It is the harsh, old-
fashioned, regressive, ideologically-unenlightened way. There are numerous turns of 
phrase that might be associated with this approach: “Drills and skills.” “Unyielding 
teacherly authority.” “Teaching writing as a product, rather than as a process.” “Emphasis 
on cosmetic correctness.” “De-emphasis of students’ personal experience.” “Gallons of 
spilt red ink.” “The politically unconscious dark ages, before we were aware of such 
things as ‘ethnocentrism’ and ‘marginalized subjectivities.’” But thankfully, the thinking 
goes, we have moved far beyond this. Peter Elbow and Donald Murray helped us 
understand that writing must be imagined—and practiced—as a fluid, inventive process, 
and that at the earliest stages of writing at least, correctness was less important that 
content. Mina Shaughnessy showed us that what we call “grammatical errors” can 
actually be a sign of positive growth. James Berlin unveiled the false consciousess that 
was so much more likely to suffocate and stymie students in the Current-Traditional 
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classrooms. Sure, the field has its share of problems and open questions, but at least, the 
thinking goes, we have moved beyond tightly-regimented drill-and-skill procedures that 
dominated the past. 
Due to a dearth of contemporaneous research, it is difficult to know precisely 
what went on—and, to an extent, continues to go on—in current-traditional classrooms. 
Nevertheless, scholars have offered some educated guesses. Robert Connors, citing 
Kitzhaber, posits that current-traditional pedagogies “represent an unrealistic view of the 
writing process, a view that assumes writing is done by formula and in a social vacuum.” 
(Composition-Rhetoric, 254). James Berlin traces the current-traditional tendency all the 
way back to George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), and its emphasis on 
cosmetic correctness, as well as its eradication of invention from the writing process 
(Writing Instruction… 21-22). And in The Methodical Memory, Sharon Crowley 
unleashes a litany of polemics against current-traditionalism, faulting the approach for 
grounding its rhetorical practice in universal principles of mind, nature, and language. 
While these reasonable minds can, and do, disagree on many points, a common vein 
connects them: current-traditional pedagogy is overly rigid and formulaic; myopic 
towards the emergent complexity of the writing process; and unconscious of the social, 
ideological, and political forces that shape the course of this process. 
In many ways, modern composition scholarship was born as a corrective to 
current-traditionalism. However, while we are not without knowledge of current-
traditional pedagogy, we cannot go back in time and drop in on a 19th century 
composition classroom, The field, then, is defined in contrast to an image of current-
traditionalism that may be as much phantasm as fact, a ghostly Derridian “presence” 
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floating over a void, in relation to which we assert our existence. Nonetheless, whatever 
it was, we seem to have left it in the dust long ago—and this, I submit, is probably a good 
thing. Yet, in some ways, the spectre of current-traditionalism continues to haunt us. At 
universities across the U.S., professors from a variety of fields complain about the 
inability of their students to compose even a simple email properly, and fret that they 
need more overt grammar instruction. “Literacy crises,” often more perceived than real, 
have periodically agitated the public at large for decades (the earthquake of “Why Johnny 
Can’t Write” still produces occasional aftershocks). And the recent uproar surrounding 
Richard Arum and Jospia Roksa’s Academically Adrift (2011), which skewers higher 
education in the United States on the grounds that students aren’t being highly educated, 
stands as but one prominent example of this pressure from without and within. Whenever 
this pressure arises, calls for “returning to the basics”—i.e., to approaches like current-
traditional pedagogy—are inevitable. 
Composition will not, and should not, embrace the kinds of practices associated 
with the above image of current-traditionalism. But in certain respects, it is returning to 
and revising some aspects of older, more “classical,” more rigid and formulaic 
pedagogical approaches. In many ways, the popular Writing Arguments composition 
textbook bears little similarity to the above representation of current-traditionalism, but 
faint resemblances can be gleaned. It may not pontificate on the value of diagramming 
one’s sentences as one writes, but it often appeals to what might be called a top-down 
procedural strategies: learn the basics of “rhetorical triangle,” and then apply this 
knowledge to your writing; understand how each example sentence only partially 
integrates the concepts of  “reasons, warrants, and conditions of rebuttal,” and then 
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“create arguments to support the warrants in support of the partial arguments” (84). This 
is not overt grammar instruction, but it is functionally parallel: Learn a system, and then 
apply it. Repeat until proficient. On its surface, this appears to be much more current-
traditional-like than, say, Peter Elbow’s freewriting exercises in which writers forget 
every rule they’ve ever been taught, and plunge boldly forth into the unknown, the 
undiscovered, the uninvented. 
In this chapter, I will analyze contemporary the procedural pedagogical tendency 
(or neo-classical rhetorical pedagogy, as it might be called), and consider the tensions 
that emerge in its application. In reality, what we label “procedural pedagogical 
approach” is, like any pedagogical approach, expansive and internally heterogeneous; to 
study every facet and variation of it would be a book-length project in itself. So here, I 
will focus on the concept of kairos as a teachable rhetorical strategy and, by extension, 
the rhetorical agency a writer would presumably acquire if she were to apply this strategy 
effectively.  
Kairos, of course, has a long history as a rhetorical term. The concept was shaped 
and reshaped by numerous classical Greek thinkers working more or less independently, 
and, as such, it was marked by multiple, overlapping definitions. As Phillip Sipiora notes, 
one can identify “almost a dozen different meanings of kairos in Greek drama alone” 
(Rhetoric and Kairos, 18). The idea of kairos animates Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric 
as “the faculty of observing, in any given case, the available means of persuasion” 
(Rhetoric, 6). It is embedded in Isocrates’ description of educated people as “those who 
manage well the circumstances which they encounter day by day, and who possess a 
judgment that is accurate in meeting occasions as they arise and rarely miss the expedient 
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course of action” (Sipiora,13). And for Gorgias, the sophist, the meaning-generating 
nature of kairos—that is, its potential for rhetorical and interpretive readjustment in 
accordance with varying circumstances—supplants the Platonic notion of “pure 
knowledge” in Gorgias’ more relativistic worldview (McComiskey, 22-23). The meaning 
of the term, then, like the meanings of all terms, has never achieved a settled consensus. 
There is an intersection at which most of the definitional Venn diagrams converge: kairos 
can be said to denote, roughly, a rhetor’s awareness of and responsiveness to a particular 
rhetorical context. It is this definition of kairos on which this chapter relies.  
The chapter can be roughly divided into two parts. First, it will develop a 
deconstructive—or reconstructive--critique of procedural pedagogy, through the lens of 
kairos. More specifically, I will consider the rhetorical concepts of agency and kairos in 
light of Alain Badiou’s Being and Event, a philosophical text that attempts to explore and 
define the ineffable material forces that influence our thoughts and words in ways beyond 
our control. Badiou’s analysis highlights a problematic that lies at the core of procedural 
pedagogy and, as I later discuss, at the core of all pedagogies: the tension between 
rhetorical textbook’s tidily teachable strategies, and the messiness and volatility of real-
world rhetorical practice. The goal of this section is to paint a fuller, if more troubled, 
picture of composition practice, one which might be entitled “A Rhetor Implementing 
Kairos-Seizing Strategies.” In other words, this chapter highlights the messy interaction 
of logical and relatively simple composition theories with the labyrinthine complexity of 
practice. 
The other section will turn this complexification on its head, and consider the 
extent to which the categories of “procedural pedagogy” and “process pedagogy” are less 
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separable than is sometimes assumed. The aim here is not to dissolve the (indissolvable) 
tension, but to meditate on how this tension both plagues and motivates the discipline, 
and how it reveals itself as a paradox that the field of composition currently inhabits, has 
always inhabited, and will forever inhabit. In a sense, this chapter aims to resist today’s 
academic climate of professional specialization and territorialization, of competing 
“schools of thought” that debate over which school might have slightly firmer grasp on 
truth. In illuminating the debate, in all its nuance, complexity and paradoxicality, this 
chapter essentially asks: What does it mean to assert that both sides of the debate are 
correct? And not only that, but what does it mean to assert that each side of the debate 
actually is the other side in important ways? What if process pedagogy has more in 
common with procedural pedagogy—and, indeed, current-traditional pedagogy—than we 
have previously thought? And if so, why is important for us to emphasize these overlaps? 
James Kinneavy’s 1994 article, “Kairos: A Neglected Concept in Classical 
Rhetoric,” did much to re-popularize kairos within rhetoric and writing studies.  For 
Kinneavy, kairos is defined as the “right or opportune time to do something, or right 
measure in doing something” (221).  Put yet another way, kairos can be understood as a 
decisive and timely rhetorical intervention, made when the conditions of a situation are 
right for just such an intervention. For example, let us say that a first-year composition 
student has received a grade on his paper that he views as unfairly low. That student 
could, immediately upon receiving the grade, jump out of his seat and harangue the 
professor with a verbal tirade; this would be an example of poor kairos, as it is unlikely 
that the teacher would be persuaded by such a rhetorical move (indeed, she may even 
notify the campus mental health services). On the other hand, the student could quietly 
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return home, consider the teacher’s commentary, and then, still disagreeing with her, 
compose a restrained and well-reasoned two-page response to her comments. The teacher 
may then be swayed to raise the grade, but even if she were not, the student’s response 
would surely stand as a better example of kairos than would the series of shouted 
invectives. 
For Kinneavy, and for the many composition scholars who heeded his call for a 
reintroduction of the concept, kairos had profound implications for classroom practice. If 
implemented, it meant that students needed to compose persuasive writing that was 
relevant to their careers or real-life interests, and that their audience needed to be real--
i.e., not their teacher. Kinneavy himself is unambiguous on this point: “Real publication 
of the students' papers, in any local or state or national medium, directed to real audiences 
for specific purposes, is ideal for any composition program” (237). In a first-year 
composition course that taught kairos, then, a student might write (and submit) a 
newspaper editorial decrying the defunding of Pell grants. Or, as the top-selling Writing 
Arguments textbook, which notes the importance of students’ “understanding the real-
world occasions for argument” suggests, a student might write a persuasive paper for 
another academic department (xxxii). Leaving aside for now the question of whether 
writing an essay solely for a teacher cannot also be considered kairotic—after all, 
persuading a composition teacher to give one a high grade for the course would seem to 
be an opportune intervention within a particular set of real-world conditions—kairos 
aimed to wrest writing away from the “artificial” bubble of the traditional classroom, and 
deploy it into a world of “real” discourse, where effective rhetoric has real effects.     
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Writing Arguments provides a series of tips aimed at helping students determine 
how to seize the kairotic moment: 
1.) As you analyze the argument from the perspective of kairos, consider the 
following questions: 
a.) What is the motivating occasion for this argument? That is, what causes this 
writer to put pen to paper or fingers to the keyboard? 
b.) What conversation is this writer joining? 
c.) Who is the writer’s intended audience and why? 
d.) What is the writer’s purpose? Toward what view or action is the writer trying  
to persuade his or her audience? 
e.) To what extent can the various features of the argument be explained by your 
understanding of the kairotic moment? (118-19) 
This list of questions constructs the student in a particular way: as a sort of 
distanced, critical observer who approaches rhetorical situations formulaically. The 
method is analogous to that of an offensive football coach who studies the opposing 
team’s formation on a given play, calls a time-out, and then considers his own team’s 
formation in light of the opposition’s, perhaps redrawing his diagram of Xs and Os in 
order to maximize the chances of his squad’s offensive success. The list’s objective tone 
borders on positivist: “What conversation is this writer joining?” seems to imply that 
there is only one conversation to identify, and that it is, moreover, readily identifiable. On 
the other hand, the list alludes to a messier, more subjective dimension of kairos, hinted 
at in the last question, with its qualifying words (“to what extent can the features... be 
explained by your understanding”). The list may read like a simple instruction manual, 
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but its neat linearity lies in tension with the messier and less predictable vicissitudes of 
the student’s rhetorical situation. 
Of course, some students will succeed more than others, and perhaps the ideal 
student who can determine the answers to all the questions is meant to be more of a 
capital ‘I’ “Ideal Student,” an image of perfection that is unreachable in practice but 
which, when striven for, increases the effectiveness of one’s writing. But the implication 
still stands: Students aim to be rhetors that exert calculated control over their rhetorical 
acts. And with this rhetorical power comes a power over reality not only in the sense that 
the student can access some partially hidden truth (e.g., the true purpose of a given 
author’s text), but that they can intervene in the conversation at hand and shape the 
conversation itself, and by extension the world, with their words. This is capacity is 
implied in Writing Arguments, in that in contrast to some composition textbooks, many of 
its sample essays are not standard representatives of “academic discourse,” but are 
examples of public discourse: op-ed pieces in newspapers; Al Gore’s Nobel-prize 
acceptance speech in which he calls for a more vigorous and serious international 
response to climate change; a Jonathan Rauch essay on the benefits of biotech 
agriculture, originally published in the widely-read Atlantic magazine. Regardless of the 
extent to which these essays sway public opinion, there is no doubt that their intent is to 
sway it, in a very real way. 
And rhetoric can certainly alter discourse in this way: Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 
rhetoric, for instance, galvanized a political movement that granted some long-withheld 
rights to millions of disenfranchised African-Americans. Or, more provincial to 
composition studies, Peter Elbow and Donald Murray’s work enacted a broad shift in the 
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way language was taught in the academy and beyond. Here, however, I want to 
complicate this kind of rhetorical efficacy, through the lens of rhetorical agency. In 
another chapter, I argue that cultural studies pedagogy, while aimed at helping students 
develop into agents capable of giving voice—and increased political legitimization—to 
their subjectivities and the discourse communities they represent, is nonetheless limited 
in power, given that power in society is also determined by factors that lie beyond the 
reaches of language—e.g., the forces of skin color and financial capital.  Here, I want to 
examine the forces that confound kairotic moments even as they make them possible--
forces with which even wealthy white male writers must contend. Namely, I will use 
Alain Badiou’s theory of the “event” as a way to highlight the inherent unpredictablity 
and volatility of kairotic situations, and the unintended consequences that accompany 
“rhetorical agency” as defined by a particularly dominant conceptualization of it. I will 
also aim to complicate and refine this conception of rhetorical agency. 
Alain Badiou’s Being and Event, first published in French in 1988 and translated 
to English in 2006, is a landmark philosophical opus. On the surface, both its method and 
its aims—using Zermelo-Frankael set theory as a way to redefine the role of 
contemporary philosophy vis a vis other fields of inquiry—may seem utterly divorced 
from concerns over kairos and/or composition studies. However, for all his philosophical 
innovations, Badiou is positioned, however awkwardly in some senses, within the 
Continental tradition that spawned the likes of Deleuze, Foucault, Althusser, and 
Lyotard—theorists whose work has had deep, if often implicit, implications for the 
humanities in general, including composition studies. Indeed, scholars such as James 
Berlin (2003) and Lester Faigley (1992) see post-modern Continental philosophy as a 
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bedrock of social-constructionist critical pedagogy. And notions such as the post-modern 
“subject” and the idea of “competing historical narratives,” still prevalent in the pages of 
the discipline’s most widely-read journals, are generally used in tacit reference to these 
philosophers, even if the terms themselves have gained so much currency that explicit 
citation is often unnecessary. Badiou, however, moves this philosophical tradition in a 
much-needed new direction, revitalizing it by responding to some of the most common 
criticisms of postmodernism (e.g., the charge that its focus on language and 
representation precludes the possibility of both ontology and the subject; Badiou, in 
contrast, seeks to develop a sturdy foundation for the subject, and argues for existence 
what could be called a capital ‘T’ ontological Truth). But even as it bolsters Continental 
philosophy, it also complicates it, attempting to reconcile it by highlighting some of the 
problems and dilemmas that that tradition, and thinking beings in general, must inevitably 
confront. In this chapter, I am not interested in the specific mathematical formulas that 
Badiou produces to support his thesis; I am untrained in mathematics, so am unable to 
discern their validity, or lack thereof. Furthermore, I am not concerned with whether all 
the details of his arguments are “correct” or not. As Godel’s “incompleteness theorem” 
proves, in terms of mathematics—I use it here as an intuitive metaphor—no system is 
capable of proving itself. My use of Badiou’s work is simply to toss a wrench into the 
composition conversation, to view it through a fresh lens, to mash the systems together 
and see what knowledge is generated. 
In Being and Event, Badiou aims for nothing less than the full-fledged renovation 
of ancient Greek ontology’s “ruined temple” (23), and the revitalization of the 
philosophical quest for truth, which he sees as having grown enervated in recent decades. 
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“Truth has two illnesses,” he proclaims in Infinite Thought. “In my opinion, it is suffering 
from linguistic relativism, that is, its entanglement in the problematic of the disparity of 
meanings; and it is also suffering from historical pessimism, including about itself” (39). 
In other words, as Badiou sees it, the insights of poststructuralism—undecidability, 
difference, inescapable representational bricolage, etc.—have cultivated an unhealthy 
cynicism towards the grand, age-old concept of truth. Badiou wishes to dispense with this 
cynicism and develop a philosophy that, while recognizing the insights of 
poststructuralism, also tackles the question of truth—with a capital “T.”  In doing so, 
Badiou also seeks to resolve some the tensions between Continental philosophy and 
analytic philosophy, its much more formalized and logical-positivist counterpart that 
dominates philosophy departments in the United States. The scope of Badiou’s project, 
then, spans from Hellenic to the deconstructive, and stands as a Herculean attempt to 
upheave and rejuvenate Western thought. It also stands as a self-reflexive example of the 
very processes he describes; as he remarks in the translation’s preface, the book “does not 
lend itself to immediate comprehension”—a fact that, I hope to show, is precisely the 
point. 
Badiou begins by outlining a problem whose roots can be traced all the way back 
to Parmenides, a 5th century BCE Greek thinker: “What presents itself is essentially 
multiple; what presents itself is essentially one” (23). Here, Badiou is referring to an 
ontological quandary that has baffled philosophers for millenia: Being, or the real, 
appears to have a plural quality; after all, as any sentient organism knows intuitively if 
not abstractly, there appears to be a variety different objects and phenomena in the world. 
This perception, however, must be squared with the notion that all these multiples must 
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somehow add up into a singular whole, the “one,” to be described ontologically. In other 
words, it is evident that the real, as presented to us, appears as a multiplicity, yet it seems 
patently wrongheaded—multiple dimensions in the universe notwithstanding—to speak 
in terms of “the reals,” rather than of “the real.” Another way to conceptualize it is to 
consider that while the tangible universe is heterogeneous, it could presumably be boiled 
down to its constituent, atomistic parts: perhaps, as modern theoretical physics suggests, 
tiny strings of energy that take on different properties by vibrating at various frequencies, 
a sort of subatomic symphony out of which the entire universe emerges. When all these 
strings are taken in sum, what do we name the sum they constitute? 
Ontology, thus, is essentially the study of the presentation of multiplicity vis-a-vis 
the elusive “one.” In light of this, Badiou sees mathematics as the ideal epistemic 
approach with which to wrestle with Parmenides’ conundrum. If the universe is presented 
as multiples, mathematics can present2 this universe by distilling it into pure quantity; this 
is what leads Badiou to his provocative assertion, “Mathematics is ontology.” In 
particular, it is one axiomatic system within the field of mathematics, Zermelo-Fraenkel 
set theory, that Badiou sees as providing the theoretical tools required to ontologically 
present the one. And within this, there is one theorem of particular interest to Badiou: 
Russell’s Paradox (originally discovered by Ernst Zermelo, but first published by 
Bertrand Russell). The paradox is commonly described as the impossibility of a “list of 
lists that do not contain themselves.” Somewhat more concretely, say that you have three 
separate grocery lists—one for baking supplies, one frozen dinners, and one for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For Badiou, set theory ontology, unlike language, is non-representational: it does not “signify” 
an exterior concrete world. However, it embodies, or functionally mirrors, the concrete world’s 
multiplicity. As the translator points out, set theory “does not posit being outside itself but detains it within 
its inscriptions; it unfolds being performatively” (xxiv).	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produce—none of which contain references to themselves (e.g., the baking supplies list 
contains flour and vegetable oil, but does not contain the term “baking goods”). Now say 
that you want to compile these lists into a meta-list (or meta-set), based on the fact that all 
of these lists share non-self-referentiality. This set is the “list of lists that do not contain 
themselves.” Thus arises the paradoxical juncture: The meta-set is such a list in itself, 
insofar as it does not list itself as being among the multiples. But if it included itself on 
the list, it would no longer meet its own requirements, because then it would become a 
“list of lists that does contain itself.” This is an important assertion, because historically 
ontology has generally sought to depict being, or truth, as a kind of unified fullness. This 
tendency spanned centuries and animates a host of philosophical precepts, from Plato’s 
theory of forms to Hegel’s theory of a dialectical triplicity leading to an Absolute Spirit at 
the end of history (Phenomenology of Spirit). But the paradox means that such unity is 
mathematically impossible: there is simply no way to assemble the multiples into a grand 
overarching set. 
Badiou deduces from this paradox that, in fact, the “one is not.” The ontological 
multiples that philosophers have been struggling with for centuries are purely and only 
multiple. If one tried to compile them all into a single set, a single “being,” the paradox 
would stymie their efforts, because there is no set that can include all sets. In other words, 
it is mathematically impossible to create an overarching set that can encompass all other 
sets (and the multiples contained within); therefore, there is no way to reveal, even in 
theory, the grand cosmic unity that ontology has traditionally pursued. From this, Badiou 
draws a conclusion that, for him, reconciles the classical ontological pursuit of pure truth 
with the postmodern contention that absolute, universal truth is inaccessible (or, as 
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Richard Rorty puts it, “no God's-eye point of view, no skyhook provided by some 
contemporary or yet-to-be-developed science, is going to free us from the contingency of 
having been acculturated as we were” [13]). 
Put roughly, Badiou asserts that being can, in fact, be presented as sets of 
multiples, coherent and comprehensible. However, since Russell’s Paradox demonstrates 
that such a set can never be complete within itself, there must always be hidden 
“multiples” that lie outside of the set we perceive, ready to wreak havoc on the self-
contained system to which we have grown accustomed. According to Badiou, these 
hidden multiples, which he refers to as “indiscernible,” are where the “real” is located. 
An absolute truth, a being, exists after all. 
This is not to say, however, that truth itself is much more readily perceptible than 
it had appeared during Derrida’s heyday. Badiou goes on to outline the concept of a 
“truth event,” the site of which he defines as “an entirely abnormal multiple; that is, a 
multiple such that none of its elements are presented in the situation” (175). An event is a 
cataclysmic moment, a sort of ontological ground zero, where an indiscernible multiple is 
“forced” into a preexisting set, or “state of the situation” (104), ripping the situation’s 
coherence asunder. So when an indiscernible element insinuates itself into a situation—
an inevitability for Badiou, given Russell’s Paradox—the set must reconfigure itself in 
light of this new element in order to maintain its internal consistency. As a concrete 
example, say that someone has a plate full of apples. One could say that “redness” is the 
basis for this set (or situation) of apples. But if an orange is added to the plate, “redness” 
can no longer function as the common denominator. One must therefore rename the basis 
for this set—e.g., “fruit”—in order to maintain its meaning. And one could then add, say, 
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an onion to the plate, which would shift the set to “food that grows from the ground”; and 
then perhaps a baseball, which would shift it to “round objects;” and so on. An event, 
then, is that which inserts itself into a given situation, confusing matters, causing us to 
scramble to re-comprehend that situation. 
Of course, an event need not—and for Badiou, in fact could not—be as mundane 
as a plate full of spherical edibles. Badiou divides the ontologically-constructable 
universe into four domains, or “truth procedures:” love, politics, science, and art. Any 
time something unexpected, undetectable, and confounding occurs within one of these 
domains, something which forces society to reassess and reshape that domain, said 
occurrence can be described as an “evental site.” Badiou’s standards for what counts as 
an event are rather lofty; he lists as examples “the appearance, with Aeschylus, of 
theatrical tragedy; the irruption, with Galileo, of mathematical physics; an amorous 
encounter which changes a whole life; the French revolution of 1792” (46). So within art 
history, Picasso’s inauguration of Cubism and Shakespeare’s plays were major events; 
within science, the discovery of pennicillin; within love, the moment when a person 
realizes that their beau is, indeed, the one they want to marry and cherish forever (though 
if they later decide to divorce them, that moment could perhaps also stand as an event).3 
More concretely, consider the French Revolution. This transformative moment of 
political upheaval marked the end of the French monarchy and the inception of a secular 
democratic republic. Its shockwaves reverberated throughout Europe, portending the 
demise of monarchies elsewhere. And while it had something of a precedent in the 
American Revolution, it was, by and large, indiscernible: it was abrupt, calamitous, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  It should be noted that for Badiou, natural events do not count as events; only events that 
introduce something new and transformative to the realm of human affairs achieve the status of event.	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no one really saw it coming. This unwelcome (for the monarchy, anyway) intrusion of 
being into the established order ruptured the surrounding situation. But Badiou sees 
opportunity—and even ethics itself—emerging from these ruptures. When the order is 
fractured, we have an opportunity to, as he terms it, pledge “fidelity” to the disruption, to 
act upon it ethically. We do this in spite of our inability to fully comprehend the truth’s 
nature and magnitude; after all, as Badiou puts it, “[truth]... is indiscernible in the 
language of the situation” (396). Truth may drastically alter the ways in which we use 
language to describe the world, but it remains inaccessible: we can only “perceive” in 
terms of language’s reordering. Pledging fidelity to an event and responding to it 
ethically is thus is a way of attending to truth, or performing a “truth procedure.” We can 
never really know what hit us, but by identifying the site of impact and analyzing it, we 
can forge a kind of mediated connection with truth. 
In this case of the French Revolution, the people of France pledged their fidelity 
by beheading the king and queen and developing the concept of universal human rights.  
Before the revolution, a bicameral legislature was not part of the discernible French 
situation, but after the revolution, it was, and the situation then changed to accommodate 
this indiscernible. Of course, even after a post-evental reconfiguration, future events will 
still occur, destabilizing situations further and demanding new truth procedures. And 
again, we will never see them coming—if we could, they would not be events. But the 
evental process will continue forever. Our world will be continually wracked by forces 
beyond our awareness, and we will continually struggle to keep the ship afloat via 
innumerable innovations and strategies. 
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But what does this have to do with kairos, and with teaching writing? On one 
level, it can function simply as a description of occurrences in writing and in classrooms, 
insofar as it can function as a description of anything that occurs in existence. Any 
perceived “event,” from the Virginia Tech massacre to an unusual experience that a 
writer has while working on a memoir, could stand as a rough or metaphorical example. 
And we can pledge “fidelity” to these events by passing stricter gun control laws, or by 
revising the memoir so as to accommodate the life-changing experience. On this level, it 
would seem that Being and Event has little to offer scholars outside of philosophy, other 
than a dinner conversation topic that can make one appear well-read and intellectual. On 
another level, however, it complicates some of the notions of kairos and rhetorical 
agency that presently dominate composition scholarship. 
Unsurprisingly, there are multiple and competing theories of what constitutes an 
“agent,” or “student agent.” But for many scholars, as Cheryl Geisler points out, “concern 
with the question of rhetorical agency arises from the postmodern critique of the 
autonomous agent.” Postmodern and poststructuralist theory deconstructed the idea of 
humans having a single, stable identity, and replaced this notion of identity with a 
configuration of multiple (and often frictional) ideologies and and cultural perspectives 
aligning in a provisional “subject formation,” which is itself always subject to flux and 
realignment. Along with this redefinition comes a heightened emphasis on the external 
forces that shape an “individual.” For instance, the structural Marxist Louis Althusser, 
argues that a subject is produced by an “interpellation” of a person into a broader, 
preexisting ideological framework. For the question of agency, the implications of this 
are immense. An “agent” cannot be conceived as an autonomous individual who 
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challenges an exterior world, because a subject and the exterior world are interwoven and 
mutually constitutive (there is no separate “other” to engage with in the traditional sense). 
Furthermore, since the subject is constructed by forces beyond its full comprehension and 
control, the very notion of agent as a “person who acts in an intentional manner” is 
problematized, because intentionality is muddled by the complex forces that an actor 
confronts and is shaped by. One cannot even fully know oneself, much less the world and 
what one is attempting to do within it.  
Within composition scholarship, the postmodernist challenge to agency and 
subjectivity is addressed in Lester Faigley’s Fragments of Rationality. Here, Faigley 
recognizes the difficulty that confronts a postmodern subject grasping for agency and 
autonomy: 
Postmodern theory… would situate the subject among many competing 
discourses that precede the subject. The notion of ‘participation’ itself becomes 
problematic in its implication that the subject can control its location and moves 
within a discourse… [Postmodern] theory understands subjectivity as 
heterogeneous and constantly in flux. The present frustration of those… who have 
used notions of community as a critique of the autonomous individual, but then 
have had these notions of community unravel into complex sets of power 
relations—is where to locate agency in a postmodern subjectivity. (226-27) 
Faigley contributes to the project of solving this problem by using Lyotard’s concept of 
the differend as a bedrock for a postmodern ethics. Lyotard takes a constructionist 
approach to the problem of ethics, rejecting the idea that ethics can be located outside of 
preexisting discourse. Indeed, as Faigley points out, Lyotard’s book on this topic, The 
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Differend, is cross-referenced in a way that makes the text infinitely self-referential and 
circular. The effect of this is that there can be no “complete” reading of the text (236). 
The Differend folds in on itself, creating a labyrinth of language from which there is no 
exit. For Lyotard, language itself is a kind of moebus strip: even if there is a being 
exterior to language, it is not accessible to us. 
Lyotard locates ethics in the act of linking phrases that “put into play a conflict 
between genres of discourse” (in Faigley, 237). There may not be an ethics external to the 
discursive bricolage, but it is possible to forge novel connections within it, and the 
responsibility we have towards the connections we make is, for Lyotard, a site of ethical 
action. And for Faigley, this connection-making serves as a way for composition students 
to become ethical rhetorical agents. Faigley recognizes some of the limitations of this 
framework, e.g., some marginalized groups may not be “able to participate in the in 
democratic pluralism when they lack access to organizational and informational 
resources” (238). He also acknowledges that his postulation is incomplete. While Lyotard 
usefully theorizes subjectivity at the “microlevel” of local phrase-linkages, it does not 
fully resolve the problems of agency in the postmodern subject; as Faigley puts it, in the 
end Lyotard “does not offer more than a call to justice” (239). But more recent 
composition scholarship aims—much like Badiou—to move beyond postmodern 
agentive dilemma, and towards a theory of the subject that clarifies what it means to 
speak of rhetorical agency and, by extension, of kairos. 
In “Rhetorical Agency as Emergent and Enacted,” Marilyn Cooper contends out 
that, Faigley’s tentative proposal notwithstanding, post-modern and post-structual 
theories of the subject tend to  
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deny that a subject can ‘have’ agency. The new subjects are assumed to be so 
fragmented that they are incapable of coherent intentions or actions, and agency is 
merely a position into which they are interpellated, a role they can perform or a 
node they can occupy temporarily. (423).  
This assumed ephemerality of agency results from the idea of the decentered 
subject: if the subject is conceived as little more than a fluctuating nexus of competing 
ideological and social constructions, then, to paraphrase Gertrude Stein, there isn’t any 
“‘them’ there.” Even if Lyotard’s differend opens up the possibility for a kind of agency, 
this does not necessarily mean that coherently identifiable agents are creating the effects 
of agency. For if the postmodern subject is determined largely by intersections of various 
others, then what appears to be “individual agency” would be better described as 
“multiple others converging temporarily on a locus, and generating first-year composition 
essays when they do so.” In other words, we end up with agency—or the effects of 
agency—without an actual agent. This is a problem for composition pedagogy: if our 
students cannot “possess” agency, then they cannot possess rhetorical efficacy either. 
For Cooper, the only way to formulate a viable theory of agency is to bring about 
“the death of not only the modernist subject but of the whole notion of the subject” (432). 
Key to the eradication of the subject-object binary is Humberto Maturana and Francisco 
Varela’s notion of autopoiesis. Autopoiesis is a biological concept that describes living 
systems as “structurally coupled” with their environments, i.e., situated within dynamic 
dialectical processes in which an organism and its environment constitute and 
reconstitute each other mutually. Understood through this lens, agents are neither 
autonomous nor interpellated into the other; rather, the agent and the other “continually 
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restructure themselves as the structure of each unit responds in its own way to 
perturbations from the other” (427). It is in this autopoietic process that Cooper locates 
agency. 
The upshot of this is that everyone is already an agent. Agency is everywhere and 
inescapable. On the surface, it may seem as if agency’s ubiquity renders it a useless 
concept. After all, if we all already have it, then why should we worry about helping 
students “acquire” it? The answer is that while agency may be universal, effective 
harnessing of that agency is not. After all, while all students may already be agents, it is 
obvious to anyone who has taught a semester of first-year composition that some students 
appear to be more agentive—that is, rhetorically effective—than others. For Cooper, the 
difference lies in the extent to which one possesses “openness to other possibilities, to 
other opinions, to the voices of others” (441). If rhetoric can be characterized as 
deliberation between multiple agents, with each agent aiming to change this or that 
agent’s mind regarding this or that issue, then this kind of openness is essential to the 
very existence of rhetoric. One cannot be persuaded if they refuse to be open to 
alternative views, and if persuasion is impossible, then rhetoric is futile. Indeed, the root 
cause of much-lamented congressional dysfunction and gridlock in the United States can 
be understood as a lack of openness between members of Congress—and this implies a 
failure of agency itself. (It should perhaps be noted that this lack of openness is not 
uniformly spread across Capitol Hill. Cooper identifies Barack Obama as an exemplar of 
openness, and attributes much of his rhetorical prowess to this openness. On the other 
hand, when Richard Mourdock, the 2012 Indiana Republican candidate for Senate, 
asserted that “bipartisanship ought to consist of Democrats coming to the Republican 
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point of view,” it became apparent that not everyone in Congress is taking their agentive 
responsibilities seriously.) 
Badiou’s Being and Event also attempts to resolve the problem of the decentered 
postmodern subject, and Badiou’s solution to the problem has the corollary effect of 
casting rhetorical agency in a new light. For Badiou, the subject arises when an event 
occurs, fidelity is pledged to the indiscernible, and a truth procedure is initiated. As he 
writes: “the definition of the subject: that which decides an undecidable from the 
standpoint of an indiscernible” (407). In other words, the subject is formed, transiently, at 
the interstice of a preexisting situation and the truth that punches through it. In the 
context of Badiou, the tightly interwoven—and in some ways coterminous—relationship 
between knowledge, truth, and truth-procedure leads to a reframing of the concept of 
agency: a “rhetorical agent” can be understood as a person who identifies an event and 
responds to it with fidelity and ethical action.  
It must again be acknowledged that Badiou does not view event, and the 
subjectivities that can emerge from them, as common occurrences. As he puts it in Une 
Soirée Philosophique, “the subject is rare” (24-25). This is because, for Badiou, the event 
itself is rare: although he does not offer many concrete examples, the supposition seems 
to be that only in extraordinary circumstances—Aeschylus’ tragedies, or Leonardo da 
Vinci’s painting of the “Last Supper”—will a true “indiscernible” surge into and shatter 
ontologically constructible reality. He implies that a true event is nothing less than a 
catastrophic schism in the existing order of human knowledge, one that dramatically 
reroutes the course of history. If we operate under this assumption, then my earlier 
examples of events—e.g., lovers getting divorced—are utterly wrongheaded. So does this 
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mean that, if Badiou’s theory is used as a model for rhetorical agency, we must concede 
that the chance of acquiring agency is lower than winning the lottery and being struck by 
lightning—both on the same day? 
In a word, no. One way to tackle the problem is to argue that, despite the 
monumental influence of Being and Event on Continental philosophers since its French 
publication in 1988, the frequency with which “events,” however defined, occur remains 
a matter of vigorous debate. As Patrick O’Connor notes, Derrida, who developed his own 
theory of the event, depicted a “much more radical and frequent usurpation” of the 
established order (151). As I have pointed out, Continental philosophy, for all its 
sweeping explanatory power, is not exactly susceptible to either empirical confirmation 
and/or falsification; there is no way to “prove,” in an objective sense, whether Derrida or 
Badiou forwards the most “true” theory regarding the frequency of events. And, as I have 
also mentioned, it is because of this unfalsifiability that I view Continental philosophy 
not as a means of evaluating the efficacy of real-life classroom practices, but as a kind of 
heuristic that enables us to consider real-life practices in different, unconventional 
terms—terms that can help us perceive gaps and mishaps in our thinking. Reading one 
system in light of a competing system often teaches us new things about both systems, as 
well as things that lie outside them both. Given this, one could just say, “I prefer 
Derrida’s theory to Badiou’s, and since Badiou has not explicitly debunked Derrida’s 
theory, I’m going to run with it.” However, there is another approach that I find more 
attractive. 
Badiou’s theory of the event seems to hinge on the punching-through of an 
indiscernible into knowledge as a totality. In other words, an event is something that 
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absolutely no one could have foreseen. However, no individual consciousness, nor any 
community of individuals, is privy to the totality of human knowledge; it possesses but a 
minute sliver of it. For this reason, it is quite possible to—at risk of bending and 
stretching Badiou’s theory beyond his approved limits—consider that even if an instance 
occurs that would not qualify as an “event” for Badiou, due to it already having been 
subsumed into human knowledge-as-totality, could nonetheless be virtually 
indistinguishable from an event to a community of people who are utterly unaware of the 
instance’s subsumption. Indeed, Badiou calls indiscernibles indiscernible for a reason: 
even if our known world is being torn asunder, we still cannot know with certainty 
whether or not we are confronting a true evental caesura. Yet we are responsible for 
pledging fidelity to these ruptures anyway, because if we didn’t, we’d never pledge 
fidelity to anything, be it an event or not. Agency is enacted through this blind struggle, 
this grasping in the dark in search for novel possibilities and new spheres of knowledge. 
We cannot control the frequency or nature of events, but we can control our vigilance and 
openness towards them and, through rhetorical action, try to suture the rips and tears in 
the existing order. Whether or not we grapple with events on a daily basis is immaterial. 
It is the grappling—in and of itself—that counts. 
In terms of rhetoric and first-year composition, Badiou’s theory of the event leads 
to a refinement of the definitions of and relationships between kairos and rhetorical 
agency. Badiou’s sparsely-occurring events—overthrowing a long-ruling monarchy and 
establishing a constitutional republic, or ushering in a new artistic paradigm—are clearly 
kairotic under any definition of the term. But if seizing a kairotic moment is understood 
to be the process by which we seek out and respond to what we perceive as “events,” or 
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to other ruptures that, even if they are not true events, nonetheless stand as an opportunity 
to expand the realm of knowledge—then the term’s umbrella widens to encompass many 
more potential rhetorical situations. Generally speaking, first-year composition students 
must contend with an untold array of anxieties and uncertainties. They must confront any 
number of  “academic discourse’s” many incarnations, most of which will be alien to 
them; struggle to appropriate the “independent adult” identity in spite of the vestigial 
remnants of adolescence that shadow them; venture off into an unexplored territory 
known only as hic sunt dracones, and then compose a five-page essay that effectively 
analyzes this territory, to be turned in before class next Monday. Read in this way, most 
any first-year composition assignment can be viewed as a kind of kairotic moment. Our 
students—particularly, but not exclusively, the traditional fresh-out-of-high-school 19-
year-olds—will be continually and heavily pummeled with “indiscernibles,” with the 
real, with truths that they have not yet confronted but must confront, whether they like it 
or not. And first-year composition is one of the arenas of this barrage, this struggle—and 
it’s often a uniquely important one, in that many courses allow or encourage students to 
engage with these events through process-oriented writing. Every time a student is asked 
to charge forth into this terra incognita and tango with unknown dragons, their personal 
“situations” are disrupted, on however small a scale, and they must find a way to not only 
repair the damage, but do so in a way that actually edifies their situations. Unless all the 
students simply recycle old pro/con papers on abortion rights that they wrote in 10th 
grade, this process plays out in every classroom to some extent. 
Admittedly, this is a truism in many ways. That first-year composition students 
struggle with uncertainty is not news to anyone who has been a first-year student. But in 
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light of a particular dominant conception of kairos—that is is scarce, and extraordinarily 
difficult to grasp—a different picture emerges: kairos is everywhere, in every classroom, 
all the time. First-year composition is a veritable cornucopia of Badiouian micro-events 
(though, of course, the students may perceive them as quite macro, indeed). This 
complements Cooper’s suggestion that, rather than placing agency, carrot-on-a-stick-like, 
atop the proverbial Everest, we should toss the notion of agency as a acquired 
empowerment out the window, and emphasize instead “responsibility” and “openness.” 
Or, as Badiou might put it, a vigilance toward the evental “others” that can both shatter, 
reshape, and strengthen our worldviews.   
But however ubiquitous kairos may be, ubiquity does not equate with tractability. 
Being and Event may have attempted to reconcile the one with the multitude, but the 
resultant ontology is far from a seamless—or even intelligible—whole. That 
indiscernibility is so central to Badiou’s evental universe is telling: kairos may be 
commonplace, but the truth procedures by which it materializes are fraught, uncertain, 
arising from volatile void that roils behind the veil of the constructible order. One can 
respond to a kairotic event, and even develop a formulaic procedure for doing so, as the 
Writing Arguments textbook does. Indeed, as any experienced writer knows, it is always 
good to form a plan before intervening in potentially kairotic rhetorical situations, and 
even Badiou’s terminology—truth “procedures”—point toward the formulaic nature of 
composition. But our procedures will always be tainted with errancy and purblindness. It 
is out of this dynamic--and often conflicting--interplay between our deliberate rhetorical 
posturing and the vicissitudes of the indiscernible that kairos and agency emerge. 
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The chaos and conflict that so often arise when well-laid plans (e.g., a formula for 
kairos-grasping) collide with concrete reality are elucidated in Lucy Suchman’s landmark 
critique of artificial intelligence research, Plans and Situated Actions. Though published 
in 1987—which may be viewed as a veritable paleolithic era when to comes to research 
in computer and machine technology—Suchman’s contentions remain remarkably 
relevant today. She argues that the dominant paradigm of her time regarding AI—that 
intelligence involves the analysis of a problem, then a devising of a plan, and, finally the 
execution of the plan—is, while not precisely incorrect, a deeply insufficient and 
simplistic description of human cognition. Citing Boden’s example of this process: 
If one intends to buy bread, for instance, the knowledge of which bakers are open 
and which are shut on that day of the week will enter into the generation of one’s 
plan of action in a definite way; one’s knowledge of local topography (and 
perhaps of map-reading) will guide one’s locomotion to the selected shop; one’s 
knowledge of linguistic grammar and of the reciprocal roles of shopkeeper and 
customer will be needed to generate that part of the action-plan concerned with 
speaking to the baker, and one’s financial competence will guide and monitor the 
exchange of coins over the shop counter. (Boden, qtd. in Suchman, 44) 
Indeed, such planning and execution is an important, integral aspect of human problem-
solving ability, as is well-known to any rhetor who has analyzed her audience prior to 
putting words to the page. But people are not exactly automatons, either. We do not 
approach the world as if our craniums were packed with cogs and wheels that whirr into 
action every time we make a trip to the refrigerator; we do not consciously map out a 
comprehensive blueprint for rising up from the sofa, navigating down the hallway, 
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opening the fridge door, retrieving the pitcher of iced tea, etc. Or, perhaps more 
accurately, we do do that to some extent, but not in the same way that an 
anthropomorphic robot with circuit boards for brains and software programs for thoughts 
would do it. In fact, we perform this task, and countless other tasks, much more adroitly 
than any currently conceivable robot ever could. This is largely because, unlike any robot 
that exists today, we can rip our well-laid plans to shreds at any time if they happen go 
awry, and then plan anew, improvise. 
This limitation of current AI technology, Suchman notes, is reflected in her 
recounting of a 1960s project to build a robot that can “navigate autonomously through a 
series of rooms” (29). The robot could achieve this feat by observing the room, plotting a 
path through the obstacles contained therein, and then following the path. As long as the 
environment remained undisturbed after the robot had charted its course, it was 
successful. But if the obstacles were moved around, the robot was hopeless—after the 
blueprint had been devised, it could no longer observe the room, so it just bumbled about, 
bumping into objects, lost in the proverbial dark. The robot’s plan, in filtering out as 
“noise” crucial information about its environment, was simply too inflexible. But a 
human on her way to the fridge would simply recognize that that, for instance, her 
husband was standing in hallway and blocking her path; so rather than knocking into him, 
she would merely walk around him, or ask him to move, “please.” For Suchman, the 
upshot of this distinction is that plans are best understood not as rigid dictators of actions, 
but as resources that can usefully inform our action, as long as we so happen to find them 
useful in a given situation. 
	  	  	   81	  
Regarding rhetoric and composition theory more specifically, Thomas Kent 
provides a theoretical vocabulary that helps ground the processes described by Badiou, 
Cooper, and Suchman in terms of localized communicative interaction—a useful 
framework when it comes to composition theory. In Paralogic Rhetoric, Kent develops a 
framework that echoes Badiou’s, but grounded in a different, more socio-linguistically 
oriented foundation. Extending the work of Analytic philosopher Donald Davidson into 
rhetoric and composition studies, Kent concludes that reading and writing involves the 
“interpretation of another language’s code,” an interpretation we come to through what 
he calls “hermeneutic guessing.” The term “guessing”—rather than, say, “ascertaining”—
stems from Kent’s rejection of the idea that language practices can be described in terms 
of  “conventions” or “discourse communities.” On this point, Kent follows in the 
footsteps of Davidson and, to an extent, Derrida. This rejection does not equate with the 
assertion that conventions don’t exist at all; they do. But conventions are not the 
foundation of communication, as many frameworks (like social-constructivism) often 
assume. For Kent, because every communicative situation is different and no two 
interlocutors possess the same knowledge, there is no viable way to systematize all the 
local human interactions that occur. Rhetoric, therefore is paralogic, i.e., it cannot be 
codified. So hermeneutic guessing is bound up with the fact that because language cannot 
be systematized, our rhetorical choices, or guessing strategies—or fidelity pledges—are 
likewise impossible to codify. A writer can never know with absolute certainty whether 
or not her communicative guesswork will be effective, just as a reader can never know 
whether he will accurately guess the writer’s intentions. Conventions, such as they are, 
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may help improve the precision of hermeneutic guessing, but they are hardly axiomatic. 
And it is through this dialogic guesswork that beliefs and knowledge are produced. 
Kent’s analysis of language’s resistance to systematization further troubles 
procedural pedagogy’s highly systematic approach to rhetoric. This is not to say that 
there is no substance to the contention that, for instance, effective rhetoric is often 
marked by the adroit blending of ethos, logos, and pathos, or that a successful seizure of 
kairos presents an argument in what appears to be an audience-sensitive and temporally 
prescient way. And there is no doubt that effective rhetors grapple with these concerns, 
even if only on a subconscious level (as tends to be the case in my own writing). Kent’s 
analysis does, however, infuse these procedural strategies with a high degree of 
uncertainty.  
As a hypothetical example, consider the classic case of the graduate student who 
wishes to publish his first article. He has read many articles similar to his own, and 
knows that it is important to have strong ethos when trying to nab that coveted initial 
publication. He attempts to achieve through what on the surface seems to be the safest 
and most obvious and route: In the first paragraph of the article, he cites other scholars 
who are addressing the same topic. “I’d better cite a lot of people here,” he thinks, 
“otherwise, the editors will immediately mark me as some grad student who doesn’t 
know his stuff yet.” So he loads up the introduction with references; indeed, he includes 
nearly as many citations of the words of others as he does his own. Finally, he submits 
the article to the journal with cautious optimism, woefully oblivious of the fact that an 
over-cited introduction is often interpreted by journal editors as a rhetorical misfire 
particularly prevalent among grad students trying to publish their first article. Indeed, it is 
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noteworthy that many of the cornerstone articles on rhetoric and composition—such as 
those included in the Cross-Talk in Comp Theory anthology—are marked by an unusual 
scarcity of introductory citations, relative to what most graduate students produce in their 
seminars (I have not conducted any empirical research on the matter, but I would not be 
surprised if the essays in Cross-Talk had substantially fewer citations, on average, than 
the total population of articles, for reasons I shall come to in a moment). A fair number of 
them even begin with personal anecdotes. Yet, to make matters even more confusing for 
our poor graduate student, the authors of the classic composition articles are often able to 
get away with personal anecdotes only because they have acquired the necessary ethos in 
the first place, by virtue of having already become established scholars. So our grad 
student is placed in the perplexing position of having to find some way to sprinkle his 
citations lightly enough to appear confident and professionally “arrived,” yet not so 
lightly that he appears hubristic and glib. So much for for “rhetoric and composition 
discourse” being an easily systematizable, non-paralogic entity. And the strategies for 
projecting ethos found in Writing Arguments appear here to be just as likely to enfeeble 
his article as to invigorate it. 
Read rather bluntly, all this implies that a rhetorical “blueprint” for apprehending 
kairos is akin to a software program that governs a robot’s artificial frontal lobe. It may 
sound like a good plan; indeed, it may actually be a good plan. But when the messy work 
of executing that plan begins, the obstacles—or indiscernibles, or misfired guesses—that 
confront the rhetor may not remain as fixed and intelligible as we would like. Take, for 
example, a person who, on May 1, 2011, decides to publish a newspaper editorial in 
response to a recent article about the United States’ inability to catch Osama bin Laden. 
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They might memorize Writing Arguments’ formula, but any number of pitfalls could 
gape open: They may find that they don’t fully understand the political discourse they are 
entering into, and that they don’t have enough time to study it before their editorial is 
rendered a belated response to the article in question. Or, even if they do manage to 
compose something they perceive as effective, they can never be sure how an opposing 
view might respond—especially considering the fact that, if the editorial were published 
the next day, it would only be a matter of hours before Barack Obama announced that bin 
Laden had been killed. A critic of more procedural approaches to composition may even 
be tempted to think that, in light of so many potential “events” that threaten to vitiate the 
editorial’s efficacy, the “instruction manual” approach to writing should be eschewed in 
favor of some other, more flexible rhetorical strategy: perhaps something like Elbow’s 
“declaration of independence... from care, control, planning, order, steering, trying to get 
it right, trying to get it good,” only in the absence of which he found that he could 
ultimate compose “decent stuff” (xvii). 
But this would not be a debate-stopper. In fact, it would only be the beginning a 
debate that might turn out to be unresolvable. Here, a proponent of more procedural 
approaches, citing Suchman, might retort by pointing out that humans are not 
automatons, and that even if a given rhetorical “blueprint” is inefficient, it is nonetheless 
a useful resource that can inform our actions. A writer can acknowledge the limitations of 
their initial plan, and then resort to an alternative plan in Writing Arguments (there is no 
shortage of plans in that book), or even return to the original plan, reconsidering it in light 
of the new information that had been collected. If this were the case, then it would appear 
that, in many ways, both parties were correct. Preferred pedagogical approaches 
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notwithstanding, it is this paradoxical tension—i.e., a tension between contrary but 
equally correct doxas or beliefs—in its entirety that best describes the combination of 
systematism and dynamism within every act of rhetoric and writing. 
Indeed, this tension can be found at the heart of Badiou’s project. Despite his 
preoccupation with rupture, fluidity, and the general bedlam of material reality, Badiou 
grounds his theories in mathematics: a systematic philosophical springboard if there ever 
was one. The set theory with which he is concerned may lend itself to ambiguity more 
than some other subsets of mathematics, but he aims for maximum formal rigor, out of 
which the turbulence of “events” emerges. This tension can also be found in even the 
most ostensibly process-oriented (e.g., non-procedural) pedagogical approaches; as I 
show in another chapter, even Peter Elbow’s Writing Without Teachers contains a certain 
amount of instruction manual-like rhetorical blueprints. It seems that no matter how 
radical or “bottom-up” a pedagogy is, no matter how unaligned it appears to be with 
Writing Arguments, a procedural component will invariably be present somewhere in the 
framework. Take, for instance, Gregory Ulmer’s Heuretics. This is about as avant-garde 
as pedagogical approach could possibly be, aiming, first and foremost, to subvert and 
deconstruct theoretical paradigms in general, replacing them with original counter-
paradigms of a writer’s own design. But it achieves this objective through an 
“antimethod” (12) that is, in a certain sense, about as formulaic as a method could 
possibly be: the CATTt, an acronym for contrast, analogy, theory, target, and tail/tale (or 
invention). The CATTt is a sort of interactive algorithm, a virtual machine into which a 
writer “inputs” a particular framework (modernism, in his example), deconstructs it as it 
passes through the CATTt’s stages, and then receives an inventional “output” 
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(postmodernism). Ulmer insists that the CATTt is not an algorithm, because it requires 
the writer’s active participation (12). But while his argument is mostly persuasive, one 
could still be forgiven for mistaking it for an algorithm. And in any case, there is no 
doubt that for all its subversiveness and interactivity, the CATTt still demands an 
allegiance to its formula, an unwavering adherence to its prescribed, if open-ended, 
blueprint; at the same time, however, this allegiance leads to independence, to conceptual 
revolutions. In this sense, the CATTt and the kairos formula in Writing Arguments have a 
lot in common: the formula may be rigid, but its improvisational application to real-world 
rhetorical exigencies is anything but. 
So when it comes to the distinctions between procedural approaches and 
alternative pedagogical approaches, it seems clear that there is no purity to the disparity: 
as discussed earlier, Writing Arguments is chock full of opportunities for student’s 
imaginative, spontaneous interaction with the textbook; and Peter Elbow offers multiple 
writing “procedures,” even though rhetorically, they come across more like “flexible, 
friendly advice.” So while there are certainly substantive differences between Elbow and, 
say, Fulkerson, these differences are akin to those between total darkness and total 
light—both a scientific impossibility, because the former will always be contaminated by 
stray electrons from the latter; and not enough of the latter exists to completely fill all the 
spaces in which the former lurks. In practice, each approach implicitly advocates a least a 
sliver of the other’s assumptions. And indeed, as much as composition teachers tend to 
view current-traditional pedagogy with the sort of disdain often reserved for the pre-
women’s suffrage era, there is no escaping the fact that, as Berlin and others have spent 
their careers pointing out, the teacher will always be at the “helm” of the classroom to a 
	  	  	   87	  
significant extent, regardless of whether she arranges the desks in a circle and nurtures 
democratic class discussion. She will always be frustrated with students’ egregious 
grammatical faux pas and will make some effort to correct them, even if she eschews the 
red ink in favor of a more tenderhearted blue. She will always assign final grades, even if 
she permits repeated revisions; and in her flawed humanity, the grading will never be 
perfectly just, no matter how many peer-reviewed articles she reads about empowering 
marginalized discourse communities. Also, it might be worth noting that sentence-
combining has been making something of a comeback recently. 
Here is another truism: The composition classroom, like every other arena of 
human affairs, is mind-bogglingly messy, self-contradictory, troublesome, and 
overwhelming. It has consistently confounded our individual and collective intelligence; 
this is why scholarship continues to point out, usually correctly, the oversights and 
shortcomings of other scholarship. This is also why it is so endlessly interesting: these 
tensions are here to stay, forever. It’s a Rubik’s Cube with no solution, but one that our 
innate problem-solving faculties cannot resist toying with. One might argue that to 
highlight this affinity between procedural and alternative approaches is akin to boldly 
proclaiming that there will always be a slight gap between reality and humanity’s 
perception of it: a truth so familiar that it doesn’t require a chapter-length dissection. But 
I would submit that it is a truth so elemental that it can’t be discussed enough, and that 
sometimes, in our struggle for professional status and tenure, in our institutionally-
enforced fealty to specialization and territorialization, in our efforts to find chinks in the 
armor of existing scholarship and make a critical intervention, we forget just how 
perplexed we are by even the most basic problems of the field. We’re in a maze, and 
	  	  	   88	  
there is no exit. This is worth keeping in mind—as if we could prevent it from occupying 
our minds—as we fret over syllabuses and textbook options; as we pace back and forth 
across our living rooms trying to decide whether a particular student essay deserves a B- 
or a C+; as we, to paraphrase the historian Arnold Toynbee, try one damned thing after 
another, never getting it exactly right, but never abandoning our efforts to make these 
things work just a little bit better. And perhaps, in light of all this puzzlement, there is at 
least one thing we can know is true: that though events both large and small will to tear 
our assumptions asunder, we can choose to watch out for them, to pledge our fidelity to 
them, to remain responsibly open to them, even when—or especially when—they appear 
so alien that they seem like an alternate reality. 
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CHAPTER 3: PROCESS APPROACH 
“In 1818, Joseph Jacotot, a lecturer in French literature at the University of 
Louvain, had an intellectual adventure.” So begins Jacques Rancière’s The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster, a 1991 analysis of the power dynamics between teachers and students. The 
year 1991 was a time of vigorous debate over this very topic within composition studies. 
In the preceding years, Peter Elbow had been fine-tuning his theory of the “teacherless” 
classroom, forwarding his philosophy of education in Embracing Contraries (1987); 
David Bartholomae, on the other hand, had published the Ways of Reading textbook—
still a common fixture in contemporary composition courses—in 1987. This was also the 
time when Elbow and Bartholomae, in 1989 and 1991, began conversing about their 
competing pedagogical approaches—and began a conversation that would famously 
culminate in a very public debate within the pages of College Composition and 
Communication in 1995. However, despite the conceptual connections (and frictions) 
between Elbow, Bartholomae, and Rancière, the latter was never discussed—or even 
name-dropped—in either College English or CCC.  Nevertheless, Rancière’s account of a 
peculiar, 200-year-old pedagogical experiment is no less relevant now than it was then, 
and illuminates this core debate, which has always shaped and continues to shape the 
discipline: the complex, transactional relationships between knowledge, students, and 
teachers. 
Jacotot was a teacher of, among other things, mathematics, ancient languages, and 
law. He had obtained a position at the Ecole Polytechnique. But when the House of 
Bourbon reclaimed power in France in 1814, he was forced in exile in the Netherlands. 
Fortunately, the king of the Netherlands was generous, and Jacotot secured a 
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professorship in Louvain at half pay. The trouble was that only few students at the 
university at which he was assigned to teach were familiar with the French language, and 
Jacotot knew no Flemish. He was a teacher who, like many teachers at the time, viewed 
himself as a sort of “master explicator” who verbally transfers his authoritative 
knowledge to the less-educated students. The presupposition here, as Rancière puts it, is 
that an “oral explication is usually necessary to explicate the written explication,” and 
that, therefore, “the reasonings are clearer, are better imprinted on the mind of the 
student, when they are conveyed in the speech of the master” (5). Under this assumption, 
if the languages of a teacher and his students are mutually incomprehensible, then 
developing an effective pedagogy would seem to be a Herculean, if not downright 
impossible, task. 
Nevertheless, Jacotot did what most any teacher in his predicament would do: the 
best he could under the circumstances. Jacotot learned of a bilingual edition of Fenelon’s 
Telemaque, a didactic novel popular at the time among Enlightenment thinkers, that 
ventured to fill in some of the “gaps” in Homer’s Odyssey. He assigned the book to his 
class and, through an interpreter, instructed them to study the French text with the aid of 
the Flemish translation. The results of the experiment-by-necessity vastly exceeded 
Jacotot’s expectation of “horrendous barbarisms” (6). Not only were the students, without 
any help from a master explicator, able to decipher the French text, they managed to 
identify the key themes and concepts as adroitly “as many French could have done” (6).  
Jacotot couldn’t have known it at the time, but his experiment foreshadowed two 
debates that have been broiling ever since the teaching of college writing gained a critical 
self-awareness and concretized into a full-fledged academic field. The process movement 
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that began in the late 1960s and early 1970s revolutionized writing pedagogy by 
emphasizing the process of writing—brainstorming, drafting, revising, etc.—rather the 
finished product. One of the effects of this paradigm shift was to partially reduce the 
authority of the teacher and his sometimes-tyrannical red pen, and shift the balance of 
power towards the students who, rather than regurgitating teacher-mandated “themes,” 
instead relied on a few basic precepts involving the writing process and actively explored 
themselves and their worlds through writing. Crucially, this placed the students’ writing 
at the core of the classroom, along with the experiences, ideas and perceptions 
documented therein. In this chapter, I will read process pedagogy in light of Rancière in 
order to more fully explicate and complicate the mechanics and dynamics of classroom 
practices that aim to place students in the driver’s seat, or at least give them partial 
control over the steering wheel. 
The process approach, it should be noted, cannot be isolated from the debates that 
emerged from its frictive relationship with competing pedagogical approaches. These 
debates revolved (and still revolve) around a fundamental question: What is the most 
effective—and, for many scholars, politically progressive—way to constellate the 
relations between students, teachers, and knowledge? Should learning be situated within 
a more egalitarian and/or dialectical relationship between a teacher and her students? Is 
there a need for a strong teacher authority in any classroom? Is such an authority 
avoidable in the first place? To what extent should student writing be essayistic—in both 
the noun (a text written in the “essay” genre) and verb (to “essay” is to strive, attempt, 
explore) senses? To what extent should more formalized “academic writing” stand as the 
centerpiece of the course? Like any long-running debate, this one has taken on a variety 
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of shapes and forms, but the 1995 conversation between David Bartholomae and process 
theory trailblazer Peter Elbow provides an unusually lucid example of it, and one that, if 
read from a certain angle, is of utmost relevance to Jacotot’s (and Rancière’s) 
recognitions. Stating their cases in the pages of CCC, Elbow and Bartholomae differ over 
the extent to which the roles of “writer” and “academic” conflict. Put roughly, 
Bartholomae maintains that teachers need to emphasize students’ writing within 
academic discourse conventions in order to gain literacy and empowerment with/against 
this dominant discourse. Elbow, on the other hand, contends that while students’ 
appropriation of the role of “academic” is critically important, the role of the writer 
should nonetheless be privileged. For him, this means that the classroom should be a 
space in which students come to “experience themselves as writers” (78) via free inquiry 
through writing. Inevitably, such inquiry can result in naive self-absorption. But as Elbow 
points out, such pride (and even arrogance), along with a counterbalancing dose of 
caution, is inherent to anyone—including academics—who are confident enough to see 
themselves “writers worth listening to.” Student writing is not only about words on a 
page; it’s also about self-perception, identity (re)construction, the affirmation of “I am a 
writer.” Ultimately, in such a classroom, it is the students who take ownership of their 
writing—not the teacher to whom they must write “up.” 
Rancière casts the Bartholomae-Elbow debate—and the tendency toward process 
pedagogy more broadly—in a new light, highlighting tensions that exist in every 
composition classroom: the complex processes by which students learn and become 
“agents,” and the balance of power between teachers and students. The overlaps between 
and fissures across this pedagogical triad are numerous, and often subtle. Elbow’s 
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bottom-up, student-driven classroom parallels Jacotot’s in some senses, but it is not 
congruent with it; more so than Rancière, Elbow’s scholarship recognizes the practical 
ineluctability of teacherly authority, albeit a reduced authority aimed at empowering 
students. Along similar lines, while the teacher’s power is pared down in Elbow’s 
classroom, even he acknowledges—along with Barthomolae, although to a lesser 
extent—that the academy’s institutional demands may require a certain level of teacherly 
dominance in the classroom; indeed, power relations are inevitable in institutions. And 
given the brevity of a semester, a certain amount of masterly explication may be 
necessary for the sake of pedagogical expediency. Bartholomae, too, plants a foot (or a 
toe, at least) in Elbow’s territory when he affirms that students should “of course” have 
an opportunity to write what Bartholomae calls “sentimental realism;” however, he also 
feels he doesn’t need to teach it in his courses (71). The categories, in other words, are 
not always clearly demarcated. 
I will not argue here for a universal implementation of Rancière’s “universal 
teaching” method (which would, if anything, transform my doctorate in Rhetoric and 
Composition into a useless scrap of embossed parchment). But by reading process theory, 
as well as the problem of teacher versus student authority, in light of Rancière, this 
chapter will aim to portray the political tensions that every classroom inhabits—not to 
provide easy answers or resolutions, but to dramatize the difficulty, if not impossibility, 
of circumventing them. Most teachers like to think that their classrooms are “student-
centered,” and Rancière pushes the concept of the student-centered classroom to its 
logical extreme. What does this say about our teaching, and the ideals that inform it? 
And, just as importantly, what does it mean for student agency? 
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 “The only slogan that had any value,” Rancière writes of Jacotot’s radical 
pedagogy, “was equality of intelligence” (56). All intelligences are equal. Such a 
sweeping declaration may to raise the eyebrows of even the staunchest political 
progressives, this one included. Despite the fact that we are committed to the just and 
equal treatment of all students, is it not evident that some students perform better than 
others under the same circumstances? Of course, socio-economic background plays a role 
in student performance. It is difficult to stay attentive in class if your skin color brands 
you as inferior in the eyes of your teacher, or if you parents are too poor to serve you 
breakfast before school (a first grade teacher I know relates frequent anecdotes 
suggesting that low blood sugar levels in six-year-olds are a major contributor to 
“deficient” accountability test scores). But what about the two upper-middle-class 
brothers, who are treated lovingly and equally by their parents, but nonetheless end up on 
opposite ends of the academic success spectrum—one at Harvard, say, and the other in an 
“alternative” school for troubled teens? What about differences in brain wiring and 
chemistry? It is impossible to fully disentangle culture and intelligence, but surely there 
are biological factors that would undermine any myth of equal intelligence among all 
humans.  
But for Rancière, these are the wrong questions to ask. For one, the difficulty in 
answering those questions, given our limited scientific knowledge about the human brain, 
the complexity of socio-economic factors’ impact on cognitive function, and the bias 
inherent in culturally constructed assessments of “intelligence,” renders any attempt to 
incorporate them into pedagogical practice dubious. It’s as if speculative questions about 
brain wiring or breakfast availability among first graders are somehow, in a topsy-turvy 
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display of mental acrobatics, reified into questionable answers: This student comes from 
a poor family and is a few grade levels behind his peers, so he must need more explicit 
top-down grammar (or math, or science) instruction; this student has wealthy parents, yet 
still struggles in class, so there must be something wrong with her brain chemistry (but 
not, of course, innate ability)—let’s prescribe her some Ritalin. 
Undoubtedly, such student plights are, in many cases, real.  But for Rancière, the 
pedagogical approaches that so often address them are even more troubled (and 
troubling) than the students themselves.  And the trouble for Rancière lies in part, in the 
fact that some students are labeled, explicitly or implicitly “inferior” to others, even if 
this inferiority is mitigated or offset by, for instance, inequitable economic forces far 
beyond that student’s control—forces eloquently described by Mike Rose throughout his 
career, from his own childhood experiences as a (mis)labeled “remedial student” to his 
account of the oft-unrecognized intellectual acumen of waitresses, plumbers, and 
hairdressers. Other scholars who have investigated the interactions and confusions 
between culture and cognition include Mina Shaughnessy (who described basic writers as 
“natives” who need to become members of a social community) and James Paul Gee 
(who noted that students who struggle with basic reading and writing might also be 
masterful players of Pokemon—a game that is actually far more complex than the 
reading and writing with which they struggle—and questioned the utility of direct 
instruction for literacy skills in light of students’ natural acquisition of such skills through 
daily immersion). Rancière is also troubled by the fact that the teachers themselves, by 
virtue of playing the role of the Keeper of Knowledge—“This poor student is not 
performing well in math, so I shall pull him aside and explain the theorems to him more 
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clearly”—are complicit in this assumption of intellectual asymmetry in the classroom. 
Even if a teacher assumes that all the students are of equal intelligence, it is still quite 
possible for him to not believe that everyone in the classroom is of equal intelligence or 
ability: the teacher still occupies the lofty position of master explicator. 
The preceding paragraph will, and should, raise a variety of red flags in the minds 
of many composition teachers: “But in my classroom, my students and I construct the 
class discussion collaboratively, democratically and dialogically.” Or: “I don’t assume 
that my students are less intelligent than me; on the contrary, some of them appear to me 
far more intelligent than I was at that age [I have certainly noted this in some cases]. But 
it is an indisputable fact that they are less experienced than I am, in the ways of both 
writing and the world, and one of my jobs as a teacher is to share this experience with 
them.” These protestations may well be valid, but they also don’t get at the heart of 
Rancière’s contention. A key aspect of universal teaching is that it is concerned not only 
with the acquisition of knowledge and skills, but also with the socially contextual 
dimension of literacy—the power relationships between students, teachers, and 
institutions. To be sure, scholars have grappled with the politics of race, class, and gender 
in the composition classroom, but in practice, students are still assessed in terms of the 
writing skills they appear to have acquired by the end of the semester. What would a 
classroom look like if we graded students on how diligently they have searched for 
knowledge in the absence of teacherly explication—if we “graded them on effort,” one 
could say?  To this end, it is important to momentarily return to and clarify Jacotot’s (and 
Rancière’s) subversive pronouncement. 
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For Rancière we simply don’t know enough about intelligence to assert, 
conclusively, that all intelligences are not equal. His supposition that they are equal is 
purely pragmatic: “our problem isn’t proving that all intelligence is equal.  It’s seeing 
what can be done under that supposition. And for this, it’s enough for us that the opinion 
be possible--that is, that no opposing truth be proved” (46, italics mine). But what use 
might we have in assuming that all intelligences are equal? ForRancière, the advantages 
of this supposition manifest in an intricate relationship between empowering pedagogy 
and liberatory politics. First and foremost, this assumption dispels with what Rancière 
considers to be the oppressive authority of the Master Explicator. But how is a teacher 
simply explaining the content of a book to students anything other than innocuous, or 
even helpful?  “The pedagogical myth,” Rancière writes, “divides the world in two. More 
precisely, it divides intelligence into two. It says that there is an inferior intelligence and 
a superior one”—the superior being the teacher, of course, and the inferior being the 
student (7). The sticking point for Rancière is that while the teacher, by functioning as a 
gatekeeper to knowledge and the power it brings, reveals (or explicates) knowledge to 
students, his higher hierarchical position remains inviolable no matter how much the 
student learns: “The book is never whole, the lesson is never finished.  The master always 
keeps a piece of learning—that is, a piece of the student’s ignorance—up his sleeve” 
(21). And whether or not the teacher is a good teacher—or even teaches correct 
knowledge—is irrelevant. The hierarchies inherent to the institution permit them to exert 
their authority in this way. 
There are problems with Rancière’s critique of explication; teacher-student 
relationships are, in practice, generally more nuanced than his account would suggest. 
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For one, Rancière’s portrayal of knowledge exchange echoes Paulo Freire’s “banking 
method” of education, with knowledge being cleanly transferred from the teacher to the 
student, as if the information were being “downloaded” by the student neatly and 
mechanistically. However, this depiction contradicts Rancière’s own description of 
language. As he puts it, any spoken word—and this must presumably include any word 
spoken by a Master Explicator—may be “sent off with the intention of carrying just one 
thought”; however the word becomes “a center of a sphere of ideas radiating out in all 
directions, such that the speaker has actually said an infinity of things beyond what he 
wanted to say” (63). In other words, words are multivalent and subject to interpretation. 
Under this assumption, a student of a Master Explicator would seem to not be so 
stultified. 
But the usefulness of universal teaching to contemporary composition theory 
doesn’t lie so much in its critique of the mainstream 19th century pedagogy it defines 
itself against. Its usefulness lies within itself. In universal teaching, the teacher can teach 
what she does not know; she must simply keep “verifying that [the student] is always 
searching” for answers in the texts (33). “What do you see?” the ignorant master asks her 
pupil. “What do you make of it?” (23). The teacher’s “ignorance” opens a space in which 
the student’s thoughts can freely flourish. The text being studied is what keeps the 
playing field level: “The materiality of the book keeps two minds at an equal distance, 
whereas explication is the annihilation of one mind by another” (32). The student, then, is 
given (almost) complete autonomy. Still, though, the teacher’s presence remains, even if 
only as a motivating force, so not even Jacotot’s classroom is entirely “teacherless.” Is a 
purely student-centered classroom even possible? It would appear that it is not. 
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Aside from Jacotot’s, the theoretical frameworks with which Rancière grapples 
are, for the most part, those developed by prominent Hellenic philosophers (Plato, 
Socrates, etc.).  But as Kristin Ross, translator of The Ignorant Schoolmaster into 
English, points out, Rancière’s polemics have another, more contemporary, target, if only 
tacitly: Pierre Bourdieu, the influential sociologist whose magnum opus, Distinction: A 
Social Critique on the Judgment of Taste, has achieved canonical status in the humanities 
in general, including composition studies. Put roughly, Distinction theorizes how 
arbitrary taste-markers construct, embody and reinforce unjust socio-economic 
hierarchies: An upper-class person who listens to the “Well-Tempered Clavier,” for 
instance, dominates, via taste distinctions, a person who prefers more lowbrow musical 
selections (Bourdieu cites “The Blue Danube,” but the latest pop-country or gangster-rap 
smash hit could also stand as an example). Bourdieu’s thesis sparked a flurry of 
extensions, elaborations and applications and remains one of the most-cited texts in 
cultural studies, particularly by politically engaged scholars who aim to use his theories 
to move toward a more equitable society. If we can understand the mechanics of how 
power is expressed through cultural signifiers, the assumption seems to be, we can 
dismantle the oppressive machine, emancipating the disenfranchised as we do. 
Among the more obvious counter to Rancière’s arguments is that even if we 
accept that masterly explication stultifies students, explication remains a necessary aspect 
of teaching. Virtually anyone who has ever been a student could provide an anecdote of a 
teacher whose overt clarification of a given issue or concept proved invaluably helpful. 
The importance of explication seems even more paramount when the time constraints of 
pedagogical situations are taken into account; if students need to become proficient in a 
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given skill before, say, the end of a semester, but one of them just can’t seem to grasp it, 
then the committed teacher may well opt for the short cut, pulling that student aside and 
pronouncing, “I am here to show you how it is done.” But citing Jacotot’s successes—
which caused quite a stir of excitement in Europe at the time, inspiring small legions of 
imitators—Rancière holds fast to the assumption that all intelligences are equal, and that 
all intelligences can therefore learn with a high degree of autonomy. Jacotot, he notes, 
repeated his initial experiment with a painting class (Jacotot had no expertise in the art of 
painting). By Jacotot’s own account (if he is to be believed), it was a rousing success. 
 The details of this success story point to two key components of the pedagogy: 1.) the 
role of the teacher, and 2.) the nature of pedagogical efficacy under Rancière’s 
framework. 
What is an ignorant schoolmaster, or “universal teacher” (as Rancière refers to it), 
supposed to do, if masterly explication is impossible or off-limits? The answer: to ensure 
that students are tackling the material with persistence and gusto: “[The universal 
teacher] will not verify what the student has found; he will verify that he has searched” 
(31).  A composition teacher, then, may assign a difficult text (e.g., a bilingual essay by 
Gloria Anzaldua), but rather than explaining the meaning of the text to the student, she 
will simply verify that the student is making a serious attempt at wresting, or 
constructing, meaning from it. In answer to those who may point out that 18-year-old 
college freshmen are generally unequipped to engage effectively with such a difficult 
text, Rancière more or less concedes that the results of such an exercise may not be 
breathtakingly brilliant on the surface. As he admits in his discussion of Jacotot’s 
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painting pupils, “Undoubtedly, there is a great distance from this to making 
masterpieces” (66). But for Rancière, this distracts from the larger, more important point:  
But it’s not a matter of making great painters; it’s a matter of making the 
emancipated: people capable of saying, ‘me too, I am a painter,’ a statement that 
contains nothing in the way of pride, only the reasonable feeling of power that 
belongs to any reasonable being. (67) 
So for Rancière an emancipatory pedagogy isn’t just about knowledge or skill 
acquisition; it’s about how that knowledge is acquired. For if a student “gets used to 
learning through the eyes of others,” he will forget how to learn through his own, and his 
stultification, and oppression, will only become more deeply entrenched (51). It is also 
about the emotional dimension of knowledge acquisition, the feelings of empowerment a 
student experiences when they proclaim their status as painter or writer. As Marilyn 
Cooper points out, following Bakhtin, emotion is a crucial and foundational aspect of 
agency, because “every concrete act of understanding is active: it assimilates the word to 
be understood into its own conceptual system filled with specific objects and emotional 
expressions” (Bakhtin, qtd. in Cooper, 438). Universal teaching aims to situate students’ 
inquiry within their embodied experience—and with the social practices embedded 
within that experience. 
Despite the subject-object relationship between students and teachers in 
Rancière’s text, which sometimes suggests that the teachers liberate the students, it is 
important to (re)emphasize that for Rancière, the teachers, too, must become liberated; 
emancipation is, and can only be, a two-way street.  Universal teaching aims to achieve 
this by placing students and teachers on an equal footing, working as a “community of 
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[ignorant, yet intelligent] equals” (21), whose social relations are tied to the text being 
studied. In “teaching” the book, the teacher simply allows the text to exist as itself, 
without any explication, and then invites the students to forge their own connections with 
and to the text. There is no suggestion that the text contains stable, accessible “hidden 
meanings” that only the teacher can fully unpack. For Rancière, nothing will do other 
than the total obliteration of the traditional teacher-student relationship, which leaves a 
level playing field from which new structures are built communally, from the ground up. 
In an echo of Freire: “Overturning the existing order would be just as irrational as the 
order itself” (88). 
Of course, Rancière is a Continental philosopher, not a scholar of Rhetoric and 
Composition. But composition scholars have grappled with the matter for decades; a 
particularly notable example is Elbow’s Writing Without Teachers, which was published 
nearly 20 years before The Ignorant Schoolmaster. But grappling with a topic, and even 
debating it at length, is not the same as resolving it. And I would submit that the 
unflinching radicalism of Rancière’s approach illuminates these problems in soberingly 
sharp relief, reigniting and dramatizing them, raising questions about what we mean 
when we speak of our classrooms as being “student centered.” In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will reread the perennial and ongoing debate over process theory—the 
processes it advocates, its still-disputed political stance (or, as some would argue, lack 
thereof)—in light of Rancière.  Composition scholarship may have spilt barrels of ink 
since Donald Murray proclaimed that we should teach writing as a process, but in some 
ways, the shockwaves that that proclamation unleashed ripple just as strongly today. So 
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while Rancière’s arguments may not strike us composition scholars as wholly original, 
they do, as I hope to show, rekindle one of our field’s originary concerns. 
The following passage was published over two centuries after Jacotot taught:  
[In] proposing the teacherless writing class I am trying to deny something-- 
something that is often assumed: the necessary connection between learning and  
teaching. The teacherless writing classroom is a place where there is learning but  
no teaching. It is possible to learn something and not be taught. It is possible to be 
a student and not have a teacher... I think that teachers learn to be more useful 
when it is clearer that they are not necessary. (Elbow, ix-x, italics in original) 
Peter Elbow’s Writing Without Teachers was not a normal writing textbook when it was 
published in 1973, and is unusual even today. It does not contain detailed instructions on 
the proper use of the semicolon. It does not provide examples of streamlined five-point 
essays. It discusses audience, but rather than taxonomizing the concept into abstract terms 
like “real,” “imagined” and “invoked,” it forwards images of friends reading each other’s 
writing. And while he discusses, often in concrete terms, the idea of freewriting as a 
method to discover writing subjects, there is an absence of words like stasis or topoi, in 
either the classical or postmodern senses. In fact, the word “invention” does not appear in 
the book at all. 
Elbow’s aim was to provide a framework for a “teacherless” writing classroom; 
indeed, he even states that he “particularly want[s] the book to help students not enrolled 
n a writing class and people out of school altogether” (viii). The word help is indicative 
of Elbow’s assumed role as a sort of non-teacher, at least in the conventional sense: The 
book does not exactly instruct, tutor, lecture, or enlighten. To borrow from Rancière’s 
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lexicon, while the book does offer eminently flexible and polyvalent tips, hints and tricks, 
it keeps overt explication to the barest minimum. Theory abounds, but only in the most 
contingent, least rigid of senses: theory is not an inviolable framework, but a mutable 
cognitive catalyst, shifting in light of changing (or newly perceived) facts. Elbow does 
not hide any secrets up his sleeve; there is no Writing Without Teachers Vol. II: For the 
Advanced Writer. On the contrary, the gist of Elbow’s book is that no one keeps, or can 
keep, secrets from student writers. Secrets emerge from the gaps in the freewriting that 
the student identifies, from the fruitful and readily pursuable tangents that lie just beyond 
the body of a first draft. The exploratory writer creates, and unveils, his own secrets. 
It is true that the book contains the occasional declarative proclamation; indeed 
the first chapter begins with one. But they sometimes seem designed to efface, at least 
partially, Elbow’s authority as a teacher: “The most effective way I know to improve 
your writing is to do freewriting exercises regularly” (3). This sentence, while assertive in 
tone, is packed with subtle signals suggesting that in the end, it is the reader of this book, 
and not Elbow, who will determine that reader’s best writing practices.  “The most 
effective way I know” implies two important points: First, the “most” implies that there is 
more than one way, even more than one effective way, to improve one’s writing, and 
second, the “I know” suggests that regular freewriting is simply the most effective that 
Elbow knows works for him, personally. There is no reason to think (and the rest of the 
book implicitly supports this) that this injunction cannot be improved upon, revised, or 
customized for individual writers. The “I know” also highlights a key stylistic aspect of 
the book. In many places, it verges on (and sometimes is) a personal narrative piece. 
Rather than constructing himself as a lecturer on a lofty lectern, pontificating on 
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unimpeachable writing practices, Elbow comes across like an old friend, a guy sitting 
across the table at the bar or coffee shop, discussing his experiences in the friendliest of 
terms and leaving these experiences open to interpretation. So even when Elbow’s 
rhetoric appears to be dogmatic (e.g., “Avoid anything more than one feeling, perception 
or thought. Simply write as much as possible” [61]), it is nonetheless filtered through this 
more general ethos of openness and elasticity. Its interaction with the reader is not 
entirely top-down, like an instruction manual for a universal remote control. The burden 
is on the student to figure out how to use the book, how to write with it and away from it. 
That the student, not Elbow, has so much control over the steering wheel here 
helps explain why Writing Without Teachers is marked by what might be called a 
pedagogy of calculated chaos. One section is titled “Chaos and Disorientation,” and is 
largely written in the personal narrative form described above; Elbow even, as he does at 
various points of the book, provides concrete examples of his own freewriting 
investigations, and all the confusion and conceptual anarchy that mark such 
investigations. “If the main advice people need to help make their writing grow is to start 
writing and keep writing,” he writes, “their main experience in trying to follow this 
advice is the feeling of chaos and disorientation” (30). First, it is worth noting the use of 
the word “advice” rather than, say, “directive”; the vague (read: polyvalent) nature of the 
advice itself; and the invocation of “experience.” Once again, Elbow represents himself 
as a real person speaking with a real reader, not as an unassailable authority speaking 
unilaterally to a reader—and once again parallels Jacotot’s pedagogy in his emphasis on 
embodied emotional and social experience. Second, and more to the point at hand, 
Elbow’s discussion of how randomness and chaos often precedes coherence in writing 
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(an experience that any reader of this chapter will be all too familiar with) draws 
attention, once again, to the fact that the burden of learning to write effectively lies with 
the student. All that really needs to be done is to write a lot, think about it a lot, and then 
write a lot more. Writers need to blaze their own paths through the wilderness of their 
free-written words, to become agents of their own essaying. Though confusion is 
inevitable, eventually—if the writer is persistent—the stew of competing ideas will 
coalesce and sharpen into focus.   
So, although Elbow offers advice aplenty, this advice tends to be remarkably 
simple and unmystifying. For Elbow, there is no magical, abstruse writing formula that 
requires exceptional intelligence or effort in order to learn, no trove of complex secrets 
that can only be fully understood and elucidated by an ultra-masterful writer. Indeed, one 
of the most important aims of the book is to work against the idea that if a student cannot 
write well, it must mean that expert writers have some special, esoteric “trick” that 
enables them to do so, and that the novice writer must lack knowledge of this trick.   
In terms of Rancière, Elbow may not be a strict “universal teacher.” He offers a 
sort of avuncular advice, and offers it in the readers’ home language, assuming they are 
speakers of English. But as I noted above, his advice, especially when read in light of the 
autobiographical and experiential style of the book, is not dogmatically “explicative.” His 
discussion of disorientation and chaos, for example, suggests that there are aspects of the 
writing process that no teacher can explain for the student; the student must learn, and 
discover, on her own terms. His pedagogy, then, tends toward the Jacotot-ian end of the 
spectrum. To borrow Rancière’s terms, the teacher cannot perform the “search” for the 
student; all she can (and must) do is “verify” that the student is searching, that they write 
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and keep writing. And in a way, the “classroom” of Writing Without Teachers is even 
more radically teacherless than Jacotot’s, insofar as Elbow does not grade the reader’s 
writing, does not hover over his shoulder to verify that he is, indeed, writing with 
consistency and tenacity.   
Furthermore, unlike a mainstream education system that, as Elbow saw it, “made 
people who were smart think they were stupid” (xiv). Elbow more or less assumes, as the 
title of his later collection of essays, Everyone Can Write, indicates, that all intelligences 
are equally capable of producing good writing. Elbow’s teacherless classroom may be 
messy and slow at times, as the students are charged with forging their own way through 
their writing, with little teacherly instruction. But the classroom’s power is derived from 
this very messiness. As Elbow puts it in his discussion of students reading their own own 
work:  
One of the genuinely valuable aspects of the reading you get from the teacherless 
class is that in a sense it is inferior: it will have ‘mistakes,’ the reader will miss 
some meanings that a teacher would get. The most obvious example is that these 
readers give you better evidence of what is unclear in their writing. (128)  
On the surface, this would seem to mean that students are skillful readers of their 
own work, simply because they produced it. But between the lines, there is an even more 
important point: The students are in control. They have power over their own writing. 
They are constructed as critical, capable, agents. And with this power comes confidence. 
Like Jacotot’s painting students, who could exclaim, “I am a painter!”, Elbow’s students 
can self-assuredly declare: “I am a writer!” In this sense, then, Rancière highlights one of 
the most salient aspects of Elbow’s classroom: It rejects, or at least seeks to minimize, 
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student stultification, emphasizing a kind of agency that does not merely entail an 
acquisition of skills or knowledge, but places great emphasis on students’ perceptions of 
themselves—or experiences as themselves—as agents, as creators, as authors. Elbow 
notes that some critics of his pedagogy disparage it as “anti-intellectual” (147). But for 
Elbow, and by extension Rancière, this is precisely the point. When the hyper-
intellectual, pedantic professor (and the cultural capital he wields) is removed from the 
equation, what is left?  A student who, in the absence of a stultifying master, believes that 
she can write—and then proceeds to do just that. 
Needless to say, however, Elbow’s pedagogy was not, and is not, without its 
detractors. Among the more conspicuous critiques of Elbow’s version of the process 
approach lies in the 1995 debate between Elbow and David Bartholomae, which occurred 
in the pages of College Composition and Communication. The debate’s sticking point 
involves the amount of autonomous control that first-year composition students are 
granted over their own writing; or conversely, the extent to which teachers should work 
to situate student writing within/against dominant institutional conventions, as expressed 
through academic discourse (“a discourse” which, by Bartholomae’s own account, “is a 
single thing only in convenient arguments” [62]). Elbowcontends that there is a “conflict 
between the role of writer and that of academic” (72). He laments this conflict, wishing 
that students (and, indeed, professors) could “inhabit both roles comfortably,” but the 
tension exists nonetheless. 
Elbow frames his argument in terms of the competing roles between writer and 
reader, in a kind of poststructuralist power struggle. Writers, on the one hand, want “to 
have readers actually interested in what was on their mind, what they intended to say, 
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reading for intention” (75); readers, on the other hand, want to wrest the meanings they 
choose from the text, to assert control over the message received. This struggle is 
ineluctable. But Elbow maintains that teachers—not only the readers and evaluators of 
student writing, but ambassadors and embodiments of the academy’s broader structures 
of power—should back off a bit, should withhold judgement (at least “till they revise” 
[78]), should allow students to take ownership of their writing and, once again echoing 
Jacotot’s painting students, allow them to feel that they are writers. For Elbow, an 
excessive assertion of power on the part of the teachers stifles this sense of agency—a 
sense agency that all writers, including academics, have and must have in order to 
forward bold and compelling arguments. As Elbow puts it: 
We see this contest between readers and writers played out poignantly in the case 
of  student texts. The academic is reader and grader and always gets to decide 
what the student text means. No wonder students withdraw ownership and  
commitment. I can reinforce my point by looking at what happens when the tables  
are turned and academics produce text for a student audience—that is, lecturing  
extensively in class. Here the academic also turns the ownership rules upside  
down and declares that in this case the writer-lecturer gets to decide what the text  
means. (76) 
If this logic is taken to its extreme limits, then the teacher basically represents 
himself as a kind of well-intentioned totalitarian, taking absolute control over the 
meanings of student texts. Of course, few composition teachers would abstain from 
praising their students’ writing and encouraging them to continue, but the essential 
gesture of textual domination is present any time a teacher grades a paper, and this 
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domination, while a necessary component of teaching (if only due to institutional 
demands), nonetheless implies that the students are beholden to a teacher-master, a 
possessor of a hidden knowledge or expertise that can only be revealed through the 
suggestive flick of an ink pen. Elbow’simage of students withdrawing “ownership and 
commitment,” then, can be read as the kind of shrinking away from authority and 
responsibility that Rancière’s notion of stultification denotes. The implication is that 
students are, for the time being at least, incapable of composing compelling, convincing 
texts without the aid of a teacher. 
So for Elbow, “the main thing that helps writers is to be understood; pointing out 
misunderstandings is only the second need” (77). This would seem to align his approach 
somewhat with Rancière’s, insofar as the students are placed in a position of power and 
autonomy, capable of investigating the world through language on their own. Yet, there is 
a peculiar tension within Elbow’s pedagogy, especially when his intervention in his 
debate with Elbow is read in light of Writing Without Teachers. And this tension can be 
located in the preceding quote: writers are to “be understood,” but there is a still a need 
for “pointing out misunderstandings.” This authoritative pointer-outer of 
misunderstandings—i.e., the teacher—is conspicuously absent from Writing Without 
Teachers. In that book, Elbow spends about a page discussing the uses of talking to other 
people about a written text, but there, the playing field appears far more level: “I write a 
paper; it’s not very good; I discuss it with someone... Until I could see my words 
refracted through his consciousness, I couldn’t say it [in a more effective way]” (49). In 
this account, there is no suggestion that the person with which the writer engages in a 
productive conversation is in any way smarter, or more of a writing “expert.” The 
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discussion is politically and intellectually horizontal, as if equal minds are gaining 
insights through mutually constitutive, democratic, and dialectic dialogue. This parallels 
Rancière’s classroom, where equal intelligences study the same text on equal footing, 
without the need for a master explicator. So why, in his conversation with Bartholomae, 
does Elbow imply that the classroom really does need a teacher after all, a person 
knowledgeable enough to identify “misunderstandings,” on a more or less dogmatic 
basis? 
This question could perhaps be answered via a thorough elaboration on one of 
Elbow’s self-admitted worries. Elbow remarks that he values his students’ writing of 
autobiographical essays, because they, as embedded as they are in domains of 
experiential knowledge familiar to the student, allow students to gain a sense of agency 
and power in their writing. But he also confesses some misgivings, fearing that if he 
encourages autobiographical essay, the students’ writing risks devolving into self-
absorbed navel-gazing and naivete, and may create or reinforce a student’s self-
perception as “a central speaker at the center of the universe” who doesn’t need to fulfill 
the standard academic requirement of situating their writing in light of the writing of 
others (80). Bartholomae, to say the least, shares this concern. 
“There is no writing that is writing without teachers,” Bartholomae declares.  And 
while he notes that he would universalize this statement to all writing contexts, for the 
sake of the essay, he says only that “there is no writing done in the academy that is not 
academic writing” (63). The parallelism of these two constructions is informative: 
Bartholomae specifizes [Note: yes, that’s really a word] writing in general to writing “in 
the academy,” and teachers in general to academic writing. Teachers, then, are on some 
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level equivalent to, interchangeable with, or (at least) inextricable from the larger 
discursive domain that is academic writing. This conflation is central to Bartholomae’s 
argument. If, as he argues, “academic writing is the real work of the academy,” then 
students’ acquisition of literacy in academic discourse should be the classroom’s 
foremost concern. So if, as is likely the case, the teacher is the only person in the 
classroom who possesses a strong command of that discourse’s conventions, then the 
teacher has a responsibility to function as a sort of benevolent gatekeeper to this 
discourse, explicating and demystifying it for students, proactively helping them to 
negotiate its arcane list of rules, regulations and practices. More broadly, the underlying 
assumption here is that power is something that is granted by an authority or institution; 
this stands in tension with Elbow’s assumption that agency emerges from perceptions and 
embodied experiences of an individual. 
For Bartholomae, the notion of a “teacherless” classroom is a myth. And not only 
that, a pernicious myth, one that, in trying to hide the teacher, “hide[s] the traces of 
power, tradition and authority present at the scene of writing” (63). This argument echoes 
a long and ongoing tradition in composition theory, a tradition inaugurated by scholars 
like Berlin and Bizzell, who, a decade before the Elbow-Bartholomae debate, 
demonstrated that no pedagogy is innocent, that no teacher is ideologically pure, and that 
these political contaminates of supposedly utopian, student-“empowering” classrooms 
need to be actively and transparently critiqued. To pretend that the teacher, and the 
discourse community she represents, can truly “relinquish her authority” not only ignores 
the fact that the moment a teacher walks into a classroom on the first day of the semester, 
her authority is thoroughly and permanently recognized by her students; it also turns a 
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blind eye to the very real authority that academic discourse is granted by institutions, 
which ultimately works to the students’ detriment if they don’t become literate in it. After 
all, few professors outside of composition will value the personal narrative form in their 
courses. If we don’t prepare students for such courses, Bartholomae asks-—that is, if we 
don’t teach them academic discourse conventions—then what are we preparing them for?   
Bartholomae connects Elbow’s pedagogy to a “desire for an open space, free from 
the past (65).” But for him, no such space exists. Political asymmetries permeate every 
classroom, and however intimidating academic discourse may be to a first-generation, 
working class college student, pretending that it is not, finally, the real (writing) work of 
the academy won’t make it disappear. Furthermore, there are no grounds for assuming 
that the genre of personal writing “is more real than the other...  in assuming that one is 
real writing and the other is only a kind of game academics play” (68). This seems 
particularly true in light of post-structuralist theory, which deconstructs notions of the 
unitary subject and the tidy determinacy of language. Of course, one can imagine a 
classroom that, while still aiming for a student’s ability to say, “I am a writer!”, does not 
lapse into what Bartholomae refers to as “sentimental realism” (69). And indeed, with 
today’s more internationalized student demographics, we are seeing more and more 
students who, given their cultural conditioning, are deeply uncomfortable with “personal 
writing” as it is traditionally and narrowly defined. But one could still encourage students 
to write in whatever form that makes them feel like writers, be it a personal essay or a 
more disinterested analysis of phenomena with which the student is familiar, first-hand or 
not. Even so, however, Bartholomae’s critique seems to hold steady: How are we 
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teaching responsibly if we are not teaching students the rules our own language, the 
language of the academy? 
Despite its power, however, even this critique has limitations. For one, it could 
easily be reversed and maintain a comparable power: How are we teaching responsibly if 
we are not teaching students how to perceive themselves as agents, how to declare 
themselves writers in an Elbowian sense? Are not both aims equally laudable? 
Furthermore, the aim of “preparing” students to write in accordance with academic 
discourse conventions has its own set of obstacles. “Academic discourse” is not a 
monolithic entity; a biology professor might favor conventions that differ from a 
sociology professor, and preferences may vary between a mathematical sociology 
professor and a feminist sociology professor—or even between two feminist sociology 
professors. How does Bartholomae’s pedagogy account for this? What does his pedagogy 
look like? 
His influential Facts, Artifacts, and Counterfacts, co-written with Anthony 
Petrosky and published in 1986, outlines a pedagogy that seeks to take on the 
responsibility of teaching students academic discourse. And unsurprisingly, it is a 
markedly different book from Elbow’s. To begin with, it hinges on a definition of 
“empowerment” that is decidedly dissimilar from Elbow’s, even though aspects of it may 
seem congruent on the surface: “A course in reading and writing whose goal is to 
empower students,” they write in the introduction, “must begin with silence, a silence 
students must fill.  And it must provide a method to enable students to see what they have 
said--to see and characterize the acts of reading and writing represented by their 
discourse” (7). They flesh out this objective by creating a 16-week course, during which 
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students are presented with comparatively difficult academic texts, composed in a 
discourse with which the students have only a “hesitant and tenuous relationship” (8). 
 Over the course of the semester, through a project of reading texts in light of each other, 
reconsidering (and re-reconsidering) their interpretations of these texts through writing, 
and composing original interventions into the critical conversation that these texts 
represent, students gradually come to appropriate, more comfortably, the identity of 
“academic”—and, along with it, “a way of seeing themselves at work within the 
institutional structures that make their work possible” (40). For Bartholomae and 
Petrosky, who view Elbow’s pedagogy as a kind of protective shelter against the “real 
work” of the academy, this approach encourages students to do the same kind of work 
that, say, professional composition scholars do—and in doing so, they imply that this is 
how agency is acquired. 
But do professional composition scholars do the same kind of work that, say, 
biology and sociology professors do? To some extent, yes: they all work with and against 
an established knowledge domain. But at the same time, conventions will vary; the kinds 
of texts assigned in Bartholomae’s course bear little stylistic resemblance to a laboratory 
report. Indeed, the methodological connections between the work of biology and the 
work of Bartholomae’s (and Elbow’s) version of composition studies are general enough 
that Rancière can be inserted into the connective web as well: They are all involved with, 
as Rancière puts it in describing universal teaching, “observing, comparing, and 
combining,” with “learning, repeating, imitating, translating, taking apart, putting back 
together” (68). 
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Furthermore, does the course really begin “with silence, a silence students must 
fill?” On the one hand, it certainly does: Students are required to wring their own 
meanings from the texts, and compose their own essays in response to these 
interpretations. But on the other hand, there is nothing “silent” about the assignments; the 
teacher’s expertise and authority looms over each assignment, instating directives both 
subtle and not-so-subtle. For instance, here is an excerpt for a writing assignment in 
response to I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings: 
Here’s how we want you to write...We’re not interested in summary, because we  
have read the book, too... Tell us... what stands out for you. Then, tell us what  
things in your own life you can associate with what has stood out for you.  These 
associations may be ideas of yours, feelings, experiences, memories of other 
books, of other courses, or things people have said to you. You want to move 
from recording what stands out for you as significant to a way of accounting for 
why these passages or sections are significant. It’s very important that you 
write...for an hour of straight, uninterrupted writing. (54). 
Several aspects of this passage are eye-catching. For one, it is noteworthy that, 
despite the apparent pedagogical gulf between Bartholomae and Elbow in their 1995 
debate, two aspects of this assignment are rather heavily informed by the theories 
forwarded in Writing Without Teachers: Its advocacy of a vigorous, freewriting-esque 
process (“an hour... of writing”), and its suggestion that students connect the texts being 
read to their personal experiences. Bartholomae might reply that his version of 
experiential writing is different from Elbow’s, since rather than having them write in 
what he sees as Romantic, solipsistic isolation, he asks them to—like an academic—
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consider their pre-existing ideas and the unfamiliar texts relationally and dialectically. 
But Elbow might retort by arguing that, when read closely (and even not-that-closely), it 
becomes clear that Writing Without Teachers promotes no such navel-gazing. In fact, the 
above assignment, which Bartholomae would argue represents a particular kind of 
“academic” thinking, dovetails near-perfectly with Elbow’s definition of the “cooking” 
stage of the writing process:  
one piece of material (or process) being transformed by interacting with another: 
one piece of material being seen through the lens of another, being dragged 
through the guts of another, being reoriented or reorganized in terms of the other, 
being mapped onto the other. (49)  
One might also ask whether the “Romantic autobiographer” is even a possibility, 
given that even if one attempts to write as hermetically as one can, then each writing 
project will be shaped by the realizations wrought by the project preceding it. An actual 
hermit, living and writing in the woods, might write from summer to autumn to winter to 
spring only to find that, when he sees the summer the next year, it appears very different 
from how it did before, in light of, say, his winter writing. In this sense, then, if one is 
writing consistently, then it is virtually impossible to not follow an academic-like 
procedure. The only difference would be textual content of the procedure, be it a series of 
College English articles or the blooming, wilting, and re-blooming of a daylily. And 
style, of course, would depend simply on this content, for one can hardly write about an 
academic article without appropriating some of its stylistic features (terminology, etc.). 
A person aligned with Bartholomae may then reply that Bartholomae’s assigned 
texts are more rigorous, difficult and “academic” than Elbow’s, and therefore prepare 
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students more sufficiently for the “real work of the academy.” Perhaps, perhaps not, but it 
is immaterial: Elbow’s pedagogy, especially when read in light of Bartholomae’s 
“counter”-pedagogy, is fully compatible with rigorous academic texts (or any other kind 
of text, for that matter). For that matter, Jacotot’s pedagogy is compatible with them, too, 
and even overlaps with them, for like Bartholomae’s pedagogy, Jacotot encourages the 
analysis of difficult academic texts through “learning, repeating, imitating, translating, 
taking apart, putting back together”—which, in turn, sounds a lot like Elbow’s concept of 
“cooking.” What, then, are the core tensions that animate and separate these approaches? 
And what do they mean for student agency? I will conclude this chapter by suggesting 
that the light cast by Rancière’s radical approach, along with Marilyn Cooper’s recent 
scholarship, illuminates these tensions. 
As noted earlier, a key component of Jacotot’s universal teaching is the student’s 
ability to proclaim, “I am a painter” (or “I am a writer”). This parallels Elbow’s aims, but 
its emphasis on the embodied perception of oneself as an agent also parallels Marilyn 
Cooper’s theory of agency as forwarded in “Rhetorical Agency as Emergent and 
Enacted.” Emotions, she argues, prepare us for actions (430), and moreover, “individual 
agency emerges ineluctably from embodied processes.” (443). That agency is 
“ineluctable” is crucial for her analysis, because for her, agency is everywhere, all the 
time. Nevertheless, an agent can be an agent without realizing it—and this is the sticking 
point. Bartholomae, in stressing the importance of students learning the conventions of 
academic discourse, places a strong emphasis on teachers, institutions, and the customs 
and conventions associated with them. This is certainly not to say that he is not concerned 
with students, but it does suggest that he views agency as something taught, or granted, to 
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the students by the teachers—and that it has always been this way, and must be this way, 
because we would be doing students a disservice if we failed to “prepare” them for the 
“next step.” Elbow, on the other hand, locates agency in the student, and if he doesn’t go 
as far as Cooper in saying that it’s ineluctable, he does suggest that it is already in 
everyone, and that it just needs to be unleashed—hence, he wrote a book titled Everyone 
Can Write. 
Rancière, like Cooper and Elbow, locates agency in the student.  
Know yourself no longer means, in the Platonic manner, know where your good 
lies. It means come back to yourself, to what you know to be unmistakably in 
you… Stumbling is nothing; the wrong is in diverging from, leaving one’s path, 
no longer paying attention to what one says, forgetting what one is. So follow 
your path. (58) 
That is not necessarily the path that Bartholomae gestures towards, which is lined 
with the discourse conventions of professors and academic institutions. And the 
emotional experience of perceiving this agency in oneself is paramount for Rancière. 
Emotion is so important, in fact, that Rancière compares a student in a universal 
classroom to a poet:  
He communicates as a poet as a being who believes his thought communicable, 
his emotions sharable. That is why speech and the conception of all works as 
discourse are, according to universal teaching’s logic, a prerequisite to any 
learning. The artisan must speak about his works in order to be emancipated; the 
student must speak about the art he wants to learn. Speaking about human works 
is the way to know human art. (65) 
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In universal teaching, then, the student shares her emotions with the teacher 
through language. Moreover, this is a prerequisite to acquisition of agency and 
intellectual empowerment. As discussed earlier, there are so many overlaps and 
compatibilities between Elbow’s version of process theory and Bartholomae’s pedagogy 
that they don’t look all that different from each other when one peels away the rhetoric 
and gets to the core of the matter. But this tension between the emotional experiences of 
students, their perceptions of themselves as empowered creators of knowledge, as 
“poets,” and the demands of institutions and the professors that inhabit them stands as a 
key tension between Elbow and Bartholomae. For all their disputation of the role of 
academic discourse in the classroom, that is not the central question of the debate, not 
least because, both pedagogical approaches are compatible with academic discourse 
acquisition. The question is, what does it mean for a student to be “empowered?” What 
does it mean for a student to be an “agent?” 
Universal teaching was, and still is, a radical pedagogical approach, and one that 
is not likely to be implemented in many first-year writing classrooms. But just as, say, 
Karl Marx’s radical reflections on capitalism and communism can help us understand the 
foundation of what the more moderate Democratic Party is striving for, the extremity of 
Jacotot’s approach helps reveals the core of process theory and the tensions that it 
inhabits. In Everyone Can Write, Elbow recalls his experiences in a university “system:” 
In a genuine sense it was ‘my system’—but it seems as though the way my 
system functions (except perhaps for deeply secure people) is to make it feel as 
though it isn’t my system unless I give up on part of what is central to me and go 
along with it. Perhaps this is how structures of power and elitism function. (25).  
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In response to this anxiety about giving up on part of what is central to him, 
Jacotot might say,“Follow your path.” He might also bemoan the stultifying effects of 
these structures of power, and accuse Bartholomae of reinforcing them. This would not 
dissolve the tensions between Elbow and Bartholomae—as the latter correctly 
emphasizes, the institutions exist whether we like it or not, and we must find a way to 
please them if we are to succeed within them. But Jacotot’s advice would still be 
valuable, and worth considering as we navigate the varied and conflicting demands of the 
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CHAPTER 4: TRANS-LINGUAL APPROACH 
Globalization sparked by a post-Fordist world economy has done much to 
invigorate the intellectual ecologies at colleges and universities across the United States. 
The emergence of alternative cultural, and ethnic perspectives serves to fruitfully 
complement and complicate the ethnocentrism that has historically dominated the 
academy. It has also given rise to new fields in the humanities, particularly within 
English departments: post-colonial criticism, diasporism, and Latino and Trans-Pacific 
literatures, just to name a few. However, unprecedented diversity also presents us with 
unprecedented challenges. This is particularly true when it comes to first-year 
composition. A Chinese student who arrives in the U.S. to study mathematics may be 
able communicate with his department’s faculty via calculus, but even the most elegant 
equations cannot attend to other rhetorical exigencies that accompany any field of study, 
e.g., research reports, literature reviews, and responses to to professors’ emails. That 
composition courses are expected to help international students navigate this linguistic 
and rhetorical terra incognita—an expectation all the more amplified by the fact that 
first-year composition is required for most students at most universities—means that our 
image of “composition student” must move beyond the traditional English-as-a-first-
language-speaking demographic. Given that an increasing proportion of our students may 
be unfamiliar with dominant English grammar conventions—much less conventions of 
style, structure, citation, authorial ethos, etc.—how are we to productively and 
democratically balance the political, cultural, and linguistic tensions that will inevitably 
come into play in the classroom? 
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A proliferation of recent research seeks to provide, or at least move toward, 
answers to this question. But as is the case with any unsettled and ongoing conversation, 
the answers bring forth still more questions. And unlike the concerns of the other 
chapters of this project—the debates over process theory, social-constructivist pedagogy, 
and procedural pedagogy—the translingual problematic is a relatively recent 
development, so the historical distance from which to view it is far narrower. The story of 
the multilingual classroom is still unfolding, and still growing in breadth of import; it is 
“breaking news.” Methodologically, however, this chapter is aligned with the others: it 
will seek to identify the tensions and contradictions inherent in the multilingual 
classroom, to flesh out and define the key terms and concepts that animate this debate in 
order to provide a more nuanced platform on which it may transpire. The multilingual 
classroom is a territory we are only beginning to explore; this chapter aims to calibrate 
the compass, and orient inquiry in a productive direction. 
To this end, I will analyze the state of the conversation surrounding the influence 
of globalization and international Englishes in/on the composition classroom. Following 
Lu and Horner, I will scrutinize the attitudes and concepts we bring with us when we 
teach in a translingual classroom (and all classrooms, as Lu and Horner note, are 
translingual to the extent that every student—and every person—employs different 
discourses in different social circumstances), and consider how these attitudes might play 
out in practice, particularly with regard to student agency and empowerment. As Lu and 
Horner put it, “The translingual approach encourages reading with patience, respect for 
perceived differences within and across languages, and an attitude of deliberative 
inquiry” (304). This chapter elaborates on what this approach may entail and demand. 
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Translingual pedagogy is relatively new, and has therefore not influenced the history of 
composition scholarship to the same extent as process theory, procedural rhetoric, and 
social-constructivism. However, its recent arrival is auspicious, given the increasing 
internationalism of classrooms in the United States and elsewhere; it seems reasonable to 
assume that translingual theory will continue to inform composition scholarship for the 
foreseeable future. This chapter is methodologically aligned with the rest of the 
dissertation: By mixing and mashing competing theoretical frameworks, I aim to uncover 
the core tensions that constitute and motivate them, and provide an enriched portrayal of 
the contemporary classroom scene. 
It is important to emphasize that alternative, “non-standard” Englishes are not 
reducible to mere different systems of signification, because they are imbricated with the 
broader political and economic forces of fast capitalism, e.g., the “English Only” 
movement, and the economic opportunities and exploitations enabled by international 
free trade agreements. Globalization, which Eva Lam describes as  
an umbrella term for what is taking place around the world in association with 
global integration of economies, rapid media and information flow facilitated by 
new communication technologies, international migration of labor, the rise of 
international and trans-regional organizations, and resultant cultural 
transformations challenging traditional social structures (214)  
has presented the composition classroom with increasingly widespread and urgent 
problems. And in response to these problems, a wealth of progressive, promising and 
rigorous scholarship has emerged in recent years.  
	  	  	   125	  
Yet, as with any highly complex problematic, responding to it can be akin to 
contending with a Whack-A-Mole machine: One problem gets pounded down, but a new 
one (or the same, ever-persistent one) just pops up in its place, and the new problem was 
perhaps created by our response to the initial one, via the unseen levers and cogs—the 
plays of power, language, ideology, and culture—that lie beneath the visible surface. The 
goal of this paper will not be the whacking of a particular, vexing mole, but to cast a few 
more rays of light on the hidden mechanisms of language, ideology, power, and culture 
that make these moles so troublesome in the first place. In “The Discourse on Language,” 
Michel Foucault posits that, while the distinction between true and false is neither 
modifiable nor institutional, the “will to truth”—that is, the means by which we reveal 
truth—is, and functions as, an exclusionary force. We are invested with the “possibility 
of speaking of experience, in it, to designate and name it, to judge it and, finally, to know 
it in the form of truth”; thus, to name or label a language serves at once to delineate it and 
proscribe any alternative ways of understanding it. With respect to our understanding of 
how issues of class, power, culture and ideology permeate language, we are met with 
competing wills to truth—a “battle ‘for truth,’ or at least ‘around truth’” (Foucault, 
344)—that struggle to reveal themselves and mask their counterparts. And the truth in 
question is not merely academic: language, as Bourdieu points out, is imbricated with 
class and power; it is not a coincidence that even the most fervent celebrators of “non-
standard” dialects in the classroom tend to be highly fluent in “standard” English. This 
chapter will investigate the tensions that pervade this struggle with respect to translingual 
pedagogy. 
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The multilingual classroom confronts us with a thicket of contradictions and 
complications. I do not claim possession of a pedagogical machete with which to hack 
through the entanglement. In fact, I strongly suspect that no such machete even exists. So 
instead, this chapter aims to shine a light on the thicket’s perplexing convolutions, thus 
offering a fuller, more nuanced portrayal of the linguistic and ideological forces with 
which we, and our students, grope and grapple. And I will call for a pedagogical 
disposition that, recognizing the nonexistence of a tension-resolving machete, attempts 
not to reconcile, but to inhabit the linguistic struggle that animates and constitutes every 
classroom and every conversation in which we so frequently and inevitably find 
ourselves.  
The debate over the (in)validation of non-standard English dialects and 
vernaculars in the classroom can be traced as far back as the NCTE's landmark 1974 
resolution, "Students' Right to their Own Language" (SRTOL). The resolution affirmed 
students' “right to their own patterns and varieties of language —the dialects of their 
nurture or whatever dialects in which they find their own identity and style” (1). Needless 
to say, the “dialects” identified here are not those of the affluent middle and upper-middle 
class students that, then and now, comprise most of the pupils in most American 
classrooms; the affirmation of the “right to [one’s] patterns and varieties of language” is 
not intended to legitimize a wealthy white male student’s wanton disregard for the rules 
of semicolon placement. Rather, the dialects in question here are those of perennially 
marginalized communities—African-Americans, Latinos, Southern whites, and virtually 
every community that tends toward impoverishment—who, following the shifts in 
culture, and public and university policy in the wake of the civil rights movement, began 
	  	  	   127	  
enrolling in college in large numbers. Having often been excluded, or at least 
discouraged, from the academy for generations, some members of these communities 
were less literate in the dominant discursive paradigms that the academy both represents 
and reinforces. This posed a serious dilemma for teachers and institutions. If a student is 
an African-American great-grandson of former slaves, having grown up in rural poverty 
(and discrimination) with little access to books and quality education, is it fair to to flunk 
him out of freshman composition just because he struggles to grasp the rules banning 
double negatives, excessively personal style, and nonlinear digressions from the structure 
of the 3.5 essay? 
Thus arose a prototypically post-modern problem to contend with: the complex 
relationships between language, culture, ideology, economic disenfranchisement, and 
skin color. Language, SRTOL suggests, is not merely an abstract system of grammatical 
rules and regulations, occurring in a vacuum, divorced from and floating loftily above 
political and material forces. The literacy struggles within the African-American 
community do not result from some inherent laziness or incapability in the students. 
Instead, those struggles are a result of widespread and systematic discrimination on the 
part of more dominant social groups (i.e., whites, especially affluent white males). In 
some cases, this discrimination can even be viewed as a deliberate attempt to bar 
marginalized groups from the gateway to literacy: as both a plantation owner who deems 
a slave’s possession of a book a capital crime and a 1950s South Carolina school board 
that places black students in rotting, overpopulated schoolhouses with overworked (and 
perhaps underqualified) teachers know, preventing a population from educating 
themselves is an effective way to keep them “out of trouble,” as it were. How could we 
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not take this into account in our teaching and still refer to ourselves as ethical, empathetic 
beings? 
Another assumption of SRTOL is the fundamental arbitrariness and functional 
equivalence of all language systems. The African-American community has, and has 
always had, a rich culture, a cornucopia of symbolic conventions that serve as both a 
communicative conduit and a bedrock for cultural identification. They, like the French 
and Chinese, seem to get along just fine with the language they have. Who are we to tell 
them that their way of speaking and/or writing is somehow invalid, uncivilized, uncouth, 
incorrect? This position—and its detractorswas famously dramatized in 1996, when the 
Oakland, California school board passed a resolution proclaiming “ebonics” a separate 
langage from English (“ebonics” is a somewhat pop cultural term for African-American 
vernacular, henceforth referred to as AAVE), and even went as far as to train teachers in 
the language, using pay raises as an incentive. 
The Oakland school board imbroglio highlights an unusual aspect of this 
academic debate: unlike most academic debates, the public at large paid attention to it. 
And not only were their ears perked, their tongues were at the ready, prepared to 
intervene in the discussion with forceful, and sometimes vociferous, counterarguments. 
The furor surrounding “Why Johnny Can’t Read,” a 1975 Newsweek cover story that 
provoked hysterical reactions from the public about a perceived literacy crisis in the U.S., 
is a notable example of this. More recently, we have Richard Arum and Josipa Roksa’s 
Academically Adrift (2011) a scathing critique of what they see as a lack of learning (and 
teaching) on college campuses. Their book is not concerned with first-year composition 
or translingual pedagogy, per se. Indeed, given the passion that composition teachers 
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generally have for teaching, one could reasonably infer that Arum and Roksa might see 
composition studies as part of the solution to the problem. But the book has ignited a 
minor firestorm of criticism of higher education generally. And more pertinent to the 
translingual classroom, their statistics regarding African-American students are bleak 
(Teresa Reed, in a CCC review, called them “disturbing.”) So it stands to reason that a 
galvanized public, particularly the right-wing public, might aim their crosshairs directly 
at pedagogies that promote anything other than “Standard English” literacy. These people 
might not understand much about the realities of composition teaching, but they are the 
constituents of powerful politicians that control public funding of higher education. The 
point here isn’t that Arum and Roksa’s findings are particularly relevant to translingual 
pedagogy—especially considering that their findings may be invalid to begin with. The 
point is that public controversy surrounding college teaching methods has reached fever 
pitch at a time when teaching is more difficult than ever, and that the translingual 
classroom lies at the epicenter of this difficulty. And while the translingual classroom is a 
site of tensions between competing cultural, ethnic, and linguistic identifications, it is not 
merely an academic squabble about identity politics. Friction between economic classes 
undergirds and drives the entire discussion; cultural identity is by no means irrelevant 
here, but cultural capital, as Pierre Bourdieu points out, is never wholly separable from 
economic capital. The issue of class is made all the more significant in this globalized, 
economically lethargic era in which the middle class feels especially anxious about the 
maintenance of its status, and the working classes—facing an age where social mobility 
in the United States has fallen significantly lower than that in Europe—feel especially 
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dispirited about their diminished prospects for moving up the socio-economic ladder. It is 
across this fraught milieu that this chapter treads. 
The terms of the current debate over translingual pedagogy owe much to Lisa 
Delpit’s examinations of language difference. In The Skin That We Speak, Delpit relates 
an anecdote about her daughter, Maya, who had of course been raised by a college 
professor and therefore spoke “Standard English.” Maya had recently transferred from a 
mostly-white private school to a school that was 98% African-American. One day, she 
came home and spoke words and phrases associated with African-American English 
Vernacular (AAVE). Delpit suggested that Maya avoid such language in the future, lest 
she be judged negatively by, say, a job interviewer. Maya’s response: “You don’t have to 
worry about me... ‘cause I know how to code switch!” (39).  
Delpit came to believe that code-switching offered a method of helping students 
to negotiate academia's asymmetrical linguistic terrain, a way to, at once, celebrate 
students’ home discourses and teach them the “codes needed to participate fully in 
American life”—i.e., Standard English Vernacular and related dialects (296). In this 
pedagogy, students are called upon to “compare various pieces written in different styles, 
discuss the impacts of different styles on the message... [and] practice different writing 
different forms to different audiences based on rules appropriate for each audience” 
(295). These codes are represented to students as both arbitrarily established and 
“politically charged” (295). Therefore, “Standard English” (henceforth Standard English 
Vernacular, or SEV) is to be considered simply one discourse among many structurally 
equivalent discourses, e.g., AAVE. Standard English Vernacular’s “validity” and apical 
position in the hierarchy was not achieved through some inherent morphological 
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superiority, but by the socio-economic dominance of the (largely) white middle-class 
demographic that employs and authorizes it. So for Delpit, an AAVE-speaking student's 
dialect should be valued and celebrated as a valid vehicle of communication. At the same 
time, however, an AAVE-speaking student's lingual repertoire requires supplementation 
by SEV, one of the primary "codes of power" (42) needed for civic and economic 
participation. The goal of Delpit's pedagogy is to help students acquire literacy in both 
dialects, and learn when and where to deploy them (and not). 
This sort of contextually-dependent discourse-hopping is called "code switching," 
and it has for nearly two decades remained a common response to the pedagogical 
dilemmas posed by SRTOL. Textbooks and teaching guides continue to champion it, 
notably Rebecca Wheeler's NCTE-published Code Switching: Teaching Standard 
English in Urban Classrooms.  It has also, however, found itself the recipient of an 
increasing number of pointed critiques from composition scholars. In “Your Average 
Nigga,” Vershawn Young agrees that it is critical for linguistically marginalized students 
to gain access to the codes of power that constitute and circulate within academic 
discourse(s). However, he objects to Delpit’s means to that end: 
[Delpit] proposes a pedagogy of “linguistic performance” where teachers are 
supposed teach students to be bidialectical or to code switch, to use BEV at home 
and in black communities and WEV in school…. It’s unclear why Delpit believes 
this pedagogy is a way of “taking the focus [and stigma] off the child’s speech” 
and writing when telling them to imitate a white newscaster is to tell them that 
their language and identities are not welcome in school. (704-5) 
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In other words, code switching fails to subvert, and even serves to maintain, the 
inequitable linguistic hierarchy and the socio-economic power structures that determine 
that that hierarchy. So for Young, code-switching “is a function of—in fact, a 
contribution to—the continuing racialization of our society” (708). A code-switching 
pedagogy can valorize AAVE as a grammatically cohesive and community-cohering 
discourse all it wants, but the implicit message remains: You can, and indeed should, 
speak AAVE at home, but keep it out of the classroom because the SEV-wielding arbiters 
of rhetorical propriety will perceive it as invalid, incorrect, and “too black.” 
In his analysis of how power imbalances shape what is revealed through language 
and what is obscured, Foucault remarks upon the speech of the “madman.” For Foucault, 
the madman’s words, being in tension with the dominant will to truth (i.e., rationality), 
“did not strictly exist.” Whatever the madman said was taken as “noise,” so he was 
“credited with words only in a symbolic sense”; thus the label of “madness” was imposed 
upon the madman by the dominant discourse (341-42). While disenfranchised students 
are certainly not madmen, there is an extent to which their voices are similarly damaged 
and squelched by the language and concepts that inform code-switching pedagogies. 
Keith Gilyard points out that code switching not only presents a politically lopsided 
schematization of dominant and marginalized discourses, but transfers this asymmetry 
into individual students’ identity complexes with psychologically perturbing results. 
Gilyard calls this “enforced educational schizophrenia” (163) because, as Young notes, 
“black students are forced to see themselves embodying two different racial, linguistic, 
and cultural identities” (705).  The upshot of this is that code-switching preserves the 
very injustices that it seeks to ameliorate: 1). non-SEV dialects’ “invalid” cultural status, 
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and 2.) the racist and racializing perception, from both within and without, of these 
dialects' subject positions as marginal and “inferior.” 
However, recent scholarship has aimed to revise and remedy this perceived 
problem of well-intended self-sabotage. In his 2006 article “The Place of World 
Englishes in Composition,” Suresh Canagarajah develops a framework that strives to 
avoid code-switching’s reductive and damaging dualisms. Linking “monolingual 
ideologies and linguistic hierarchies” (587), he posits the model of “code-meshing,” 
which allows students to “accommodate more than one code within the bounds of the 
same text” (598). Young also aligns himself with this position, suggesting that we 
encourage students to “combine dialects, styles and registers,” and allow “black students 
to mix a black English style with an academic register” (713). Canagarajah also notes, 
citing linguist Ronald Wardhaugh, that code-meshing is an inherently more “natural” 
rhetorical mode, since students almost always already demonstrate command over 
multiple varieties of their languages; in other words, utterances are already the product of 
meshed codes (p. 713). Code-meshing's corrective is to temper the cognitive dissonance 
caused by vacillating between multiple discourses depending on rhetorical context. It also 
constructs marginalized students as accommodable of a variety of dialects at once, SEV 
included, thus opening the possibility for moving beyond “either you're in or you're out” 
perceptions of student-academy relations and towards a more negotiable linguistic space 
in which mutually constitutive discourses intersect and interact. This is meant to help 
students position themselves within/against academic discourse in ways that do not 
necessarily exclude their home dialect. And Young's article is aptly self-reflexive on this 
level: he incorporates rhetorical strategies associated with AAVE, such as the personal 
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narrative, into his writing, thus essentially validating these tropes as “academic” by virtue 
of their placement in a top-tier composition studies journal. Geneva Smitherman also 
performs the African-American discourse/identity in “CCCC's Role in the Struggle for 
Language Rights,” in which she integrates AAVE idioms into her writing: “The NCTE 
done come a long way, baby!” (372). 
Similar attempts to locate sites of linguistic resistance via emphasis on the 
complex relations between language, culture, identity and politics have flourished over 
the last several years. For instance, in “Metaphors Matter,” Min-Zhan Lu introduces the 
term “transcultural literacy.” While it is a more general and theoretical concept than 
code-meshing, it is “compatible” with the practice, and provides a useful metaphor for 
discussing the kinds of “transactional,” “transformative,” and hegemony-resistant 
rhetorics that code-meshing exemplifies (712-3). As she writes, transcultural literacy and 
the pedagogies to which it refers “center attention on the tension between the specificity 
of particular instances of learning and writing and the continual structuration of 
linguistic, cultural, social processes.” That “structuration” invokes the verb form of 
“structure”—“to structurate,” or “to structure”—is important here. In opposition to static 
and monolithic representations of social constructions (e.g., English-Only), writing is 
seen as a site at which the dynamic tensions between competing, interwoven, and 
politically-charged structures (linguistic, cultural, social) can be negotiated, restructured. 
The individual writer is a participatory agent in this perpetual (re)construction of wider 
social realities. Thus, in its critical commingling of conflicting dialects and discourses, 
transcultural literacy and code-meshing lie at the nexus of the global and the local, where 
competing languages and the ideologies they express are engaged in a mutually-
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reconstitutive, dialogic struggle within an individual text. In this sense, the code-meshing 
writer is the initiator and mediator of this dialogue between discordant discourses—and 
from this nexus, she has the power to reshape their relations and the power asymmetries 
that condition them. (Canagarajah's description of multilinguals' strategy of “shuttling 
between languages” and communities also captures this dialogic, transactional feature of 
code-meshing.) 
Yet, while code-meshing may appear to offer a method by which students can 
approach academic writing without invalidating their home dialects, it is not entirely 
clear to me how it de-racializes discursive politics. After all, just because two rhetorical 
modes inhabit the same sentence or essay does not necessarily mean that they now 
occupy equal positions in the linguistic hierarchy. A student may mix street talk with 
scholarly prose, but the text still may be viewed by most audiences as less a seamless 
integration and reconciliation of the dual discourses than a haphazard, “schizophrenic,” 
internally frictional, and error-fraught mishmash. A code-meshed text’s achievement of 
the “academically valid” status is thus predicated on reception and context, rather than 
features inherent in the text, and this achievement may often require a Gilyard-esque 
degree of cultural capital that many marginalized students lack. In other words, the 
acceptance of code-meshing as valid may depend less on the rhetorical deftness of the 
author’s mixing and more on the perceived status and preexisting power of the author 
herself: Marginal discourses are permissible and praiseworthy, but only if the author is 
viewed as having sufficient social accreditation and a proficient command of the 
dominant discourse as well (e.g., like Young’s command). This is the blind spot of code-
meshing’s nominally inclusive notion of “academic validity;” to return to Foucault again, 
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a valid code-meshed text is valid not simply because its words are well-formed, but 
because it is infused with the author’s institutionally-legitimized power, which flexes in 
ways that the cultural capital-rich author may be “incapable of recognizing” (343). 
Young and Smitherman’s code-mixing success may be akin to an anecdote related by 
Pierre Bourdieu, about a Bearnais town that was visited by the mayor of a more 
cosmopolitan—and “proper” French-speaking—city. The mayor addressed the town in 
the town’s own provincial (read: marginal) patois, and the “audience was moved by this 
thoughtful gesture” (68).  But the seeming kindness of this dialectal choice veils a deeper, 
more troubling political asymmetry. As Bourdieu writes, the mayor 
can create this condescension effect only because… he possesses all the titles (he  
is a qualified professor) which guarantees his rightful participation in the  
‘superiority’ of the ‘superior language…  What is praised as ‘good quality  
Bearnais,’ coming from the mouth of a legitimate speaker of the legitimate  
language, would be totally devoid of value… coming from the mouth of a  
peasant. (68) 
Ironically, then, code-meshing—a rhetorical strategy intended to help 
marginalized students engage with the dominant discourse—may only be greeted with 
positive reception if the mesher is perceived as already “fluent” in the dominant 
discourse.  In such a case, code-meshing’s “neutralization” of the power relations that 
permeate linguistic (and racial) difference is illusory. The cruel hierarchy remains 
unswayed. The author, regardless of his racial or discursive self-identification, is simply 
viewed as also a speaker of the “standard” discourse, and with this qualification is 
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licensed to speak whatever language he wants with minimal risk of being perceived as 
“inferior.” 
Code-meshing runs into even deeper complications on a purely linguistic level. 
 Young notes that code-meshing is a natural way of speaking, but he doesn't emphasize 
the fact that all languages are naturally comprised of multiple dialects, often arranged in 
tensional and politically-charged configurations. A plethora of scholarship in recent 
decades has challenged notions of linguistic sovereignty, from analyses of AAVE that 
identify its hybridic roots in English, Caribbean, and West African syntactical patterns 
(Williams, 1975) to Mattielo's study of the pervasiveness of slang--e.g., non-standard 
dialectal idioms—in SEV (2005) to Pratt's linking of the cultural construction of 
“unitary” languages to fantasies of coherent nationhood. A student code-meshing AAVE 
and SEV, then, is inevitably meshing far more codes than that. And close inspection may 
reveal complex codical interrelations that reveal their multilingual roots: Is the personal 
narrative form that Young invokes as an AAVE mode really a monolithically AAVE 
mode? Or is it an SEV form that has been poached by and recontextualized with some 
African-American communities?  Or does it echo a distinctly African-American (or 
African) narrative style that has been imported into English? And if it is the product of 
such dialectal interplay, then to what extent are the forms separable in the first place? 
And, moreover, is language even the most salient factor at play here, or is it culture, 
class, gender, race, or an ensemble of all of the above? The richness is evident even 
without destabilizing the codes themselves, a project that would undoubtedly pinpoint the 
gross reductiveness of the categories in question. After all, English grammar has 
Germanic roots, and over the centuries it has appropriated and integrated countless terms 
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and conventions from languages and dialects from all over the world, including dialects 
within itself. And these sub-dialects are, in themselves, porous and in perpetual flux. So 
while a code-meshing pedagogy may intermingle SEV and marginalized English 
discourses, it does not fully subvert the rigid demarcations that stratify, ratify and 
racialize the hierarchy itself. Young clearly has a sense of these borderlines’ spuriousness 
when he remarks that he “sometimes couldn't tell the difference between WEV and its 
nonstandard vernacular, just as I sometimes can't distinguish BEV from anything else” 
(708).   
There are, however, some political and practical reasons for leaving them intact. 
After all, the fact of Standard English's heterogeneity clearly does not automatically 
undermine SEV's (or WEV's, or whatever) vast “linguistic utopia” (Pratt) and the power 
structures that fund and legitimize it. And in its hypostatization, the false “standard” 
enjoys true sociopolitical clout. It becomes a fabrication with the power to truly oppress, 
a delusion commanding a flesh-and-blood army of bullheaded believers. African 
American Vernacular English may be just as internally logical and valid as SEV, but that 
fact may provide little comfort to an African-American student who has been told 
throughout his life that he writes and speaks “incorrectly,” and that he is thus “stupid”—a 
circumstance analogous to cases of racial discrimination, where a person of mixed-race 
ancestry may be categorized as simply and purely “black.” So there is a compelling 
argument for framing controversy as a (dubious) SEV-BEV binary: because it has real 
effects, it really is an issue that needs to be confronted.  
And just as these imagined linguistic communities have the centripetal power to 
unite and oppress, they also have the power to unite and resist—see SRTOL's injunction, 
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for instance, or the Black Arts poetry movement of the 1970s. Or, to draw an analogy 
with other forms of cultural constructedness: the Civil Rights Movement, the ongoing 
project that, while still far from complete, has made strides in raising the cultural status of 
African-Americans—a racial category that, as the field of genetics has long established, 
has no basis in biological reality. When engaged in a war with an unjust fabrication, it 
may be that a just counter-fabrication can serve as a pragmatic and effective weapon. 
Taken in sum, the pedagogical problems and possibilities presented by this 
efflorescence of translingual research echoes an age-old dilemma that has haunted the 
Western academy since David Hume first identified it in the 18th century (the original 
meaning of which I bend slightly here): How do we go from the is--a richer description of 
the way languages work and interact--to the ought--a pedagogical prescription that helps 
students contend with the often-oppressive political dynamo of SEV and its imaginers? 
As Werner Heisenberg, the theoretical physicist, showed in his study of subatomic 
particles, the more accurately you measure a subatomic particle’s position, the less you 
can know about its momentum (and vice versa). A roughly analogous dynamic is at play 
here. The more one focuses on linguistic resistance—which is most readily conceivable 
in terms of comparatively reductive dichotomies (SEV vs. AAVE, for example, or 
perhaps some slightly more complicated set of relations—the more oversimplistic one’s 
assumptions about the language forms become. And, of course, if one focuses squarely 
on the complexity of language and language learning, it becomes virtually impossible to 
visualize what “resistance” might look like in light of this complexity. 
This tension is rooted in two components of language and linguistic practice that 
are, paradoxically, both inextricable and mutually exclusive: the linguistic component, 
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and the ideological component. With regard to the former, linguist M.A.K. Halliday’s 
influential work shifted linguists’ assumptions about language away from static, systemic 
conceptualizations, and towards more dynamic, “functional” conceptualizations. For 
Halliday, language should not be “interpreted as a system of forms, to which meanings 
are attached” (F40). In other words, we should not theoretically crystallize linguistic 
forms, and then study the ways in which meanings circulate through these forms. Instead, 
with his theory of “functional grammar,” Halliday advises that we move in the opposite 
direction: language should be interpreted not a system of forms through which meanings 
flow, but as a “system of meanings, accompanied by forms through which meanings can 
be realized... This puts the forms of language in a different perspective: as a means to an 
end, rather than an end in themselves” (F40). In other words, languages are dynamic, 
open systems whose forms (to the extent that they are “formal” at all) are contingent on a 
vast array of local, emergent, “bottom-up,” functional language practices. Framed as 
such, notions such as “Standard English” or “African-American English Vernacular” 
become meaningless in many ways, hinging on a conception of language as a static 
system, imposed from the top-down. (On its surface, Halliday’s position may appear to 
echo the post-structuralist critique of Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural linguistics, 
which greatly informed literary criticism. There are key differences, however, and like 
most scholars in the field of linguistics, Halliday worked independently of the post-
structuralist movement that influenced literary criticism). 
Read in this light, composition scholarship concerning linguistic politics may 
appear to be a house without a foundation, an edifice doomed to collapse, because it rests 
on the assumption that languages are stable enough to assign labels to. However, with 
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regard to the other component of language practice—the ideological component—this 
scholarship is on much sturdier ground. In 1979, linguist Michael Silverstein, who is 
generally aligned with Halliday’s views on the dynamics of language, defines language 
ideology as “a set of beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization or 
justification of perceived language structure or use” (qtd. in Joseph, 203). This idea—
which was later appropriated by Mary Louise Pratt (1987), who in turn was appropriated 
by composition scholars like Lu and Horner—is able to describe the formal conceptions 
of language that dominate not only American politics, e.g., the “English-Only” 
movement. It also describes much composition scholarship, including this very chapter. 
For despite frequent acknowledgements that language cannot be reduced to reified 
systems (which I am arguing right now), scholarship continues to describe them in 
precisely those terms (as when I frequently refer to SEV and AAVE throughout this 
chapter). 
This is the troublesome tension that inhabits composition studies. There is a 
recognition that language is grounded in complex, emergent practices; yet, at the same 
time, there is tendency to ignore functional practices to some extent, so as to enable 
analyses of languages’ more rigid ideological underpinnings. One way to account for this 
tension is to recognize that while composition may aim to incorporate theories and 
realities of globalization within itself, the disruptions that come along with globalization 
are just as relevant—and no less perplexing—to composition as they are to any other 
knowledge domain, be it an academic department or a major corporation that has just 
gone multinational. In order to assimilate the influx of non-standard English dialects (not 
to mention non-English languages) into our classrooms—and, by extension, into our 
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discourse—composition must import knowledge from disciplines that have traditionally 
been exterior to it, e.g., sub-disciplines of linguistics that deal with the distinctions and 
similarities between the forms and functions of various languages. This process creates 
ruptures, tensions, and contradictions within the field. Of course, composition has always 
occupied a site of disciplinary intersection (linguistics, education, sociology, etc.), and its 
explanatory power and motivational energy has generally been enhanced by this 
hybridization, this generative mongrelization. Just as a rogue chemist experiments by 
mixing substances, creating useful and provocative solutions and explosions, composition 
has thrived in its diverse spontaneity. But along with this spirited clashing and mashing 
of disparate knowledge domains comes a unique set of problems—problems that hound 
any academic field, but which may be particularly evident within composition. 
Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish is interested primarily in prisons and 
penal systems, but an analogy can be drawn between those systems and composition’s 
importation of other specialized academic fields: “Disciplinary power,” he writes, 
“manifests its potency, essentially, by arranging objects, the examination is, as it were, is 
a ceremony of this objectification.” Replace “examination” with “journal article” or 
“dissertation chapter,” and the power and limitations of composition studies (and also 
Foucault’s argument) are laid bare. The SRTOL resolution notwithstanding, composition 
as a discipline has not, until recent years, recognized the full magnitude with which non-
standard Englishes have altered the landscape of the classroom. Scholars such as David 
Bartholomae and James Paul Gee have done much to sharpen and enrich our conceptions 
of competing discourses (and “Discourses”). They recognize that English is not a static, 
monolithic system, but a matrix of conflicting and overlapping discourses. However, 
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these sub-discourses tend to be described as atomistic, constituent parts of a larger 
whole—as if “English” is comprised of internally consistent building blocks, which, 
while interacting in complex and politically-charged relations, nonetheless retain their 
structural integrity. Of course, one could argue (and some have) that these building 
blocks are not homogeneous within themselves, but in fact are constructed by still-
smaller building blocks; indeed, one could subdivide this as far as one wants, splitting the 
linguistic hairs into infinitely more microscopic slivers. But as Zeno’s famous paradox 
teaches us, one could divide these discourses forever and still not circumvent the problem 
of the discursive monolith: a unit can always be divided in half yet again, no matter how 
small it has become. 
In terms of Foucault, this “objectification,” this reduction of languages, dialects 
and discourses to systems, micro-systems, nano-systems and nano-nano-systems (and so 
on), is one of the ways in which composition studies arranges its object of study, its 
subject matter. And to a great extent, this is perfectly excusable and understandable, 
because without some sort of objectifying arrangement, the object of analysis unravels 
into meaningless, unintelligible noise. But at various points in time and space—e.g., the 
site at which the global meets the local in the composition classroom—the arrangement 
must be reconfigured in light of new insights and information. Foucault’s analysis of 
institutional power structures is, even by his own account, totalizing. This downplays the 
fact that in spite of their hyper-ordered structuration, prisons remain a site of destabilizing 
contention. Aside from the obvious possibility of riots, prisoners capitalize on an array of 
resources to help them resist the reduction of their bodies to inert objects, often by 
forming under-the-radar social communities (e.g., innocuous networks of friendships, or 
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gangs). So while prisons may sometimes appear to be seamless, Rolex watch-esque 
systems on the surface, the reality is more chaotic, more complicated.  
I do not wish draw too close of an analogy between composition studies research 
and the penal system, but a rough comparison can be made for the sake of clearer 
conceptualization. In its politically energized and generally well-intended effort describe 
languages in terms of totalizing systems, composition studies, by virtue of its will to 
truth—its power to name and arrange language(s)—tends to entrench itself into 
objectifying schemas that obscure fundamental language processes, as well as deep 
cultural and political forces that flow along with these processes. This is not to say that 
real-world languages practices lack a centripetal force, a drive toward unification. In 
terms of ideological reinforcement, they absolutely do. This is also not to say that 
composition studies are unusual in this respect; indeed, one could say the same thing 
about any knowledge domain. But if the implications of globalization are to be fully 
attended to, the non-systemic dimensions of language cannot be overlooked or 
downplayed.  
To be sure, scholars have recognized this tension. In “Language Difference in 
Writing: Toward a Translingual Approach,” Bruce Horner, Min-Zhan Lu, Jacqueline 
Royster, and John Trimbur challenge the assumption that “each codified set of language 
practices is appropriate only to a specific, discrete, assigned social sphere”—e.g., 
“academic writing” or AAVE—and call for an approach that recognizes the fluid nature 
of language practices (306). Furthermore, Suresh Canagarajah’s recent work emphasizes 
the innumerable local practices out of which ostensible language “systems” emerge. 
Within this context, locality is even more specified than, say, one French patios’ 
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relationship with a neighboring patois. This activity is situated at the level of 
conversation itself: syllable to syllable, word to word, phrase to phrase. Furthermore, 
each interaction is contingent on the specific (and also contingent) positions of each 
speaker within the broader, overlapping patchwork of norms and conventions that 
comprise their discourse “community” (and which are in themselves unstable). As a 
hypothetical example, an English speaker from East Nigeria may rely on a slightly 
different set of linguistic “resources” (as Canagarajah calls them) than a speaker from 
West Nigeria. But even within these East/West discourse communities, there will be still 
more variation, because discursive practices can vary from town to town, ethnic group to 
ethnic group, even from family to family and individual to individual. It is in light of this 
complexity that the “functional dynamics,” as Halliday puts it, become so crucial to any 
attempt at comprehensive analysis. Yet even this is not enough, for the tension between 
language as a dynamic function and language as a relatively static ideological system 
would remain far from resolved. 
Alastair Pennycook, in Language as a Local Practice, clarifies this contradictory 
issue. Pennycook posits that  
the idea that languages are systems of communication used by people [should be] 
challenged in favor of a view of language as a local practice whereby languages 
are a product of the deeply social and cultural activities in which people engage. 
(1)  
Pennycook works with a more nuanced definition of “locality” here, one that is 
not merely, say, “the opposite of global”; indeed, he contends that all practices, however 
global-seeming, are at root local (128). For him, locality is a kind of situatedness: 
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language emerges from human activities and interactions that occur within physical and 
symbolic spaces, and these activities and interactions both emerge from and constitute 
these spaces. Over time, these local practices accrete in a process of “sedimentation.” For 
Pennycook, what we call a discrete “language system” is better understood as a kind of 
sedimentation build-up, formed from the bottom-up. And while these accretions are 
somewhat stable, they are also, like a beach created from billions of sand grains, prone to 
erosion and change (just beach’s composition depends on “local” grains, a language’s 
composition depends on local practices, rather than the other way around.) 
The image of language as a sediment deposit cuts to the core of the translingual 
conundrum. On the one hand, language has a monolithic quality to it; if we could freeze 
time, we would see a snapshot of a language’s current configuration, the accumulated 
product of the countless local practices that add up to a tenuous whole. On the other hand, 
because time has a stubborn way of refusing to freeze, that snapshot would grow obsolete 
by the time the film is developed (so to speak), since the sediment will have shifted and 
rearranged. In terms of translingual pedagogy, this fluctuation is made all the more 
confounding by the globalized Zeitgeist in which we all now live, by the ineluctably 
increasing proportion of students that speak different versions of English than we are 
accustomed to. Barring, perhaps, a few uncontacted Amazonian tribes, all the world’s 
languages are constantly eroding and reconstituting each other in innumerable loci of 
human interaction (though of course, the same process affects even the most isolated 
communities internally.)  
Thus are the confounding dynamics of language and communication. But there is 
even more to it than that, for the translingual classroom becomes even more complicated 
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in light of questions of power and authority. For the remainder of this chapter, I will 
consider the class tensions that permeate the translingual classroom. Finally, I will argue 
that while it is impossible to fully transcend these tensions, they comprise much of the 
substance of the classroom itself, and that our pedagogies should therefore aim to inhabit 
these tensions critically, transparently and self-referentially. 
Lu and Horner, et. al. identify two pedagogical approaches that they see as 
counter-productive in the translingual classroom. First, and most obviously, teachers 
should not align themselves with the English-Only movement and seek to “eradicate 
difference in the name of achieving correctness” (306). But we should also eschew the 
more progressive and tolerant—but ultimately specious—assumption that different 
language and dialects are discrete entities that are used in discrete social spheres (e.g., 
“home,” “street” and “classroom”). While well-intended, this assumption is not only 
faulty in its conception of languages as separate monoliths, but also “overlooks the role 
that readers’ responses play in granting, or refusing to grant, recognition to particular 
language practices as appropriate to a particular sphere” (306). Instead, the authors argue, 
language(s) should be conceived as a fluctuating and interactive process(es), and as such, 
students’ writing proficiency should not be judged according to their “ability to produce 
an abstracted set of conventional forms. Rather, it will be shown by the range of practices 
they can draw on; their ability to use these creatively; and their ability to produce 
meaning out of a wide range of practices in their reading” (308). 
If this goal is just and worthwhile—and I think it is—then the challenge for 
composition studies is to develop and implement such a pedagogy. But pedagogies are no 
more easily codified than languages. In my JAC article, I argue that language is far more 
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complex than even practices like code-meshing assume, and suggest that rather than 
asking students to mesh pre-existing codes, we should allow them to “invent” their own 
codes. This, I suggested, would more fully account for language’s complexity. Individual 
students could align themselves with unique, localized codes of their own determination, 
which would also invest them with a certain degree of agency, since students could 
critique and complicate the dominant discourses that would otherwise define their 
discoursal identities from the top-down. The idea is that since codes are constructed 
anyway, we should allow students to become participatory agents in the construction 
process. 
This, however, leads to still more questions; many of them revolving around the 
ineluctable tensions intrinsic to any relationship between students, teachers and 
institutions. For one, code-inventing would not necessarily avoid the problem of rigid 
reification and the fraught politics thereof. Students might invent a new discursive 
identity for themselves, but they may merely reproduce the very sort of inequitable power 
relations we want them to avoid (and it doesn’t seem like too much of a stretch to predict 
that some students would pigeonhole themselves rather reductively). Perhaps one reason 
why the English-Only mentality persists is that some people, even some of those those 
are opposed to it, internalize the Manichean schema on which it relies. With due 
apologies to W.E.B. DuBois for altering the meaning of the term, this could be described 
as assuming a linguistic “double-consciousness” when no such dichotomy exists. 
Someone who speaks and values AAVE may nonetheless accept that the rigid AAVE-
SEV schism exists, as if they really were discrete entities.  
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The obvious response to this is that a teacher could just teach students how to 
demolish this dichotomy, this “abstracted set of conventional forms.” But embedded 
within this is yet another political pitfall, one that Lisa Delpit identified over two decades 
ago. In “The Silenced Dialogue,” Delpit conveys the frustration that African-American 
students (and teachers) often feel when dealing with liberal white teachers with the best 
of intentions.  
When you’re talking to White people they still want it to be their way,” laments 
one teacher, an African-American woman. “You can try to talk to them and give 
them examples, but they’re so headstrong, they think they know what’s best for 
everybody, for everybody’s children. (280)  
This lament, which arose from a pedagogical disagreement between the black 
teacher and a white teacher, illustrates Delpit’s broader point. The white teacher, it can be 
assumed, subscribed to a child-centered approach to teaching that emphasized students’ 
autonomy—in other words, an approach that is fully aligned with code-meshing (or code-
inventing) in that it values students’ home discourses and encourages them to express this 
marginalized discourse in the classroom. But Delpit and the black teacher have a different 
view. Delpit contends that AAVE should be celebrated and spoken when the situation 
calls for it. But she also recognizes something that, according to her, many African-
Americans feel but far fewer whites are aware of: Some African-Americans simply do 
not want the classroom to be an imagined multicultural utopia, a Kumbaya-esque 
celebration of diversity and difference. Rather, they want to “ensure that the school 
provides their children with discourse patterns, interactional styles, and spoken and 
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written language codes that will allow them success in the larger society” (285). They 
want their children to learn SEV.  
Homi Bhabha has noted how the politically progressive desire for “tolerance,” a 
desire to defy, transcend, or elide racial, cultural, or linguistic inequity, can sometimes 
result in images of the sort of happy, let’s-all-join-in-a-song-of-Kumbaya drum circle 
mentioned above—or, as Sneja Gunew calls it, a “fokloric spectacle” that tends to 
homogenize—and, in effect, de-politicize— cultural diversity (112). Difference without 
divisive belligerence is an ideal worth aspiring to, but Delpit is under no illusion that 
we’ve even come close to achieving it. It may be true that all languages are arbitrary and 
internally logical, and no language is intrinsically superior to any other. But as Delpit 
recognizes, not everyone in the world feels that way. Namely, members of the “culture of 
power” (i.e., middle class, SEV-speaking whites) often frown upon AAVE speakers, 
seeing them as less intelligent and/or illiterate in the “right” way to speak and write. So as 
Delpit sees it, AAVE should be valued, but writing pedagogy should be firmly directive 
in steering students toward SEV fluency. As she puts it:  
I prefer to be honest with my students. Tell them that their language and cultural 
style is unique and wonderful but that there is also a power game being played, 
and if they want to be in on that game then there are games that they too must 
play. (292)  
While Delpit spoke of AAVE speakers, her analysis can be extrapolated to Indian 
English speakers, Southern English speakers, Nigerian English speakers, and speakers of 
any other marginalized discourse. This highlights the fact that there are two competing 
definitions of agency and empowerment regarding linguistic difference. One view 
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emphasizes the integration of marginal languages into/within the culture of power; the 
other view also validates marginal languages, but maintains their separation from the 
culture of power. Admittedly, this dichotomy is simplistic in a number of ways. For one, 
languages are already somewhat integrated, and can never be fully separated (though the 
tension between the perspectives still exists). I would also speculate that many teachers 
are, like me, aligned with both views simultaneously. I don’t want my students to be 
judged negatively by a job interviewer, so I’ll therefore do whatever I can to help them 
gain fluency in SEV. But at the same time, I see much value in fighting to transform 
inequitable language “hierarchies” into more egalitarian language “differences.” But it’s 
a difficult and uncomfortable juggling act. Each goal can only be prioritized at the 
expense of the other, so one feels a bit like an English-speaking parent who wants to 
teach his toddler Spanish: Every time he chooses a language to speak, an opportunity for 
the toddler to practice the other language vanishes. So the hard-to-answer question is: 
which definition of agency should be foregrounded under a given set of circumstances? 
Who gets to decide? And how do we decide? 
It is important to stress here that for many scholars, allowing AAVE in the 
composition classroom and aiming for students’ fluency in SEV are not mutually 
exclusive practices. As discussed earlier, Canagarajah contends that, since code-meshing 
is already integral to how people use and learn languages, code-meshing practices will 
help, not hinder, SEV literacy. But this does not, in itself, dissolve or resolve the tension. 
Code-meshing is a relatively new concept, so there is no expert consensus regarding the 
most effective method (or methods) one could use to apply it to the first-year composition 
classroom—if, that is, it really is more effective than Delpit’s skills-oriented pedagogy, 
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which is debatable. And even if we did perform an “expert assessment” on these practices 
and tried to evaluate their efficacy, we would once more be positioning ourselves as 
Foucault’s name-designators, as excluders of alternative possibilities. This naming is 
inevitable and necessary, for it is difficult to teach without assessing one’s practices. But 
it is also a necessity with which we should be wary of growing too comfortable with, lest 
we overlook the fluctuating complexity of language and its relationship with power, 
culture, race, and economic status. 
Indeed, when it comes to competing “standard” and “non-standard” dialects and 
discourses, language functions as a veil over deeper plays of cultural and economic 
power, a sublimation of red-in-tooth class competition into syntax, grammar, style, and 
diction. In describing the petite bourgeoisie’s “anxious quest for authorities” (331), their 
relentless pursuit of markers of (high) culture that reflect and reinforce a class status 
feared to be tenuous, Bourdieu identifies the connection between “certified” cultural 
products (“classics and prize-winners”) and linguistic correctness (331). The 
disagreements between Delpit and celebrators of alternative discourses in the classroom 
may be nominally language-based, but they stem in large part from this kind of class 
anxiety: a desire for a validation of who one already is—e.g., a working class AAVE 
speaker—lying in uneasy tension with an aspiration to appropriate a habitus of utmost 
“class” and distinction, e.g., an upper-middle class bon vivant with “cultured” tastes and 
impeccable grammar. 
When we speak of setting writing “standards,” this is the struggle that is 
ultimately at stake. Horner, et al. argue that we should judge students’ writing in 
accordance with “the range of practices they can draw on; their ability to use these 
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creatively; and their ability to produce meaning out of a wide range of practices in their 
reading” (308). Furthermore, the authors respond to the question of whether there are any 
standards in the translingual classroom by saying that yes, of course there are standards, 
but we also “need to recognize the historicity and variability of standards, which change 
over time, vary across genres, disciplines, and cultures, and are always subject to 
negotiation (and hence, change)” (311). It is undoubtedly true that standards are non-
universal and in a constant state of fluctuation, and we should certainly consider this 
when evaluating student writing. I would also agree that the ability to draw on a broad 
range of practices creatively is a laudable and useful skill. But the importance of a 
person’s awareness of the non-universality of standards may sometimes seem dwarfed by 
that person’s desire for a higher class, even if the attainment of that class requires 
conformity to arbitrary—and even unjust—language standards. For Delpit, this is why a 
progressive translingual pedagogy is at great risk of overemphasizing the “variability of 
standards” at the expense of that persistently dominant standard, SEV—and, by 
extension, the cozy class status that attends it. Lu and Horner, et al. argue that fluency in 
a particular language is not required for most professions, and that the ability to work 
across differences is more important (312). There is much truth in the assertion, 
particularly in light of the increasingly globalized and multilingual world. But Delpit’s 
point still stands: SEV fluency is of utmost importance in the eyes of culture at large, and 
functions as both a marker of and gateway into the middle class. If it weren’t, the 
English-Only movement would not exist, and we would hear a lot more AAVE speakers 
in the lobby before a pricey-ticketed performance of The Well-Tempered Clavier. This is 
certainly not to say that Horner, et. al are “wrong;” on the contrary, they are absolutely 
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correct. The trouble is that Delpit is also correct, and that we must dwell within this 
dilemma no matter how we choose to teach composition in a multilingual classroom. 
This is not the only tension that emerges when current scholarship on translingual 
pedagogy is read in light of Delpit’s decades-old articles. And some of these tensions are 
particularly noteworthy for a white male teacher such as myself, who grew up in a 
suburban neighborhood where the only non-SEV speakers in sight were, as far as I could 
tell, the men who mowed the lawns. In “The Silenced Dialogue,” Delpit points out that 
“those with power are frequently least aware of—or at least willing to acknowledge—its 
existence. Those with less power are often the most aware of its existence” (5). This is a 
pivotal insight that adds yet another layer of difficulty to the question of what “agency” 
means in the translingual classroom, because virtually all first-year composition teachers 
are aligned with the culture of power to some extent or another. The academy’s stated 
pursuit of diversity notwithstanding, most composition teachers are white, middle class 
SEV-speakers, and many non-white teachers also come from middle class backgrounds 
where SEV fluency is the norm. Furthermore, if a foreign-born teacher’s second (or third, 
or fourth) language is English, or if she grew up in poor inner-city environment, that 
teacher may have a deeper understanding of marginalized students’ struggles, but she still 
represents the academy’s institutional authority, and is presumably fluent in SEV, too.  
Delpit submits that in light of this political asymmetry, teachers should employ “a 
very special kind of listening,” one where we “put our beliefs on hold [and] cease to exist 
for a moment” in an attempt to critique the ways in which our ideology blinds us and 
causes us to be oblivious perpetrators of pedagogical injustice. (297). The notion that the 
culture of power’s ambassadors are not “listening to,” or not “hearing,” the voices of 
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those who do not represent the dominant race or discourse has emerged in a number of 
forms over the years, and has shaped composition scholarship in a number of ways. But 
what we should do, pedagogically, after our ears are perked remains open to dispute. In 
“When the First Voice You Hear is Not Your Own,” Jacqueline Royster also argues that 
the African-American community’s voice has too often been drowned out of the debate—
and ostracized from the “cultured” class. But there are key differences between Royster 
and Delpit’s pedagogical models. Namely, Delpit argues that SEV should be placed at the 
center of the classroom, while Royster—who coauthored the Lu and Horner, et al. article 
discussed earlier—seems somewhat more aligned with the position that marginalized 
discourses can take an active and constructive role in the classroom. In a way, it’s 
somewhat imprudent to compare what Delpit’s wrote during the 1980s to what Royster 
wrote in 1996 and 2011; after all, perspectives evolve over time, and while Delpit has not 
publicly addressed the topic of code-meshing, it is entirely possible that she might have 
revised her earlier views and decided that non-standard discourses should be used in the 
classroom after all. But even if she were to realign herself, the questions she originally 
raised would not disappear. On the contrary, they would loom as large as ever. 
To understand why, consider once again “code-inventing,” the model I 
provisionally proposed in JAC. To recapitulate, I argued earlier that code-inventing may 
invest disenfranchised students with a certain type of agency, in that their code achieves a 
level of validation in the composition classroom. This student empowerment hinges on a 
particular definition of agency, which stands in uneasy tension with an alternative 
definition of agency that, as I see it, is equally valid and important. But regardless of 
which kind of agency we decide to emphasize most in the translingual classroom, the 
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teaching will not be easy. The composition classroom teems with clashing and 
interweaving plays of power, race, language, and ideology, and the fuller our awareness 
of the classroom’s complexity becomes, the more perplexing and pitfall-pocked it 
appears. 
“[White people think they know] what’s best for everybody, for everybody’s 
children” (Delpit, 208). As a white teacher who has suggested that code-inventing might 
be a good way to address the translingual classroom, this statement gives me pause. A 
code-inventing classroom, at least as I have described it, does not focus primarily on SEV 
fluency (though SEV fluency is not incompatible with it). Rather, it focuses on the 
processes and politics of language construction and deconstruction, and aims to help 
students understand how they, too, play a role in this process. This, as I see it, is a 
valuable lesson. But is this what all students want—and need—out of a composition 
course? If an inner-city African-American student who speaks AAVE with brilliance and 
flair has only a tenuous grasp on the formal conventions of the 3.5 essay, how useful is it 
for her to learn that SEV is arbitrary and ideological, and that there are rhetorically-
effective ways for her to blend her invented “home” discourse with SEV? If a Chinese 
engineering student wants only to study the conventions of SEV, is code-inventing the 
best pedagogy for him? I do think that code-commingling has inherent value, but then 
again, I’m also a white male with SEV fluency. What if a minority student disagrees with 
me, and just wants me to teach her grammar rules all day, so that she can begin to 
appropriate the same habitus that I inhabit? The teacher quoted by Delpit seems to 
disagree with me, and she surely took a composition course or two in college. Who am I 
to presume that I know what’s best for them? And is this presumption not merely the 
	  	  	   157	  
imposition of my own version of progressivist ideology onto my students, which is pretty 
much the opposite of student empowerment? 
Of course, as James Berlin spent much of his career emphasizing, it is wishful 
thinking—indeed, an outright fantasy—to presume that we can avoid steering students 
toward our own ideology to some extent. Even if we held back as much as we could, and 
allowed students’ ideologies to blossom and tussle in whatever way they chose, our 
ideology would still dominate. In such a case, our dominant ideology would simply be 
supposition that students’ ideologies should blossom and tussle in whatever way they 
choose. The only way to avoid entangling your ideology in the classroom is to not teach 
at all, and that’s not an attractive option. Furthermore, ideological difference is not 
simply a relativistic free-for-all. Some ideological assumptions are simply more valid 
than others. An ideology aligned with the English-Only movement is, I would submit, 
inconsistent with the facts of language, because it confuses ideology with language 
structure, and falsely assumes that the possibility for a homogeneous “standard” exists. 
As teachers, we have an ethical duty to dispel bigoted views, especially when they’re 
rooted in delusional assumptions about reality. Truth is truth, and if we know a truth 
about language that a student does not, we must share this knowledge. For this reason, if 
a teacher tells a white male English-Only advocate that his views are at odds with 
linguistic reality, I do not consider it to be an imposition of the teacher’s ideology onto 
the student. Rather, the teacher is communicating a truth to the student, whether or not 
the student chooses to accept that truth. If a student asserts that the world is flat, we 
cannot accept that as “just another perspective.” 
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But in many cases, it is not at all clear whether the facts are aligned with a 
particular perspective. Is Delpit wrong in her assertion that we do students a disservice by 
telling them that the classroom is no place for AAVE (and presumably other non-SEV 
dialects)? Are Lu and Horner wrong for asserting that there is a place for that in the 
classroom? I feel deeply uncomfortable about saying that either view is wrong. I am also 
rather uncomfortable about asserting that they’re both correct and grappling with this 
contradiction. But the latter, I would argue, is a discomfort that I must embrace. The 
translingual classroom is a puzzling space. Therefore, puzzlement—a kind of critical 
puzzlement—must be an integral feature of our pedagogical temperament. I will conclude 
this chapter by reflecting on how we might work, and teach, productively with(in) this 
everlasting disorientation. 
Considering that languages, to the limited extent to which they are isolatable 
entities, blend and transmute as quickly as we can assign a name to them, at once solid 
forms and mixing liquids; considering that an attempt to map the translingual “meshings” 
within any utterance is akin to the project of Borges’ cartographers, a bottomless layering 
of overlapping patterns; and considering that, if part of translingual pedagogy’s goal is to 
somehow strengthen our students’ agency without inadvertently squelching it in the act of 
helping them, I am sometimes tempted to put a spin on an old adage: teacher plans, 
language laughs. Formulating a prescription is like trying to catch a puff of smoke in a 
net: you might trap a few particles momentarily, but their motion is so turbulent and so 
reactant to your own motion that they will have escaped and gone elsewhere before you 
can say “code-switch.” But we must, and will, keep swinging the net. What else are we to 
do? I will readily admit that I don’t know of any way to catch the smoke; I don’t even 
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know that it should be caught. But I would submit that, even if we are a long ways off 
(maybe even an infinite ways off) from addressing all of the contradictions that constitute 
our increasingly multilingual classrooms, there are nonetheless some methods of 
addressing them that are better than others. We may not always know what to do, but we 
can approach the issues in a way that reflects and embodies their inherent difficulty. 
This means moving towards a flexible, open-ended, and transparent pedagogical 
disposition in the translingual classroom, a disposition that is as fluctuating and 
unpredictable as language itself. In other words, a pedagogy should be more than 
discussions and dissections of particular dialects of discourses. Rather, our teaching 
should mirror the processes by which languages change, cohere, compete, and dissolve. 
The lesson to students shouldn’t be simply that discourse community X oppresses 
discourse community Y (though that topic will, and should, arise). The lesson should be 
that the lesson itself embodies the struggle, enacts it as it played out and portrayed by its 
participants. Again, this is not to say that we shouldn’t dissuade a white male student 
from becoming an English-only advocate—far from it. I oppose English-Only movement, 
and I will not pretend to adhere to a relativistic view of language that sees the English-
Only and translingual perspectives as equally valid. To invoke a cliche, we may be 
entitled to our own opinions, but not our own facts, and as I see it, the English-only 
position is at odds with the facts. But if and when the tension arises, we should do more 
than state our disagreement with English-Only; we should also discuss how this 
disagreement illustrates the very linguistic, political, racial, and cultural struggles that is 
the topic of discussion. 
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“This is an excellent example of what we’ve been talking about,” we could say to 
the student. “You’re pushing for one view of language, and I’m pushing for the other. 
You say that America should adopt English as its official language; I’m saying that that’s 
a bad idea, one rooted in inaccurate assumptions about language. We are just one teacher 
and one student, so the struggle will not be resolved in this exchange. It is happening 
everywhere, all the time. And this is how it’s happening. This conversation is the struggle 
embodied.” By doing this, we can assert our position on multilingualism and explain why 
it best reflects linguistic reality, while at the same time pointing out that the core of the 
lesson is the fact of the collision of positions in itself, and the competing assumptions and 
representations that are the dynamics and process of that collusion. One could also 
discuss these processes during a lesson on SEV conventions, and consider how they lead 
to the necessity of teaching those conventions. 
This kind of dispositional and methodological open-endedness would also be well 
served by actively complicating the binaries that inevitably shape translingual 
scholarship. It is clear, for instance, that however productively the idea of code-meshing 
complicates our understanding of language practice, the concept relies on overly-simple 
categories, if only because all linguistic categories are overly simple. Even Canagarajah, 
who is extremely cognizant of language’s complexity, still uses monolithic terms like 
“Sri Lankan English.” I use even more simplistic terms in this very chapter. Considering 
this, it seems to me that the out-of-vogue idea of code-switching, however limited in its 
descriptive powers, might be worth discussing with students in a serious, non-dismissive 
way. Why? Because language is inherently contradictory: an assemblage of countless 
local practices that add into provisional norms, which add up to tentative conventions, 
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which add up to shifting dialects, which add up to entire languages that are really just a 
sprawling amalgamation of local practices, but which we still sometimes refer to as 
singular entities because we have to simplify things if we are to speak of language at all. 
That’s the whole point of language in the first place: to simplify the world, rendering it 
more comprehensible. Looking at it this way, the idea of “switching,” becomes a useful 
explanatory tool in our toolbox, among many other tools.  
An illustration: if I’m speaking to my grandmother, I’ll adopt a different code 
than I would if I were speaking to my son, or a student, or an old college friend I run into 
at a tavern. Similarly, a student that speaks AAVE at home likely deploys, or aims to 
deploy, something more like SEV in his composition classroom. To call these codes 
wholly separate entities would be a fallacy, for they intermingle with each other. So one 
could argue, correctly, that this isn’t really “switching,” because all codes are already 
meshed. But at the same time, the codes we mesh are meshed within themselves—and 
presumably, the codes within the codes are meshed as well, and so on, ad infinitum. 
There is simply no way to speak of this phenomenon in a non-reductive way. At some 
point, we have to arbitrarily pick a linguistic tendency and call it a “code.” And the 
tendency we choose will (or should) depend on our needs at that particular moment. If I 
speak to a student and then go home and talk to my wife, I’m not truly “switching,” but 
there is also a very real sense in which I am communicating within two distinct spatial 
and discursive environments. If, as Wallace Stevens’ famous poem suggests, there are 13 
ways of looking at a blackbird, then there are 13,000 (or more) ways of looking at a 
language. “Switching” from SEV to AAVE is just one of them, and however simplistic it 
is, it’s a useful conceptual shortcut that helps us describe reality provisionally. 
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Looking at it this way, code-switching, like code-meshing, has uses as well as 
limitations. It is valuable in the same way as that speciously monolithic term, 
“English”—a label that we all know is misleading, but which is also a useful way to 
cognitively map reality. If every translingual pedagogy scholar tried to fully describe the 
complexity of the English language (or the AAVE dialect, or whatever) whenever they 
invoked it, they wouldn’t get much else done, because they’d write hundreds of 
definitional pages and still not be able to fully explain what “English” is (or, more 
accurately, what all those “Englishes” are). Language is also sediment, and sediment is 
also language. Just as a code-switch is really a code-mesh, a code-mesh is also a code-
switch, depending on one’s perspective at a particular moment. If we discuss and debate 
these contradictions with students, we can help them can gain a stronger critical 
awareness of the choices they make when they frame and define language(s). And a 
debate that has animated the field of composition (“to switch or to mesh?”) will be 
dramatized in the classroom itself--a good lesson, perhaps, on the subject of “critical 
conversations” and how they work. 
What are we doing when we speak of a language? How do we speak of it? Why 
do we speak of it in this way or that way? I, for one, am not sure. There is no magic 
machete that can tame the jungle of contradictions within the translingual classroom—
i.e., within every classroom. I hope I am wrong about this, and maybe I am; maybe 
someday, someone much smarter than myself will forge such a powerful weapon. But 
until then, we need to find a way to dwell within this jungle in a way that respects and 
reflects its vegetative density. Composition scholars are making great strides by 
developing a more nuanced understanding of how linguistic difference animates the 
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classroom, and our understanding grows more sophisticated—or well-tempered—with 
each new Canagarajah article. But we still have long way to go. Languages are hard to 
describe theoretically, and grappling with the political tensions associated with 
language(s) in the classroom just as hard, or harder. But this difficulty should be 
inhabited, not resisted. And to the extent that we oversimplify—and we will all 
oversimplify—we should place this simplification, and processes of politics thereof, at 
the center of our pedagogies. The poet John Keats defined his famous term, negative 
capability, as “when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, 
without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.” I will diverge from Keats in saying 
that we should always reach after fact and reason, at least when it comes to the 
translingual classroom. But we should also embrace the classroom’s mysteries and 
doubts. If we don’t, we risk reaching for false certainties. 
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CONCLUSION 
Social Constructivist Approach  
The facts of material existence vis-a-vis linguistic representation continue to 
trouble not only the classroom, but culture in general. For one, with income inequality 
having ballooned since dawn of the Reagan era, the balance of power between the 
enfranchised and disenfranchised has never been greater. This has only deepened the 
plight of those whose marginalized existence—the existence that social-constructivist 
resistance intends to improve—prevents them from acquiring agency (including the kind 
of linguistic agency described by social-constructivism, because access to ever-more-
expensive college courses grows increasingly elusive). Furthermore, not only is it 
difficult for even progressive people to understand the struggles of the disenfranchised—
it is impossible to truly “step outside” one’s material existence (be it race, class, gender, 
or whatever) and gain the full perspective of another’s—there are forces at work that 
actively strive to disregard these struggles (e.g., right-wing politicians). Even if language 
can reshape reality to some extent—and, as I hope to have shown, it is important to 
emphasize that this is only to an extent—not everyone who wields words does so in a 
progressive fashion (e.g., when Paul Ryan blames the plight of the poor squarely on those 
who work most to help them, on the so-called “hammock” that leads to laziness and 
lethargy). In sum, the problems that arise from representation’s impact (or lack thereof) 
on material existence are ongoing and widespread. 
Needless to say, the field of rhetoric and composition is troubled by these 
problems, too. As noted above, no one can fully escape their material existence-
conditioned subjectivities, and despite progressive English departments’ attempts to 
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promote diversity, many graduate students, professors, and instructors come from middle 
class (or higher) backgrounds (and they’re also still often white, heterosexual, etc.). Even 
the most impassioned and progressive among them are limited in their abilities to 
understand the struggles of their marginalized students. And to the extent that they can 
understand, and can use this understanding to nurture a progressive classroom that invites 
students to challenge and reshape their identities—and realities—for the better, words are 
nonetheless limited in their ability to meaningfully do so, as this chapter hopes to have 
shown.  
The complexity of these non-discursive factors poses problems as well, and 
makes it much more difficult for the first-year composition classroom to grapple with 
them. For one, the world is changing fast for the disenfranchised. From the increased 
acceptance of gay marriage, to the recent legal challenges to affirmative action, to the 
reduced funding of some social welfare programs, the rules keep changing, and they are 
hard for anyone to keep up with. Moreover, the diverse plights of the marginalized make 
it difficult for teachers to help out. Students come from an array of backgrounds, so while 
it may be tempting to treat them as a homogeneous lot—and they are homogeneous to the 
extent that they are all first-year composition students in the same classroom—doing so 
ignores the complexity of their struggles. And this raises another question for the social-
constructivist classroom: Are we to help students empower themselves individually, as a 
group, or both? The answer to this, as Berlin might say, would be to develop a 
democratic classroom in which students, through dialogue, achieve mutual understanding 
and empowerment. But this raises yet another question: What do we do with students 
who are not on board with such a classroom—students from deeply conservative 
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backgrounds, for instance? Is it not undemocratic to impose our ideologies upon them? 
As the chapter notes, Byron Hawk has asked this question, too. 
Procedural Approach 
It is inevitable to gravitate toward “best-laid plans” in the first-year composition 
classroom. With ever-increasing class sizes, ever-increasing diversity and—
concomitantly—ever-decreasing time, instructors want to find a simple, universal way to 
approach teaching. And as this chapter hopes to have shown, all pedagogies—even those 
that aim to be as non-procedural as possible—will involve some degree of planning, even 
if those plans may be changed. Nevertheless, we should welcome the prospect of events 
both large and small in the classroom. 
The implications for a Badiouian reading of kairos in the classroom are 
significant. For one, as Kinneavy contends, kairos is involved with real-world goings-on 
and controversies; this makes the stakes higher, and therefore makes possible more 
agency and empowerment for writers (although of course, writing solely for a teacher is 
technically real-world writing, too). Second, it opens the door for empowerment via 
personal writing. 
As stated in the chapter, Badiou reserves event status for only the most 
momentous of occasions. But first-year composition students encounter what may be 
seen as “mini-events” routinely—and this provides an opening for them to restructure 
their identities through writing. If they maintain, to borrow Marilyn Cooper’s term, an 
openness to possibilities, they can identify events and “pledge fidelity” to them—even if 
they are small. 
Process Approach 
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The idea of a teacherless classroom may make many of us uncomfortable; after 
all, if the classroom were teacherless, we’d all be out of our jobs. But the idea of a 
classroom as staunchly teacherless as Jacotot’s or Elbow’s can spark a useful 
conversation about how power exercises itself in the classroom, and about what the role 
of the teacher should be. 
The Elbowian/Jacototian model’s goal is to give students increased control of the 
classroom’s proverbial steering wheel, thereby giving them more agency and 
empowerment. Also, crucially, it places students’ perceptions and personal experiences at 
the center of the inquiry process. This is important, not only because it provides them 
with a sense of agency, but also because it allows them to get a sense of what we 
academics do as scholars when we explore our own experiences vis-a-vis academic 
discourse. 
The teacherless classroom, however, inevitably creates tensions involving 
questions of power. One the one hand, there are institutional pressures, not the least of 
which is the requirement that the teacher grade the essays—and grading, of course, places 
much power in the hands of the teacher. (These institutional pressures are difficult to deal 
with. To an extent, there’s only so much one can do about them other than just live with 
them, whether one likes it or not. This is not to say, however, that we should give up 
completely on resisting them; a student essay may not be able subvert the dominant 
institutional paradigm, but it can still contest it if the teacher encourages such 
contestation, and invites the student to position themselves against the academy in an 
empowering way.) And on the other hand, there are aspects of the teacher-student 
relationship that shift the balance of power towards the teacher. For instance, even if 
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Rancière/Jacotot are correct that a schoolmaster can be ignorant and still be successful, 
there are things like the wisdom that comes naturally with the teacher being older (in 
most cases) than the students. 
Translingual Approach 
Needless to say, the structure and function of language, and how it plays out in 
culture, is highly complicated. It is a fluid, dynamic process of sedimentation that resists 
restrictive labels. Yet, at the same time, labels are assigned to it—labels that are often 
fraught with ideological (and, as in the case of the English-only movement, sometimes 
oppressive) underpinnings. This complexity brings both stubborn problems and 
promising opportunities to the composition classroom. 
On the one hand, marginalized students may have difficulty grappling with the 
linguistic and political obstacles that confront them. But on the other hand, as we have 
seen, language is in a constant state of flux—and in a constant state of modification, 
contingent on the countless micro-interactions that occur everywhere, all the time, in and 
out of the classroom. And if language is being continually reshaped, that opens a door for 
students to participate in this reshaping, to manipulate codes in ways that empower them. 
Traditionally, teachers are the gatekeepers of “correctness.” However, if students 
are able to manipulate—or even invent—codes in ways that destabilize and interrogate 
dominant notions of what constitutes correctness, then the students are, in a very real 
sense, reconstructing the “gate” itself. This challenges not only “standard” notions of 
correctness, but the teachers—and institutions—that enforce those standards. This is a 
challenge that teachers should invite, so as to further empower and validate students and 
their writing vis-a-vis the academy. 
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This repositioning of the teacher in relation to students is echoed in the other 
chapters. For instance, in the process chapter, Rancière’s radically teacherless classroom, 
when considered in light of Elbow’s somewhat more moderately teacherless classroom, 
does much to destabilize the classroom’s balances of power, placing students in front of 
the steering wheel when it comes to their learning and writing. In the procedural chapter, 
the idea of events—ruptures in the known order of things that invite restructurings of said 
order—open up the possibility for student empowerment, because the event in question 
could involve a fracturing of the traditional student-teacher relationship, thereby allowing 
both the teacher and her students to reconsider the classroom's balance of power; indeed, 
the teacher could use her perceived authority to initiate a class-wide “pledge of fidelity” 
to such an event. And the chapter on social-constructivist pedagogy—despite its often-
gloomy outlook with regard to the possibility of a first-year composition student 
acquiring agency through English 101 essays—identifies a topic of discussion for a 
composition classroom, i.e., the difficulty in establishing a truly liberatory classroom. 
After all, even if there are many obstacles that confront the progressive, student-centered 
classroom, the first step toward surmounting them is identifying them—which that 
chapter attempts to do, at least in part. In sum, there are numerous ways in which 
teachers—and their students—can interrogate power asymmetries, and this project aims 
to forward them in a way that highlights their real-world potential.  
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